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A n d r e w  A r a t ó
Election, Coalition and 
Constitution in Hungary
The structure of public law produced by the Hungarian change of system has once again proved adequate for providing a framework for democratic elec­
tions, the emergence of a viable system of parties and for government forma­
tion. Yet serious shortcomings in this structure were revealed as well by the 
election results, by the difficulties of forming a coalition (one that did not 
have to be even formed by classical standards at least) and by the new dilem­
mas of constitution-making faced by the new government. All these problems 
are rooted in two features of the existing institutional arrangements: a 1989 
electoral rule that has an uncommonly large dimension of disproportionality 
despite (or because of!) its mixed structure and a narrowly parliamentarist 
constitutional revision rule inherited from the old regime. The way these two 
rules interrelate has turned out to be especially burdensome for the political 
system.
The mixed electoral rule involves competition for 386 seats that divide as 
follows: 1. 176 individual seats in two round (first: majority, second: plurality) 
single district elections 2. up to 152 seats in proportion to votes in 20 regional 
constituencies, and 3. at least 58 seats in a national compensational list. Parties 
can qualify for the regional and national lists if they attain at least 5 per cent of 
the vote for all the regional lists taken together ("popular vote"). There are thus 
178 seats distributed in individual contests as against 210 given to parties ac-
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cording to proportional voting and 
compensation. Theoretically therefore 
the level of disproportionality of this 
system should be about halfway be­
tween a pure proportional and a first 
past the post, one round, single dis­
trict Westminster system. Actually, as 
Arend Lijphart noticed for the 1990 
elections, the system is much closer 
to a Westminster system in its results,
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actually involving in 1990 greater disproportionality than all British elections be­
tween 1974 and 1987.1
In 1990 the winning MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) gained 42.5 per 
cent of the seats on the bases of 24.7 per cent of the popular vote. This time the 
MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) received 54 per cent of the seats for 33 per 
cent of the vote. Thus the disproportionality of the winner's result increased 
somewhat with the higher popular vote. All other parties, even the second place 
SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) received a lower percentage of seats (18 per 
cent) this time than their popular vote (20 per cent), as against the last time 
when the second place SZDSZ also received a 2.5 per cent "bonus". In both elec­
tions the overall disproportionality is astonishingly the same: there was a 20 per 
cent overall bonus each time to the strongest parties.
Since the authors of the electoral compromise at the Round Table assumed, 
however mistakenly, that they were following the German system with only 
minor modifications, such a level of disproportionality should have surprised 
them even in 1990. At that time one was tempted to ascribe part of the result at 
least to the effect of the pull to the first round leader in the second round. 
Indeed the MDF led in many fewer individual contests after the first round than 
in the end. But in 1994 the MSZP actually lost its first round lead in 13 or so 
contests. Thus the index of disproportionality seems to have another possible 
cause. It has been widely noticed that the Socialist Party did very little cam­
paigning on behalf of its individual candidates, many of whom were totally un­
known and yet they defeated popular politicians and leaders of the other par­
ties, including even those of the SZDSZ, which enjoyed significant support 
among the voters for the socialists. Thus in the presence of the list vote in the 
first round, voters were inclined to treat their vote for individual candidates as 
yet another party vote. But party voting in the first round of the individual 
races had the power, beyond a certain percentage point of support (probably 
around 30 per cent) to turn a mere plurality into an overwhelming lead. This 
lead of the MSZP in 162 out of 176 contests was only marginally effected by 
the contrary trends of the pull to the winner and, this time, fear of the winner. 
It should be noted that such a voting pattern vitiates at least one of the ratio­
nales for having individual districts at all, the supposedly personal, interactive 
relationship between the deputy and the district. Only 18 holders of individual 
seats in the old parliament were re-elected, irrespective of service and popular­
ity in local and national polls.
The real aim of course of some of the built-in disproportionality of the mixed 
system was supposed to be the enhancement of governability. The originally 4
1 ■ "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1989- 
1991", in Gy. Szoboszlai ed. Flying Blind. Emerging Democracies in East-Central Europe. Budapest: 
Hungarian Political Science Association, 1992, p.103.
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per cent, 5 per cent after 1993, threshold was to avoid fragmentation and to limit 
the number of parties. The two-round individual contests are designed to enable 
relatively few parties to form a coalition. With the constructive no-confidence 
vote in the house, established through the MDF-SZDSZ agreements of 1990, the 
electoral law was to provide for an easy to establish and difficult to replace gov­
ernment. Such an arrangement, of course, has severe liabilities when govern­
ment suffers great and not just temporary loss of support, as happened in 
Hungary after 1991. But the problem begins with the Hungarian electoral system 
itself, for this simultaneously represents, and potentially contrasts, procedurally 
legitimated political strength and actual electoral support. Unlike pure 
Westminster systems, the list vote or popular vote for parties is not only a statis­
tical but also a public law factum, officially published and used to determine 
which parties can enter parliament at all. Interestingly the second round popular 
vote, where the surviving biggest parties (usually only three in each race) are 
much stronger, has no such role and is rarely mentioned.2
But the first round popular vote is almost a referendum on the parties, and it 
is very widely known that the results of this are greatly distorted by the opera­
tion of the electoral system. It should be noted, that all polling in between elec­
tions simulates only the totals for the combined lists, the popular vote. Thus one 
ordinarily measures party support through this particular indicator, and it is em- 
barassing to begin governing with the support of only a minority that is likely to 
further measurably decrease. From day one of course, after the elections, the 
losers begin to appeal to the difference between the popular vote and the num­
ber of seats each party receives. The winners too act as if they were conscious of 
the difference. Thus the MDF created in 1990, if not a Grand Coalition with the 
liberals that would have been most popular, then at least an "overly large” coali­
tion whose three parties received together 43 per cent of the popular vote. It al­
so proceeded to make a political pact with the SZDSZ, the main opposition par­
ty, to amend the constitution. The winners in 1994, having received only 33 per 
cent, acted in an analogous fashion. From even before the second round the 
MSZP firmly indicated that even if they received an absolute majority of the 
seats, they would seek coalition with the SZDSZ, with whom, as it happened, 
they together received 53 per cent of the popular vote.3
This was not, as it turned out, only an electoral ploy. The winners of each elec-
2 ■ In fact, in 1994 the MSZP received 45 per cent, the SZDSZ 28.5 per cent of these votes 
nationally.
3 ■ Actually the MSZP, representing the left of the political spectrum, sought a coalition that would 
establish an alliance with a different ideological-political bloc, the liberal one. The MDF led coalition 
drew on a single such bloc only, that of the supposedly conservative, but in fact national Christian 
right-wing parties. I am convinced that the incredible drop in the popularity of the MDF a few 
months after the 1990 elections was linked to this narrow choice of a right wing coalition by a party 
that won the elections from the centre. The MSZP was not interested in repeating that mistake.
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tion, whatever they actually say, have shown through their actions that they are 
troubled by the presence of merely procedural legitimacy for a government that 
they may wish to form, and the potential weakness of their democratic legitima­
tion if they build a government around the minimum number of seats needed.4
The problem of legitimation is greatly exacerbated in relation to constitutional politics, an open terrain in 1994, as it was in 1990. The Hungarian rule of con­
stitutional revision allows two thirds of all of the members of parliament to 
amend the constitution. In 1990 the overly large coalition built by the MDF on 
purely ideological grounds controlled only 60 per cent of the seats in parliament. 
In the light of the large number of non-constitutional laws that, according to the 
amended constitution of 1989, had to be voted in by two third majorities of those 
present, the national Christian coalition was actually too narrow. Either to pass 
such laws or to change their constitutionally anchored two thirds status, addition­
al partners were needed; this was the main reason for the MDF making a political 
pact with the SZDSZ that involved electing Árpád Göncz President of the Republic 
with the apparent right (later contested) to participate in naming the heads of ra­
dio and television. The agreements led to the second major round of constitution­
al revisions, and along with the parties of the Round Table of 1989, the MDF- 
SZDSZ negotiators of April 1989 are the authors of the present Hungarian 
Constitution. But it should be strongly noted that these two parties, that studious­
ly avoided consulting their own political or ideological allies before making their 
agreement, together received only 46 per cent of the popular vote, which, howev­
er, gave them the necessary two thirds of the parliamentary seats for amending 
the constitution. They used this power in fact to dramatically change the character 
of the regime from a parliamentary, in large part consensus democracy, to a 
Kanzlerdemokratie of the German type, involving important shifts in a majoritari- 
an direction. Not unexpectedly, though the validity of its consequences could not 
be contested, the pact was never recognized as fully legitimate by the other parlia­
mentary parties. Indeed, even the right wing of the MDF, to whom the bulk of the 
party faithful belonged, also considered the pact from the outset as the original 
sin of the Antall government, and worked ceaselessly (and in part successfully) to 
neutralize the concessions that their party was forced to make to the SZDSZ. This 
state of affairs contributed to the softness of the Hungarian constitutional settle­
ment, and was exacerbated by the (unavoidable) activism and activist claims of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Thus on the eve of the 1994 election all the 
parties recognized the need to produce a new constitution.
In this constitutional setting however the results of the first 1994 electoral round
4 ■ I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the motives for coalition building in each case were 
only those having to do with the problem of democratic legitimation, or even that the legitimation 
problems of the post-communist MSZP had to do only with the discrepancy between their officially 
measured popular support and the number of the seats they won.
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worked like a bombshell. The right wing parties, learning from their own earlier 
experience, now faced the following difficult situation. The socialists, whom they 
feared and against whom government TV carried on an incredibly negative cam­
paign, were on the verge of attaining an absolute majority in parliament. But if 
they did not succeed in this they would have to form a coalition with the SZDSZ, 
with whom they were almost certain to then have the two-thirds majority need­
ed to modify the constitution and to pass or change important two-thirds legis­
lation, like media law, electoral law and legislation on local government, requir­
ing likewise a two-thirds majority in parliament. The MSZP was leading in most 
individual contests, but in the bulk of these the SZDSZ was a strong second and 
was calling for the support of the voters of the other parties to help stop an 
overly large socialist victory. However, to the strategists and the publicists of the 
right, all the way from Iqtván Csurka to people on the margins of FIDESZ (the 
liberal Alliance of Young Democrats, which was still an electoral ally of the 
SZDSZ) the greater danger was now seen not as the 50 per cent + 1 of parlia­
mentary seats for the socialists, but rather the two thirds + 1 for the MSZP and 
the SZDSZ together. Since, they reasoned, only a crushing defeat of the SZDSZ 
could stop them from joining a coalition, the main enemy the right had to con­
centrate on was now in the liberal centre and not on the left. In their hour of 
electoral disaster, more and more of the leading right wing politicians hoped for 
a purely socialist government and even recommended voting socialist where a 
right wing candidate was weak.5
Their secret hope was of course that a weak, and easy to oppose, one party 
socialist government with built-in legitimation problems would be formed. But 
they appealed, in my view not altogether hypocritically, to a fear of "constitu­
tional dictatorship", that implied variously that an MSZP-SZDSZ coalition with a 
two-thirds majority in the house would be able to govern as it pleased, would be 
able to modify the constitution in a dictatorial manner, or even that it would use 
its constitutional powers to abrogate a democratic constitution and establish 
some kind of quasi-authoritarian rule.
In the end, both the fears of the SZDSZ concerning an absolute majority for the 
socialists, and the fears of the right concerning the formation of a coalition hold­
ing a greater than two thirds share of the house materialized. The MSZP faced the
5 ■ We cannot assess the degree of success of this ploy. Contrary to preelection surveys showing 
the SZDSZ to be more people's second choice than the MSZP, it seems that, among voters who 
switched to either of these two parties, the MSZP enjoyed a slight advantage. This could have been 
the effect simply of the greater pull of the bigger winner than that of the smaller winner. In my view, 
however, it is possible that the effect of the right wing anti-SZDSZ campaign was to inhibit switching 
from all parties to the SZDSZ to some extent. This may have been especially true of those socialist 
voters who voted for the party that was perceived as furthest from the ruling coalition, who were 
strongly for a socialist liberal coalition and who first showed some inclination to switch to the 
SZDSZ to guarantee such a result.
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choice of having a government that was too weak, and having one that was too 
strong. Not surprisingly they chose the latter. The SZDSZ, on the other hand, could 
not frustrate the overwhelming coalition expectations of the public, repeatedly 
measured by various polls, above all on the part of its own voters and the liberal 
intelligentsia. Neither party could afford to take responsibility for failure to form a 
coalition; thus one had to offer and the other had to accept negotiations. And 
when negotiations were started they were fated to succeed for the same reason.
But the negotiations could not ignore the problem of forming a parliamentary 
majority with 72 per cent of the seats and thus constituent powers. Indeed, they 
first exacerbated them. The SZDSZ especially faced an uncommonly difficult situ­
ation. In ordinary coalitions, when no single partner has the power to govern 
alone and when each partner’s participation is necessary to dispose over the nec­
essary parliamentary seats, the threat of withdrawal is usually sufficient to secure 
the interests of each party. Given the absolute majority of the MSZP, the SZDSZ 
could not be protected in this sense. To deal with this problem, the SZDSZ de­
vised, and the MSZP substantially accepted, a complicated system of guarantees 
on several levels, securing a consensus requirement of the two parties in all ma­
jor governmental decisions, appointments, as well as on legislation, protecting in 
addition the ministers and legislative proposals of each party from parliamentary 
attacks (interpellations, unfriendly amendments) by disgruntled factions and in­
dividuals of the other party. These arrangements, while fully published, were 
merely political in status without any legal machinery of enforcement andTiv 
volved only voluntary self-limitation on the part of the two coalition parties.6
Yet violations, when publicized, could be politically very costly. To avoid such 
an outcome the partners set up a Coordinating Council of the Coalition, with a 
strong consensus requirement (each party would have one vote), dealing with 
disputes over the coalitional arrangements.
If successful, the result of the system of guarantees agreed upon could be un­
usually strong cooperation between the partners, leading to a unified and effective 
government of both parties. But it could also yield an overlarge parliamentary 
force, a gigantic political machine that could reduce all opposition to insignifi­
cance. It was an open question what would remain of parliamentarianism in such 
a setting, where all major discussions would occur within the parliamentary 
groups of each coalition party, or in the various forums (governmental council, 
coalitional council, combined meeting of the parliamentary parties) where the two 
parties alone are represented. This was indeed one of the possibilities that the 
right-wing parties feared when they campaigned against the danger of "constitu­
tional dictatorship". To deal with this criticism, the coalition agreement proposed
6 BA Magyar Szocialista Párt és a Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége koalíciós megállapodása. Buda­
pest, June 24, 1994 (ms.) (Coalition Agreement between the Hungarian Socialist Party and the 
Alliance of Free Democrats). 8
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to significantly bolster the opposition. Instead of dividing parliamentary commit­
tees in proportion to parliamentary seats, the coalition parties, even before final­
izing their own agreement, undertook negotiations with the other four parliamen­
tary parties concerning representation in parliamentary committees. The result, 
giving the opposition over one third of the membership in six important commit­
tees, and parity or near parity in two others, was then incorporated in the coali­
tion agreement. That agreement, and the governmental program based on it, fur­
ther indicated the coalition's intention to seek wider consensus in relationship to 
some particularly contentious fundamental legislation, in particular the media 
law.7 This was extended when the new government offered six party consultations 
over the production of a new parliamentary House Rule, the appointments of the 
new chairmen of radio and TV, and the drafting of the media law.8
All the problems of a weak opposition are only exacerbated on the level of 
constitution-making, because the new coalition is indeed theoretically in a posi­
tion (because of the inherited revision rule) to unilaterally change the constitu­
tion, the electoral law (a "two-thirds" law), and in theory at least to permanently 
weaken the political chances of today's weak opposition. This is the second 
meaning of "constitutional dictatorship" that should not, and has not been, sim­
ply dismissed. The problem is made worse by the fact that the constitution can­
not be simply left as it is. Most obviously, the electoral law and the constitu­
tion's rule of revision are both the ultimate source of the dangers to parliamen- 
tarianism and constitutional stability, and are rules whose unilateral alteration 
is likely to give rise to the worst anxieties on the part of the opposition. Yet it re­
mains true that the disproportionality built into the electoral law and the mono­
lithic parliamentary constitutional revision rule, when taken together, potentially 
allow the constitution to be made or remade by a slim electoral majority, or 
even a minority. These two rules together can open up all future electoral win­
ners to the charge (and perhaps the temptation?) of "constitutional dictator­
ship". Thus, at the very least one of these rules, and more likely both, must be 
changed from the point of view of the requirements of constitutionalism.9
7 ■ A Magyar Köztársaság Kormányának Programja (Government Programme of the Hungarian 
Republic). 1994-1998 (draft).
8 ■ This type of consultation seemed to have succeeded in relation to the House Rule, but failed in 
the case of the appointments of the two media chairmen. In general, six party consultations involve 
the danger of being used merely to produce the appearance of consensus. But they can also provide 
opportunities for the opposition parties to make impossible offers simply to have them voted down, 
so they can cry dictatorship over and over again. In the case of failed consensus, as in the case of the 
media appointments, only public opinion can decide which of the two negative scenarios actually 
took place. The fate of the House Rule indicates that neither has to inevitably occur.
9 ■  From the point of view of constitutionalism, it may be satisfactory simply to change the 
amendment rule. But it should not be forgotten that the electoral law in itself also produced both the 
necessity for an unusually large coalition and the great difficulties in coalition building.
9
Election, Coalition and Constitution in Hungary
Moreover, the rule of revision of the constitution must be changed also in order 
to bring the period of transition in the legal sense to a close. Even László 
Sólyom, the president of the Constitutional Court, who strongly favours retain­
ing the 1989-1990 constitutional document and its further development mainly 
through constitutional review by the Court, recognizes the need to create a new 
rule of revision, in order to put a relative end to parliamentary, normal political 
constitutional tinkering. He does not recognize, however, that one sitting parlia­
ment does not have the legitimacy to stop future parliaments from constitution­
al politics merely through some tinkering of its own. The process, in other 
words, must be first formally opened up, so that it can be closed, and the clo­
sure itself would require an extraordinary process of constitution-making.
The new coalition is nevertheless not in an easy position to be able to initiate 
a new and relatively definitive phase of constitution-making. First of all, despite 
its 72 per cent majority, its electoral support of 52 per cent remains too narrow 
to establish on its own anything but a winner's constitution. Discussing the 
Polish case, Wiktor Osiatinsky is quite right to point out that the electoral in­
struments that give the winning parties a great bonus in seats can be at best jus­
tified only from the point of view of governability, but not the needs of constitu­
tion-making; since a constitution ought not be merely made by, or be the instru­
ment of, a single government, but should be as far as possible acceptable to all 
the main political forces.10
B oth the MSZP and the SZDSZ have special difficulties in sponsoring a new constitution. The legal forerunner of the MSZP imposed one constitution on 
the country, and the current socialists are nervous about that historical prece­
dent. They certainly want to avoid all appearance of sponsoring, and especially 
forcing through, yet another change of system on the legal level. But the SZDSZ 
too wishes to fight against any such appearance. Unfortunately, it was only rela­
tively late between the two electoral rounds, that its leaders did in the end pro­
duce the right answer to the charge of a constitutional dictatorship in prepara­
tion. They rightly maintained that as one of the main authors of the new legal 
order they should be seen as the guardians of its main constituents. This made it 
more difficult to call for constitution-making after the elections.
Nevertheless, even before the elections there was some consensus on the fact 
that the constitution must be at the very least redrafted in order to deal with a 
whole range of problems. The most important of these was to clarify the role of 
the president, to reduce somewhat the powers of the constitutional court and to 
redefine the line of authority of the public prosecutor.11 Finally, if the
10 ■"Poland's Constitutional Ordeal." East European Constitutional Review, Spring 1994, v.3, 
no. 2, p. 32.
11 ■ See Jogállam, 1994, No. 2 for the range of expert opinion.
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Constitutional Court was to continue building a tradition of constitutionalism in 
the strong sense through its interpretations, the democratic legitimacy of the 
document as a whole had to be shored up to avoid a recurrent conflict between 
democracy and constitutionalism. Thus, the new coalition ought not simply to 
run away from these challenges merely because it has the power to redress 
them all alone. Indeed, one important justification for building the coalition at 
all is that it has the opportunity to bring the period of constitutional transition 
to a close by passing a coherent set of laws (the constitution, the media law, the 
electoral law) that would establish the liberal and democratic character of the 
new system more securely than the legal arrangements between 1990 and 1994.
This opportunity must be used wisely if its results are to have any legitimacy 
and stability. The coalition agreement (and the slightly different governmental 
programme) in fact postulate the following important points pertaining to con­
stitutional politics:
1 ■ The parties of the coalition intend to create a new constitution, but also to 
preserve the main features of the existing public law structure.
2 ■ They wish to elect a 27 member parliamentary committee to draft the new 
document, under the Minister of Justice, giving the MSZP 10 (less than 50 per 
cent), the SZDSZ 5, and the opposition parties 10 (more than 33 per cent) of the 
seats.
3 ■ They propose a popular ratification of the new constitution by August 1995 
(government statement: second half of 1995) and
4 ■ (in the governmental statement) a wide ranging professional and public dis­
cussion as part of the process.
5 «They envision several areas for new constitutional regulation including a) 
the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence by setting up a National 
Judiciary Council exercising the present prerogatives of the Ministry of Justice 
with respect to the courts; b) the redefinition of the office of the Chief Public 
Prosecutor; and c) the reform of the structure of local government.
6 ■ They accept a slight trimming of the functions of the Constitutional Court, 
but only in accordance with its own wishes.
7 ■ They specifically recommend the adoption of a new constitutional amend­
ment rule, one that requires a second parliamentary session to ratify the amend­
ments) made by the previous one.
8 ■ Finally, outside the constitutional draft strictly speaking, they foresee a new 
electoral law, abolishing the second electoral round, keeping a mixed system but 
taking the principle of proportionality into account.
These points can be best interpreted in terms of a set of principles, that in 
turn should serve the coalition well in dealing with yet unexpected but certainly 
unavoidable difficulties in constitution-making they will have to confront. It is 
therefore worthwhile to articulate these: 1
11
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i The principle of consensus: although the coalition could make a constitu­
tion alone, it prefers to include as many of the opposition parties in the process 
as possible. It is willing to expose itself even to the risk that some of the other 
parties might use the process to denounce the coalition, to repeat their charge 
of dictatorship. However, the coalition cannot make the whole process hostage 
to the politics of one or two opposition parties.
ii The principle of the plurality of democracies: while in such an ideological­
ly divided society the coalition is not going to expose the system to the possible 
conflict of parliament and a specially elected constitutional assembly, the deci­
sion concerning the constitution will not be restricted to the parliament it will 
regulate. The coalition will thus expose, in line with the requirement of the lqw 
on referenda (1989. XVII. par.7), the new or redrafted constitution to a popular 
referendum.
iii The principle of publicity: while the coalition has the power and technical 
expertise to enact a new constitution very early, respecting the role of a full pub­
lic discussion, it establishes an adequate time frame for relevant publications, 
expert conferences and public fora.
iv The principle of the veil of ignorance: in order to avoid making the consti­
tution hostage to the discussions of the next electoral campaign, and to normal 
politics, the constitution will have to be submitted to popular ratification well 
before the next elections. Thus the whole process has to adhere to an orderly 
schedule, its conclusion must not take place either too early or too late.
v Finally, the principle of continuity: having characterized the whole 
Hungarian system change, the principle of radical continuity must now be upheld 
on both the procedural and substantive level. Concerning procedures, the existing 
rule of revision must be used once more, and only once more, to enact the new 
procedure of making the new constitution, involving perhaps the new committee 
structure, and certainly the desired structure of parliamentary voting, as well as 
popular ratification currently required only by ordinary statute. Concerning sub­
stance, the new constitution-makers are likely to go beyond a mere declaration of 
wishing to maintain the main constituents of the current public law system. If they 
are to gain the support of at least one opposition party for the new document, they 
would do well to preserve the content and even the structure of the inherited con­
stitution as far as possible. This should be possible, because while there is a need 
for a new constituent process, the document itself only needs serious redrafting 
according to the points stressed in the current professional consensus.
Of course there will be constitutional change, as the documents reveal. But 
where changes are necessary, the coalition should indeed strive for maximum 
possible consensus. This will be certainly possible for example with respect to a 
partial reduction of the powers of the Constitutional Court, which is to be done 
according to principles sponsored by the Court itself. Consensus should also be 
possible where one can smoothly return to the original principle that informed 12
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the making of a rule; a case here would be the electoral rule where the enact­
ment of a two-vote compensational 5 per cent threshold German system would 
involve sufficient continuities with the present mixed system, and yet remedy 
difficulties that represent potential dangers to all of the parties. But where con­
sensus is not possible and yet change is still highly desirable, the parties of the 
coalition would do well to adhere to principles that they defended when in op­
position, a condition inevitably more sensitive to the needs of constitutionalism 
than being parts of the new and rather overwhelming parliamentary majority. 
Such might be the case in relationship to the media law, the reform of the judi­
cial system, and the reform of local governmental organization, where the new 
government wishes to abolish the powers of the Republican Commissioners es­
tablished by the previous one.
Only if these principles are more or less followed can there be a chance of a 
general agreement regarding the most fundamental point: the closing of the 
constituent process through establishing a new rule of revision that will make 
future constitutional politics more democratic, less monolithic and yet constitu­
tional change more difficult. The worst combination to be avoided would be to 
unilaterally impose a substantially new constitution along with an attempt to 
make future constitutional change next to impossible. I am convinced, however, 
that the present coalition will build on the inherited method of continuity and 
negotiation among diverse forces, rather than give in to the old European temp­
tation of claiming unlimited constituent powers. **■ 13
13
Election, Coalition and Constitution in Hungary
Z s u z s a  T a k á c s
The Perennial Lament
Az évezredes jajszó
There will be those among you who will not be able to look
at a woman again, the mere look of the wound, the smell,
if  you survive it at all, will be enough,
the need to repeat the act will forestall you,
the broken spines, the sobbing which turns
suddenly to a scream you will hear
as ifit had a will of its own.
Oh that perennial lament!
Beg to report, we have ripped off her shirt!
Beg to report, we have thrown her on the ground!
She was wailing like a broken alarm.
Beg to report we made her lie on the door we smashed down 
because she had tried to escape. Beg to report, 
we could see she was old. We saw she was ill.
We saw she was a child. Beg to report, 
we had earned the exceptional licence, 
each and every one who was there!
But the worst will be to do it again, 
to go into battle for the sake o f a woman.
To blaze and arrive at the point
and then to hear something whispering:
Let there be no witnesses! And our palm slides across 
the lips opened to cry.
Whatever you want, my love, only don't scream!
Whatever you want, only cover yourself, 
from now on please wait for me 
in a darkened room! Beg to report, 
we have thrown her on the ground and have raped her!
Beg to report I threw her on the ground and I raped her!
Translated by George Szirtes
Zsuzsa Takács
has published seven volumes of poems, including one for children, and a translation 
of the complete poetry and selected prose of St. John of the Cross. This poem 
was taken from Szarajevó, an anthology of new writing, published in Budapest in 1994.
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P é t e r  N á d a s
Blown Away
(Short story)
I n early January, when the shop reopened, only a few items were on the shelves. But there was more stuff in the large cartons that stood behind the 
counter. These were being unpacked now. Everything seemed new, clean, bright, 
fragrant. It had been snowing steadily for days. In the mirrors, on the ceiling, the 
yellow glow of the store's recessed lights seemed to clash, with all that white. A 
young woman stood on a ladder, while an older one, the sleeve of her white 
smock rolled up to her elbow, was handing her bottles of liquor. Only my eyes 
took note of the fact that this older woman was one of those who had been 
branded. Just inside the curve of her elbow, on her forearm, was her number, 
tattooed in blue ink. Actually, it began with a letter, which was followed by a 
short line, sort of a dash, then the number itself, perhaps six digits in all. 
Normally, you saw such tattoos only when men wore short-sleeved shirts and 
women were in sleeveless summer dresses. A stranger's bare arm would reach 
for the leather strap in a streetcar, grab hold, and then you'd see it. Some people 
had them removed surgically, but then the skin graft itself, the wrinkled or dis­
colored scar tissue became the distinguishing mark. The streetcar would rumble 
along, generating a pleasant breeze, and whoever noticed such an arm, if they 
noticed it, would rather stare out the open window, at streets baking in the sum­
mer heat. I know I did. Years later, the 
_______________________________  crippled and maimed war veterans al­
so began to disappear from the city, 
they must have died out. At one point, 
I don't know just when, they even 
stopped marking special seats for 
them on the streetcars. But back then 
there were still quite a lot of them 
around. Some had an arm missing, 
others a leg. They would use safety 
pins to fasten their trouser legs or 
shirt sleeves, and thus cover the place
Péter Nádas 's
Egy családregény vége 
(The End of a Family Saga) has appeared 
in nine languages. After its great success 
in Germany, Emlékiratok könyve 
(Book of Memories) will be published next 
year by Farrar, Strauss & Giroux. This short 
story, set in the late October days of 1956, 
was taken from Szarajevó, an anthology of 
new writing, published in Budapest, 1994.
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where limbs should have been; or they'd let the sleeves dangle freely over the 
stumps. Jacket sleeves were pinned inside jacket pockets. There were peg legs 
properly shod; crutches strapped to the stump of an arm or to the hip. And 
scars, marks, holes, disfigurement; traces of burns and frostbites on horrifying 
faces. None of this required any explanation, though I never could decide what 
was more considerate: to look as if there was nothing to see, or to quickly turn 
away. I'd rather do the latter. Either way, the shame lingered, for I could never 
look, or turn away, without them noticing. They knew well why I had turned, or 
why I'd made believe there was nothing to look at. In our neighborhood you 
performed this pathetic little ritual rather frequently. Cold indifference offends. 
But my sympathy wasn't much good either, because my revulsion, my disgust 
were even stronger. The most I could bring myself to do was turn away slowly.
Almost every morning I saw a man who had been reduced to a mere torso. He 
propelled himself between people's feet on a wheeled wooden platform. My own 
father would not have been any older if—even in such a state—he had survived. 
The man rolled out of Szófia utca and braked his vehicle with his two hands, 
which were swathed in heavy leather gloves. In front of the large pharmacy the 
sidewalk slanted quite a bit. I had no idea where he was coming from. Most peo­
ple were in a hurry, of course. He'd repeat the same two phrases each time. And 
always address a man. He would wait for his chance. He could get that contrap­
tion to come thumping down from the sidewalk, but on the other side of the 
street he needed help with it. First he'd swing forward, raise himself on his two 
fists and stay that way, almost allowing that dolly of his to slip out from under 
him and tip over the sidewalk. But then with another push he would yank his 
truncated limbs back on the board, and with his gloved hands quickly slow it 
down, to keep it from rolling out into the street. What had remained of his body 
was clean, sinewy, nice. It probably wasn’t just due to the physical exertion, but 
sweat poured from his forehead and neck. A handsome face looked up at 
passers-by—on his moist forehead his long, smooth, dark-brown hair had got 
all matted—and asked that he be helped back on the sidewalk. His voice re­
mained clear, steady: "I will only need assistance on the other side, if you 
wouldn't mind. An unfortunate war veteran appreciates your kindness." The per­
son to whom these words were addressed would become flustered, not knowing 
just what he was supposed to do. But the miserable creature wouldn't say an­
other word. He swung forward, rose, bounced back, slowed down in such quick 
succession that whoever saw him do it for the first time could hardly follow the 
precisely timed sequence.
Seeing him drive himself across the street, the helper would follow him rather 
helplessly. I saw him many times myself, and followed him. I wanted to know 
where he was going.
The men who were able to walk on their own two feet were overcome with 
shame. And a kind of childish eagerness. The same inexplicable shame marked
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their faces, their whole demeanor. If only they didn't have to follow an athlete's 
torso with their healthy feet. Maybe then their backs wouldn't sag quite as 
much. The rolling board made an infernal racket as it bumped and bounced and 
clattered on the uneven cobblestones. Cars had to stop. When the torso reached 
the other side, it bent forward, the two gloved hands propped up against the 
sidewalk, the shoulder muscles tense, and then, as though completing an exer­
cise on the parallel bars, he swung himself quite gracefully up on the sidewalk, 
keeping his body suspended. The man helping him just had to slide the board 
under the two stumps. All this was clear enough, no words, no special instruc­
tions were needed. But the men walking on their own two feet wanted to do 
something more, something that required strength and skill. They looked as if 
they were really trying to help. However, the torso wanted nothing else from 
them. And as he rolled away between scurrying feet, they were left there, ungrat­
ified, frustrated. I never did find out where he was going.
And then there was this walking, talking third-degree burn. Judging from her 
fine clothes, graceful movements, and refined vocabulary, she was a youngish la­
dy. Under the huge hats she wore there was not a single lock or strand of hair. 
The turned-down rim of her hat covered her forehead and threw a shadow where 
her face should have been. On her forehead there was this altogether unlikely 
dent, as if the spot where the frontal and cranial bones fused had been smashed, 
flattened, even though the skin itself showed no trace of injury. In fact, her 
sunken forehead was the only place where the skin was more or less unscathed. 
Her face was full of scars, cuts, odd creases, suture marks. She had no nose, and 
no lips either. A lipless slit was all she had, and above it two dark holes. She 
wore dresses with high, closed collars, and her silk scarves were wrapped tight 
around her neck. But if her scarf came a little loose, you could see that her neck 
had suffered burns too. Her whole body must have been covered with burns. She 
wore suede gloves and dark, thick stockings. Her breathing had an odd wheeze 
to it, the sounds came from her throat, from the hollow of her mouth, as if she 
were unable to put her words into final form. They never did became real words, 
only her intonation suggested their meaning. If I ended up standing next to her in 
a line, I had to pretend I had important business elsewhere. At such close range I 
couldn't stand listening to those throaty, muzzy sounds, they hurt my ear, 
though it was my heart that was ready to burst. But that I couldn't admit to her. 
Then again, how could somebody else's heartache have helped her? Others were 
rather more indifferent, or more considerate, and she probably got used to this 
unemotional kind of solicitude. But you could be sure of this only if she had had 
a face with which to express her feelings. Otherwise she spoke like a self-as­
sured lady who knew how to handle tradespeople.
"Any roquefort left? If not, then let me have some bologna, but do slice it 
thin. No, not from that, from the one over there, yes how veiy kind of you. And 
you will make sure it won't be more."
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The last time I saw her was the day our store had run out of bread. They didn't 
let you inside, they sold whatever they still had from a table they'd set up to 
block the open door. The overnight-curfew lasted until eight in the morning, and 
if you didn't queue up at dawn, you were out of luck. The line on the sidewalk 
stretched quite far. There were reports on the radio almost every hour that the 
fighting had ended and a ceasefire was in effect. But even if the shooting did 
stop in one section of the city, it flared up in another, and before long it picked 
up everywhere. What's more, this had been going on for three days, and few 
people had anything by way of reserves. I still can't understand the general atti­
tude, though. It's no doubt important that people have bread, but they have to 
be alive to eat it. Yet, that's not how we thought then. There was always some­
thing we needed a fresh supply of, everybody was out searching, as if that was 
the most important thing, to find that one item.
The store manager called out in the early-morning darkness that all the bread 
was gone, he would not get another delivery that day, the bakery on Király utca 
was ordered by the authorities to resupply the hospitals. A few people yelled 
back: He could have told them earlier. Only those waiting for sugar, flour, oil or 
farina should stay, the man said. He had nothing else in stock. No, madam, 
there was no salt, it was no use asking. No yeast, no matches, either. But over at 
Glázner's they'll be baking all day, there should be enough for everybody. As 
soon as he said this, the line began to dwindle.
She was there that morning, too, wearing a short Persian lamb coat, long 
pants and boots, and explaining something to the person next to her. So we all 
had to adjourn to Glázner's on Saint Stephen Boulevard. This sort of thing hap­
pened a lot during those days, but nobody seemed to mind moving on. In fact, it 
wasn't thought to be a good idea to stay in one place too long. And sometimes 
you didn't need an official announcement—word simply got around that at an­
other location there were still things to be had. And then small bands of anxious 
shoppers would begin their trek toward yet another destination. Nobody com­
plained. True, nobody knew what to expect. Was the next place going to be less 
safe? Was any location really safe? You simply succumbed to need, that's what 
caused your anxiety. So you moved on. But sometimes you couldn't get to the 
next place, not even by taking long detours, because of the fighting. Or you did 
get there, only to find out that the store was closed, or it had never opened, or 
had been reduced to rubble in the meantime. But something would always turn 
up. And in the hope of this something, everyone worked out his private strategy. 
They knew which roads to take and which ones to avoid. It wasn't wise to go off 
on your own, though. That way you didn't get to hear the latest news. But stick­
ing too close to crowds also had its dangers. Things changed constantly. So you 
navigated between crowds that were either dispersing or becoming more dense. 
Daylight was not much better than these foggy, early morning hours. It looked 
as if everyone was following their own instinct, but in reality they were all very
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much aware of what the others were doing. Maybe they did know better. And 
this odd feeling, which in more peaceful times may have alienated them from 
one another, made them stick together more. Yet this togetherness didn't feel 
right either. It made everybody think that only they knew what was best for 
them, all the others did was run off at the mouth, it might just make more sense 
to go it alone. For a while you could be reasonably sure of yourself, and know, 
too, that others viewed the same uncertainties very differently. But when it came 
to deciding, for instance, whether to cross an open square or choose a different 
route, you just couldn't make up your mind alone.
And the real danger spots weren't even where the skirmishes raged on with­
out a letup. If shots were fired at more or less the same height, or if we could 
tell where they were coming from, where they were aimed, then we could dodge 
them at least, or cling to a piece of railing or an overturned steetcar, and wait for 
a pause between two bursts and bend down and make a dash for it. That is what 
the others were doing, too. Of course, you had to count on stray bullets. When 
just about everyone made it across, somebody would get hit. And the victim 
would stay on the roadway, unless somebody was willing to creep back and pull 
him out from under a hail of bullets. And then there he was, someone nobody 
knew, either injured or already dead. By then there was no more milk anywhere. 
One woman's milk can was hit by a flying bullet. This happened during the day. 
Feeble sunlight cut through a light autumn fog. The woman was running to­
wards us from the other side of the street, while a few of us were still waiting for 
the right moment to dash across. At such moments, faces got all twisted, 
mouths stayed wide open, eyes narrowed to slits. As if at once two sentences 
were on everybody's lips: "All right, now." and "Good, I made it." When the. 
woman's can was hit, she stopped, her face frozen in disbelief. The milk poured 
out of the can in two gushing streams. Which meant that somewhere around 
there, milk was being sold. Or had been. And the spilled milk seemed more im­
portant than anything else. She didn’t even duck, but in her fury slammed the 
can against the ground. Three times, four times, without letting go of the han­
dle. The others, too, hollered for a while, but it didn't change anything.
What remains even more memorable is the quiet. An inert square, a silent in­
tersection, where everything is ominously still. Locked doors, closed shutters. 
Lightness or dark, it doesn't seem to matter; not even footsteps can disturb such 
silence. Yet deep inside it something stirs and fills the air. That was just the kind 
of unnerving dawn that greeted us around the Western Station. No light any­
where, not behind the windows, not on the street—no sound, no movement of 
any kind. It was chilly and foggy, you felt it on your skin, in your nostrils. But 
there was nothing to see or hear, not there, not yet. Perhaps cats or rats have 
such presentiment. The square was still far away, you could just about make out 
the heavily damaged railroad station towers against a still dark sky. Up to this 
point we'd been like a bunch of spirited and noisy tourists. But there was no
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question that now we'd have to be quiet and keep away from the square. 
Afterwards all we could hear was the shuffle of our receding footsteps. It re­
bounded from the walls of apartment buildings. We knew what we were doing, 
like cats and rats. It looked from here as if the upper end of Podmaniczky utca 
was open. We'd seen others turn in, so it seemed like a safe enough crossing 
point. But we didn't walk together, each of us was on his own. You told yourself: 
you'll get to Bajcsy-Zsilinszky út somehow. And didn't even ask: and then what? 
All you saw before you was Kálmán utca, where the trolleys used to run—that's 
the street you had to reach first. If you were calculating probabilities, weighing 
possibilities, your only concern was the next step. Just how you were going to get 
there didn't interest you, only the very next step. Not before or since then have I 
felt the city to be so much a part of me. One pressing need highlighted a single 
spot for me, and with that my situation was placed under microscopic scrutiny. It 
was as if I saw right away where everything was, and what sort of landmarks and 
hiding places and natural defenses—what dangers—I could count on or antici­
pate. I was like an animal that knows every trail and track. Right now it was 
Kálmán utca, and after that it would be another street, though I knew I mustn't 
get too close to the Ministry of Defense building or the Parliament. Alkotmány ut­
ca would pose a problem because it was so wide; and crossing the Boulevard 
might be an even bigger problem. But right now only Kálmán utca was under a 
magnifying lens; I didn't ask myself what I would do once I'd made it there. 
Something was bound to happen, and then again, something else might, or 
maybe nothing at all. Somewhere in the distance you heard the rattle of machine 
guns. But you heard that rattle everywhere—nearby, a little farther away, in the 
remote distance. It became dangerous only when you heard it echo right in your 
own street. Then it was like being inside a sack, with you having to find a way to 
climb out. But you never could figure out such a thing beforehand.
While I kept walking, somebody stopped me to ask what's up. There's bread at 
Glázner's, I said. Just then the whole street had a respite. People appeared in sev­
eral doorways. Rebels, too, bringing stuff out, carrying things back in. Lights went 
on in the apartments upstairs. The autumnal leaves had changed color, but the 
boughs were still full. This and all those lights made it seem as if this whole thing 
had just about run its course. Streets heaving a sigh of relief always looked this 
way, though now this one kept taking quick, sharp breaths, for nobody really knew 
how long the respite would last. It was probably a caretaker's helper who'd 
stopped me before. From a well-lighted window just overhead, a woman called out 
to him: "Will you be a dear, Stevie, and turn on the water for us?" He was carrying 
a box of ammunition on his shoulder. "Fuck you, man, you'll never get through 
here. Don't you see what's happening?" Sure 1 did; if he said so. I didn't think his 
contempt was entirely unjustified. Perhaps it wasn't even contempt. Maybe all he 
meant to say was that I was a stupid civilian. Mind you, it wasn't that hard to get 
hold of a gun. I had seen people on trucks handing them out to all comers.
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It wasn't fear that stopped me from grabbing one. I can't even say that I objected 
to all the shooting. On the contrary, I approved. I couldn't imagine it happening 
any other way. Justice was done. And where there was shooting, there were 
bound to be deaths. But my job now was to find bread. And other stuff, too. "We 
already turned it on, miss. You just go ahead and try it.” It was at the next inter­
section where I learned, from somebody else, that the Russians had pulled as far 
back as the Basilica. And had brought out their heavy guns. But the Western 
Station was still in rebel hands. Which meant it was a good place to cut across. 
What you didn't know was when it would start up again. On the corner there 
was a large photography studio. And in front of its shattered window, a bunch of 
familiar faces. Broken glass crunched under our feet. Somebody had better start 
moving, we all thought, but no one could say this out loud. Everyone was privy to 
some piece of new information, and therefore committed to this or that course of 
action. An interminable discussion ensued, everybody had his say, though it was 
not all that interesting. The only nice thing about it was that in this unfamiliar 
neighborhood, you got to see familiar faces. People looked at one another in the 
dark, they spoke their mind, they kept gesturing with their hand. Still, there were 
those who didn't say a word, who only listened, and it was mostly these people 
who later would lose their patience. Which was bad. You had to decide, after all, 
whom to side with, which faction to join. Either way, it was bad. In the end, 
everyone was waiting for his turn, only no one wanted to go first.
Strung over the deserted street, a single crippled arc light still burned. The 
trolley bus's overhead lines fell on the cable, the weight shifted the lamp's dish, 
the glass cover broke, but the light itself worked. In between piles of ripped-up 
paving stones there were dead bodies. On the corner of Kálmán utca smoke rose 
from a burnt-out tank on the sidewalk. From a distance it looked like steam. 
Perhaps the tank caught fire as it tried to avoid the pile of stones. Skidding out 
of control, it ran up the sidewalk, hit a tree, its limbs came crashing down, and 
then both tree and tank went up in flames. The charred branches stuck out of 
the wreck like horns. A single collapsed wall was all that remained of a newspa­
per kiosk. The foggy, early-morning air cradled a few sheets of newsprint. 
Nothing else stirred. Now and then the sheets of newspaper rose in the air, were 
wafted along, then deposited.
Even at this point I could see her. But only her eyes. Her face was shielded by 
her scarf. On this particular morning she wore a turban instead of a hat, and the 
color and pattern of her turban matched the cashmere scarf perfectly. It was not 
unusual to see such fineries, or even a fur coat, during those few days. People 
pulled out many things which earlier they would not have dreamed of putting 
on. As if it were a holiday of some kind, though in truth, these articles of cloth­
ing hardly suited the occasion. She held her shopping basket in her arm the way 
she always did—as though she'd just run down to do some last-minute shop­
ping. And while the others were still busy conferring and weighing alternatives,
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she apparently whispered something from behind her scarf to the man standing 
next to her, who didn't seem to understand. This man was wearing riding boots, 
which, too, were things one hadn't seen much of in recent years. Then she start­
ed walking, and it looked as if the man was going to go after her. Broken glass 
and other debris crunched under their feet in the continuing stillness. But then 
the man thought better of it; he wasn't going to follow her, which didn't seem to 
bother the woman. She stepped off the curb and continued walking, shopping 
basket in hand. She wasn't running or hurrying, she didn't even lean forward 
very much as she walked. She was simply someone going shopping. The man 
stayed in the middle of the sidewalk, which wasn't too smart of him. In those 
days the sidewalk at this spot jutted out in a salient. He stood there, as though 
on a spit of land, facing a sea of danger. He should have either turned around or 
walked on. We also watched the woman, anxious to see what'll happen to her. 
She got to the arc light all right. It would be harder after that, on account of the 
corpses and the ripped-up paving stones. The streetcar tracks protruded from 
the exposed roadbed like two lifeless spines. The city then was full of objects 
that had lost their function, their reason for being. But nothing happened. She 
walked between the two tracks where there were gaping holes now, regular 
trenches. She could easily fall into one. But the dark depths were still, we heard 
nothing suspicious. At least twenty of us were waiting at the corner for the final 
outcome. At such moments you didn't hear the person breathing next to you, or 
if you did, you were oblivious to it. When she got past the tracks, she stepped 
out of the patch of light, though we could still see her running. If she got that 
far, let her not be cut down. These were times when it was so. easy to under­
stand what people did, and why. When she reappeared, she stood in front of a 
house, on the other side.
I saw her even at Glázner's, later on. It was light by then. She had to have 
been there for some time, because she'd already joined the line. I took one look 
at this line and felt like giving up. But then what would I do for bread? Whenever 
you saw a long line, you tried to figure out what your chances were. But this 
time all figuring seemed futile. And I even dawdled, by walking ahead, as far as 
Katona József utca, to see if the situation was really that bad. In the meantime, 
of course, new people had joined the line. But others wavered, too. Not believing 
their eyes, they also went ahead to check, or tried to size things up from a dis­
tance. But the more you thought about it, the worse your chances got, because 
other people took the place that technically, on the basis of time of arrival, be­
longed to you. The line spilled out of Fürst Sándor utca, its fringes coming to an 
end on the Boulevard. That was to be my place on a line that wound massively 
around an entire city block, all along Sallai Imre utca, and then curved back on­
to the Boulevard and the bakery's main entrance. And this line did not move an 
iota, for the simple reason that there was no fresh bread, and no way of know­
ing when the next batch would come out of the ovens. There were people who'd
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brought chairs or stools with them; others just stood and shuffled their cold 
feet, or leaned their back against the masonry. Either I gave up or I didn't. No 
more hesitation. But as 1 dragged myself back to the end of the line, it occurred 
to me to walk all the way to Petneházy utca, where the central bakery was. Not 
that I had any sort of premonition then.
On the whole, things looked calm here, which may have been the main reason 
why I didn’t go off on my own. I took my place at the end of the line. There was 
no more room on the sidewalk. Those who came after me had to stand in the in­
tersection. We could always creep up just a little. Which didn't mean that they'd 
finally begun serving people inside the shop—it was quiet impatience that closed 
up the ranks. A half hour or so passed, after which things began moving inside; 
and pretty soon there was a stir outside as well. First, just restlessness, some 
quiet grumbling, a little shoving. Everybody would have loved to press forward, 
but there was no room. "Just where would you want me to move, Madam?" In 
such a situation everyone has to say something. "Just a minute, my good man, 
just one minue." Then, the helpless shuffle of feet, the rumble of irritability, the 
first solitary shouts. People given to such outbursts are held in contempt by the 
crowd, and rightly so. In order to squeeze your way into the store, you must 
make room for the happy few who are on their way out with their fresh loaves.
Whoever doesn't understand the psychology of waiting might think that noth­
ing's more natural than letting these people pass—it's in your best interest to do 
so, after all. If people aren't allowed out, no one'll be able to go in. But the fact 
is that people in such circumstances have to contend with several different pres­
sures at once. And no matter how reasonable or good-natured a person may be, 
in a crowd he will not be able to yield to all of these pressures. His common 
sense and his sense of justice will inevitably clash with his sense of urgency, and 
past a certain point he will not be in control of his conflicting impulses. His 
common sense will become especially vulnerable. Let's just imagine that some­
one at the back of the line has an urge to move forward, even though he has no 
idea what's going on way ahead of him. He may move up just a little, no more 
than an inch or two, yet already tensions flare. Instinctively, or on purpose, he’s 
slouched forward. But if he didn't, someone else would, or he'd be irritably, 
nudged along by the others. And if that happened, his sense of justice would 
surely suffer. But however much this person may cherish his common sense or 
his sense of justice, he couldn't possibly resist the will of so many people bear­
ing down on him—right now he'd buckle under his own body weight. 
Nevertheless, for a brief moment everyone is anxious for him to stand fast and 
push back, for people are for the most part well-meaning and reasonable, yet no 
one can ignore the insidious machinations of their own animal selfishness. It's 
not their fault, they will say, that this person is simply too weak to get that 
pushy creep off his back. In any case, if people are not equal in strength, not 
equally capable of resisting the pressure that's on them, then the tiny space I
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gain by virtue of my own strength will surely be filled by the weak ones, or in­
vaded by the petty schemers, who'll then manage to shove me aside.
There are those who wait for just such a moment. For needless to say, physi­
cal strength is not the only thing that varies in people—mental fortitude and un­
derstanding are also apportioned unevenly. So there are those who will valiantly 
put up with the massive weight on their back, and will even have the stamina to 
withstand the pressure, but all they really want is to keep others from obtaining 
what they would like for themselves. And this desire for a slight advantage can 
be so easily justified. This one's been standing here for ten hours. It's cold. He 
simply must go to the bathroom. And that one's child hasn't had a bite to eat in 
two days. If she doesn't make it into the store, or if the next batch of bread is 
gone before her turn, it means another one-hour wait, and that's more than she 
can take. Perhaps she is right, it is more than they can take. They have high 
blood pressure, cancer, heart trouble. And what if they run out of flour in there? 
Or if the bakery gets hit? Or if these crazy people trample them to death? 
Common sense hasn't got a chance, everyone can see that. There is always 
someone who still clings to his sense of justice. Although the only thing he real­
ly wants by now is to be treated justly by others. Everyone roars; everyone 
screams. He can't help himself and screams along with them. Even those who 
do not open their mouths scream. There are those who knew the bitter truth all 
along and now let it all out. And those who are shocked to learn that people can 
act this way and who now likewise proclaim their discovery. And those who do 
not yet know that the neighbor with whom they've just had a friendly chat is in 
fact a maniac. And there are also those who are pressed against the plate-glass 
window; who are pushed out of the line; who are kicked and stepped on. There 
are children and there are old people. Those who desperately try to leave the 
store, and those who accidentally get pushed inside. The experienced hysterics 
and the ones who really are gasping for air. And there are many who still don't 
believe that something like this can actually happen to them. It's something in­
side them, their soul, that screams. And though no sound may come out of their 
mouths, they are shaken by a strange fever, stirred by other people's screams. A 
fine membrane ruptures inside.
I must have been screaming, too; just about everybody was. When this hap­
pens, nothing can help except a moment of grace, a stroke of luck, an accident. 
Nobody feels responsible any more for what they do. Should they come out of 
this unharmed, they wouldn't know whom to be grateful to. But how odd that 
even a violent commotion in a crowd can quickly quiet down. I still don't know 
what happened; but at least the store windows weren't smashed in. Lifting their 
loaves over their heads, the first people managed to fight their way through the 
crowd. The human mass clogged the entrance, it wouldn't budge, yet they 
squeezed through. All you saw were lurching shoulders, colliding backs. At such 
moments people are faceless; memory has little to preserve. I saw it all. I stood
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no more than thirty feet away, yet I don't know what really happened. Backs, 
shoulders, the white blur of faces. My hearing remembers, though. Above the 
throng ringing the entrance, frantic screams cleaved the air. We, however, who 
stood at the very end of that twisting, block-long line (and thus were only about 
thirty feet from the spot where at any moment irremediable disaster could have 
struck), responded by merely shouting. Hoping that these shouts would remind 
the screamers that a modicum of common sense remained, all was not lost. 
They could still stop. Or do this some other way. The shouts were meant simply 
to force back the screams, yet there was anger in the shouts, the anger of frus­
trated self-interest. After all, if something irrevocable happened up there, then 
I'd end up with no bread back here. All along the line, as far as the eye could 
see, there was commotion, unrest. People stopped resting their backs against 
the side of buildings, they got up from their chairs and stools. Still not knowing 
for sure what was going on, they jostled and clamored, and were ready to press 
forward. Whatever happened, happened then, in that confused hubbub, amidst 
angry shouts and hysterical screams, in the air, where polar opposites: helpless­
ness and willfulness collided head-on.
Just when the first group of lucky breadwinners managed finally to squeeze 
through the door, and stood there dazed, happy, some choosing to take off in a 
hurry, afraid that someone may actually snatch the prize out of their hands— 
just then, the jolting, nerve-racking uproar reached its climax. This was it. 
Nothing could be louder. They all saw these people come out, and they all want­
ed to take their place. Going as far as stopping others from leaving the store. 
Molten lava might feel this way when it has to crack the earth's crust. Or the 
crust itself, when it tries to hold out around the cracks but then caves in. The 
pressure inside became simply intolerable, without significantly weakening the 
pressure outside. The loaves exhaled a hot, heady fragrance. And naturally, 
those still inside, thinking that the gods must love them to be bestowing these 
loaves, were most eager to break out. While those trying to fight their way in 
saw their whole life now as a tremulous uncertainty. The ones elbowing their 
way in were sure they were doing it for the bread—while those on their way out 
were defending their lives along with their still hot loaves. Nothing got resolved, 
of course, but the screams and shouts abated somewhat. The line began to 
move, though this didn't lessen the confusion, it just turned it into an indignant 
bustle. No one screamed any more, but everyone argued and pleaded and 
cursed. We crept forward slowly. And in the soles of our feet felt nascent hope.
I could see her even then—her turban, the uncertain outline of her charred 
face. The sun came out and we moved forward rather briskly. The sunlight 
warmed us, we could breathe in the smell of the nearby river—it mixed agree­
ably with the scent of fresh-baked bread. Nobody talked about what had just 
happened, or what could have happened. But then, it really was nothing. And if 
we kept up this pace, we'd have our bread in no time. In a matter of minutes we
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were at the corner of Fürst Sándor utca. Happy shoppers were coming out of the 
bakery again. We moved steadily along, and kept a sharp eye on each other's 
shuffling feet. At this point you realized that your situation had changed signifi­
cantly. You were no longer stuck at the end of the line, you were on your way. 
And you watched, lest somebody pulled a fast one on you—and made sure oth­
ers wouldn't get the same impression about you. The line is moving, your anten­
nae are up and finely tuned, you are ready to pounce. Everyone is pushing for 
some advantage, a half-inch lead, if nothing else, just as long as the other guy is 
left behind. It’s as though, in the name of common decency, you are always 
reining in the other guy, except that the reins are held by him. People hold back 
in others their own greed. If you can't have the upper hand, you should at least 
make sure you don't lose out. When the line starts moving, there is no time to 
argue, and when it comes to a stop again, it's too late to turn things to your own 
advantage. It has to be done now. That half-inch lead must be grabbed right 
now. And it has to appear as though the other guy's slowness or clumsiness— 
and not your despicable selfishness—is responsible for that lead. By the time we 
reached the corner of Katona József utca, the line had stopped moving. The nar­
row street was still dark and cool. A bit of sunlight seeped through between the 
rooftops, but it penetrated only the tiny side street that connects Fürst Sándor 
utca and Pozsonyi út.
The moment the line stops moving can be amazing. Everybody has to admit 
that for all their watchfulness they did not end up with the same people who 
were there when the procession began—the lineup is different. You made every 
attempt to ensure that things wouldn't change, yet they did. Familiar coats and 
familiar faces have turned into enemies simply because they somehow ended up 
ahead of you. Any moment now you'll have to team up with strangers. It will be 
a bitter moment. Quarrels can break out at such moments. Which may degener­
ate into fist fights. Or it may suddenly turn quiet, if only because the hopeful 
scuffing and shuffling has ceased. In this silence a chair or a stool hits the 
ground, a sigh is heard. Somebody says something, somebody else answers. For 
a while you have to make this spot your own. Trouble starts when somebody 
objects. This is not where I ought to be standing, he may say to himself, and in 
an unguarded moment may voice his dissatisfaction openly. Everyone's afraid of 
such a challenge. Their common fear may stifle even ongoing arguments. What's 
at work, however, is not the voice of reason—people are simply afraid.
It did turn quiet, and felt like the quiet of an ordinary autumn morning. No 
shots could be heard anywhere. I was lucky to be able to rest my back against 
the side of a building. True, I had to maneuver a bit to end up in the right posi­
tion. On the walls of this particular building you could still see the scars of the 
last war. Over the years the bullet holes filled up with soot and almost blended 
in with the moldering plaster. I grew up in this city and couldn't imagine build­
ings not looking this way. But the quiet I sensed was not real quiet after all—it
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was overtaken by a distant, even rumble. I knew by then that inside that large 
shop the baking was done in three different ovens, and a new batch of bread 
came out every thirty-five minutes or so. We figured that with each baking cycle 
we'd advance about thirty yards. If the ovens could handle the load, that is. And 
if there was enough firewood. And they didn't run out of flour. Or could get a 
new delivery if they did. And if they could prepare the dough fast enough to feed 
the ovens. Which was not very likely. At this rate, one of us calculated, they'd 
have to go through twenty-seven cycles before our turn would come, probably 
sometimes in the late afternoon. The question wasn't whether we could wait 
that long but whether we would make it inside the bakery before dark. And if we 
didn't, would the curfew be lifted by then? It was more dangerous to violate the 
curfew at night than early in the morning. And almost impossible not to get 
caught, because at night there were patrols all over the city. By morning the 
fighting usually died down.
But now that rumbling noise kept getting louder. Past a certain threshold, 
there could be no doubt—a column of tanks was approaching. Now these con­
voys weren't all that frightening. With a rumble and a roar they would move 
from one location to another. As long as they didn't stop, there was nothing to 
worry about. Besides, it was highly unlikely that they would turn into such a 
narrow street. They preferred wider thoroughfares, and kept to the middle even 
there, to make it harder for people to hurl gasoline-filled bottles at them from 
their windows. The rumble came from the direction of the Angels Field district, 
and you could tell from the sound that they were going to pass through either 
Pozsonyi út or Pannónia utca. When you distinguished the clatter of the caterpil­
lar treads in that maddening racket, you could be sure they chose Pozsonyi út. 
For in those days Pozsonyi út was still surfaced with yellow road bricks, which 
made the noise much screechier. First the clatter and the screech reverberated 
amid the tall buildings, and then, at the other end of the sunlit sidestreet, you 
saw the tanks themselves. They passed, one after another, equidistant from each 
other. Just as one left your field of vision, another entered it. The exhaust fumes 
dimmed even further the listless sunlight.
Nobody in our line moved. Those of us who could see into that tiny sidestreet 
kept looking. The fumes got so bad, and the roar so pervasive, everybody fell 
silent. Not that they would have heard even if people had kept on talking. And 
there was no end to the convoy. The vibration was picked up by the surrounding 
buildings, I felt it come together in my hands and feet, as though I wasn't the 
one shaking. And the rumbling and shaking grew even stronger, because the 
tanks, with the shrillest of shrieks, turned onto the ramp of Margit Bridge, and 
as they did the entire substructure began to shake. You felt the bridge in the 
soles of your feet. I had a city which was split in half by a river, but the familiar 
bridge was now reduced to a sensation. The vibration was picked up by the span 
itself, it spread to the block of houses around the bridge, I even felt it on my
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back. It made you oblivious to everything around you, for you kept concentrat­
ing on your own shaking body. It didn't occur to me that we might be in danger, 
though it didn't sound as though this procession was going to end anytime 
soon. Yet such maneuvers were not rare, the Russians kept regrouping their 
forces, people on the street didn't pay much attention to these comings and go­
ings. For a few days back then it even seemed possible that they'd leave for 
good. At least leave the city; maybe the whole country.
From where I was standing I had a fairly good view of that small sidestreet. 
The tanks passed a café called Samovar, and I could even see that. Behind the 
café's sun-streaked window there was a large photograph, showing Hedda 
Hiller, the lovely chanteuse, who only a few nights ago, had performed here. The 
café was open and crowded with people, all of them looking through the win­
dow, watching the tanks go by. There were also people on the sidewalk outside 
the café, and they, too, were watching. Then something happened which to this 
day I have difficulty assimilating. Sluggishly, though still as if it had a sudden 
change of heart, one of the tanks turned into this sidestreet, its treads grazed 
the sidewalk, the friction caused sparks to fly. The people standing around scat­
tered in eveiy direction. Some sought refuge in the café, others ran into the 
nearest apartment house. In a matter of seconds the street was empty. What re­
mained was the heavy smell of gasoline, and bright shafts of sunlight creeping 
down from the rooftops. Those of us standing in line did not move. With its gun- 
barrel raised high, the tank was coming towards us.
For a moment it occurred to me that all it was doing was securing the col­
umn's safe passage, in which case all this was strictly routine. It got to the mid­
dle of the tiny street, stopped, but didn't cut its engine. Nothing was happening. 
At this point I even thought that perhaps it was having engine trouble, and that's 
why it left the column. But I also sensed trouble. At that very moment the tank's 
gun began to move. It came down, quite gently, as though it were aiming at the 
apartment house in front of it, or at the wide awning over the entrance of the 
Duna cinema. But there was nothing there. We stood under the awning—a mo­
tionless crowd waiting in line. It all happened so fast, my mind couldn't react, 
only my eyes. Even so I couldn't believe that the burst of flame darting out of the 
turret, the tank’s twitch and shudder, meant that a shot was fired. And then an­
other. Two frozen images. But in between the two, a terrifying explosion. Then a 
third shot, though all that could do was hit the blast, the mayhem, the clouds of 
dust, and follow up with yet another explosion. Eveiything was blown away.
Translated by Ivan Sanders
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Poems
T r a n s l a t e d  b y  B r u c e  B e r l i n d
The Three Graces
A három grácia
let's throw a little hen party they said 
Helen Liz and Bubbles
their lives more romantic than Gone with the Wind 
which again and again they wept over 
when they had enough tears
because it so happened there was no revolution war mass terror
and the roof wasn't about to collapse on them any day now
and their men hadn’t died out on them
seeing that they lived along the peoples' highway
a crowded place
where you were lucky to survive
and after so many ordeals and disasters
to have found such a decent husband
as Helen's Gyula
at least this once we can cut loose they said
Ottó Orbán
is a poet, essayist and translator. His volume o f poems, The Blood of the Walsung, 
translated by English and American poets, was published by Bloodaxe in 1993. 
The poems above are from  The Journey of Barbarus, translated by Bruce Berlind, 
to be published by Three Continents Press, Colorado Springs, in 1995.
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and unfastened their bras under their robes 
and cackling took out their false teeth 
and moaned and mumbled while sopping 
raisin bread in the milky coffee 
and kicked off their shoes
and blissfully wiggled the toes of their stockinged feet
three survivors three war heroes 
three wretched old women 
one of them my mother
The Furious Orphan
Az őrjöngő árva
After a month of the staggers, I looked out the waiting-room window: 
I was home, on the mud-acned earth, the trees 
writhing in a foggy straitjacket.
In the examining room indifferent compassion sized up 
the case of the orfano furioso.- "He'll sleep it off."
No forest pulled up by the roots or other renaissance props; 
in the heavenly workshop, if  the master worked there at all, 
he used a ruler and compass, once in a while wiping 
his steamy glasses. The starry gear train wheeled. Black oil 
leaked on the ground: night came. I whimpered 
amidst the bone-spokes. The cellular system 
of the reversed periscope focused in on 
the local version of the general human landscape:
1940, diamond tram tracks, a food  of light clanging, 
my father gliding ahead, me following. Instead of a sword, the angel 
played with a movie projector. "The world’s steamrolled over you 
just one little bit, " said the woman doctor. All set to comfort me, 
she was no help at all. Outside, masked in sparkling memories, 
the steamroller hid with snow its concrete kisser.
1Weltanschauungthe French poet gestured irritably; 
the slow but continual round dance where momentous ideas 
day in day out come a cropper didn't interest him.
"What I'm interested in is why this one or that one is depressed."
The long and short o f it in a nutshell. In the glass birdcage 
of the high rise the Ultimate Questions o f Existence flitted about
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like parrots in a pet shop. The day by day spectacle 
remained concealed. The cell-maquis furiously persisted.
Swinging from wall to wall on the barbiturate seesaw, the so-called soul 
mourned fiercely for itself. But the body kept doing what it knew: 
digested and defecated. In disgrace the glorious 
strained for a moment between earth and sky. A pontoon bridge 
quaking under a column o f tanks: this was him, sane psychosis 
parcelled-up in flesh, the unrepeatable relation between good and evil.
"I feel for you," the Frenchman said, rising. In between fates
the spirit-door silently shut. "Boring,"
said the Fair-haired Cock of the local underground.
"The old fart's boring."
The Earth Drama Circle produced its zany farce. On the iron cot 
the daughter o f a good family lay naked. The doctor's space suit 
was left in the hospital: "Be good now, okay?" Playing the Pirate Captain 
the Secret Sickness Victim murmured in a film star's voice:
“Don't be afraid!" From the cigarette butt the angel of indigence 
ascended in an image o f smoke. The French visitor 
saw me for a dacha owner. "Really!?
You don't have a car?" I looked at the Mediterranean from a plane, 
the green dragon blew its nose on the rubbish-strewn shore, 
and time jumped up and down to tend to 
the negligible petty details that soften bones,
make mine shafts collapse and houses burn down. "How do you live here?"
I watched suspiciously the haughty little-girl's face, the twin cones
of the flesh volcano. A land of privation and riches. The onetime angler
cast out his bait for the future. On the pleasure line
the hook o f grass/hill/water: my childhood. I bit down on my fate,
shaking with love and nausea. “Sweetie,"gasped
the perishing European fish on the four-engined iron cot.
I watched the ocean from the hotel terrace above
the Ghandi Memorial. The South Pole crouched
behind the domestic flood. This was the future, this already-past:
under a radiant heaven my tongue burned with the acrid
taste o f I AM. The woman doctor sat on the stone steps: in her
hundred-thousand-year-old earth-face the oceanic eyes waved in black,
her sari ruffled by the briny wind, her hands were rattling
a bunch o f bone necklaces: "Do you love me?" A cigarette in my mouth
instead o f a howl. I was living here on the lunatic lustful star,
where the light disc burnishes the tram tracks and the ocean,
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and the orphan doesn't speak the orphan's language. Here I was the secret patron, 
cared for and carer, fat cat o f poverty, Earth's bastard: a witness. ■
Here I lost and won, here popped the sleeping pill of ideas, 
tanked up on shame and schnapps. I exhaled the smoke of a Winston; 
the Trivandrum Road gleamed to my grave, the common compromise, 
the Every Minute Our Prize: I pay, the car moves forward, 
in salty vapour, among palms, in the temporal/eternal present 
I hear my mother, the elephant-moan of the ocean.
The Pretty Silverhead
Egy szép ezüstfejűhöz
Behold the woman I love
She'll be a beautiful old woman
With a head of silver at twenty-three
Injustice infuriates her
She slams the door and plaster rains down
Mr. Orpheus and his gray-haired wife
Descend to the depths of their years
The man half paralyzed the woman hard of hearing
Do you know where the mixture is
How's that? no soda?
■It's right there on the table
Poor little old dears
How funny and pitiful they are
But when they look at each other they blossom
This is their big secret their witchcraft
This is what they are envied for and
This is why the gods hate them
Who in the golden mist of their silly myths
Wage war on each other in helmets and armour
And for relaxation impersonate the wind
Blowing coldheartedly through the world






Slowly numbness marches with its troops 
on the field of my body vaguely dozing off.
Let us imagine that blind destiny is Kutuzov, 
the prince of strategy, a shabby old man, 
who even in retreat is still on his own turf, 
because everything belongs to him as it does to God.
However we imagine, the spark finally flies to the roof 
and the burning village sizzles like fa t ...
I don't learn from affliction, the ominous symptoms are useless—
the prophet's making is his monomania,
and a chaos more ordered than logic makes the poem,
the maelstrom of life in the puddle of a cell,
while our paralysed right hand lifted by the intact left one
points to the mirage of a new beginning.
He Tosses and Turns; Lives
Egyik oldaláról a másikra fordul; él
A heartbroken tiny village among the hills; houses turned blue, zigzag muddy 
streets. From here only God's feet are visible, bugs glistening in the wind like 
shiny nails. . . The bark of the angostura tree in the drink of infinite sweetness: 
even at four in the morning I know, while watching a movie o f the sleeping mind, 
that it's all in vain, the splendour, the gaggling of geese, the smell o f earth and 
grass and manure, there's no starting over.
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V i c t o r  H a t á r
Pages from a Dream Diary
PROJ ECT S IN THE AIR
G ot an invitation to a big Busdurmaniac town because I came to finish all the blueprints and details necessary for a big development scheme, the overall 
design for which I won in an international competition. Since Busdurmania was 
overseas I had to make the passage either by ferryboat and a long train journey 
or to take one of the rickety planes of Busdurmaniac Airlines, I opt for the sea 
voyage and the rail journey which seems to be safer. Yet from the outset there 
are difficulties—red-tape, luggage lost or mislaid, services overbooked and un­
derstaffed and, of course, the language-barrier. For a while I was stuck on the 
coast at the railway-station because the railway people and seamen alike came 
out in sympathy with air-traffic controllers who declared for industrial action: in 
railway-carriages, in lounges of air terminals and in the docks, people were try­
ing to while away time by playing cards or overeating.
At last we set out from the sidings, on a long journey—the loco was a joke, 
the rattle of the cattle-trucks went on for days, across rural Busdurmania where 
there was nothing to see. In the capital—Busdurbanopolis—soon enough I 
found out that there are problems as well with Busdurmaniac bureaucracy, the 
local Planning Authorities. The language-barrier was next to nothing in compari­
son to the thought-barrier. Busdurmaniacs had a strange predilection to buy all 
sorts of TV programmes from abroad, mainly nature-films but their minds being 
focussed on the copulation scenes, they’ve cut everything else out. Thus, in the 
home, in hotel lounges and in pubs everywhere, in the evening peak hours there 
was nothing else on the TV screen but an interminable sequence of copulation 
performances—animals such as crocodiles, penguins, axolotles, buffaloes, 
camels, whales, badgers, robins and jackdaws copulating helter-skelter—a non­
stop carrying-on of ants, praying man- 
tises, dung-beetles, frogs, horses, ar­
madillos, mongooses, tapirs, mon­
keys, spiders, etc. etc. The only differ­
ence being that—according to the 
commentary in the Busdurmaniac
Victor Határ
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ih England since 1956.
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brogue—some of the predatory birds came from China, some of the underwater 
squids copulated in the Peruvian Zoo, some of the dinosauruses were not copu­
lating at all, their act being simulated by computer animators in Disneyland. 
When Busdurmaniacs throw a party, they watch the whole of the Animal 
Kingdom in heat, in enraptured silence glued to the screen: and only when the 
gogglebox goes blank do they come alive: playboys and socialites go on endless­
ly about the "acts", stating their preferences in what they have seen, praising the 
prowesses of a copulating wildebeest or the subtleties of a mating daddy-long- 
legs. Whenever 1 am desperately trying to broach the subject of my splendid 
postmodern dream of a New Development full of Desirable Dreamhouses, with 
one of the Busdurmaniac chaps from the Committee liaising with me, everything 
becomes warped into appreciation of the Feature—the convolutions of the bun­
dle of rattle-snakes in heat or the Black Mass of the dung-beetles.
So it happens that I am being put up by one of the magistrates who was in­
strumental in the decision of that international competition I won and soon 
enough I have an inkling that he is expecting some sort of a kickback in kind: he 
has two lovely daughters, one of which I am supposed to marry. Their docility 
and eagerness to initiate me into the secrets of that special interest of the 
Busdurmaniacs in natural history and in city planning leaves me baffled and mo­
bilises my European defence mechanisms. It takes a few months to find out that 
city planning in Busdurbanopolis means sitting through endless sessions with all 
concerned, committeering and counter-committeering with the conspicuous ab­
sence of construction firms—no cranes, no bulldozers, no scaffolding—not even 
a site is in evidence. It's all hot air. Busdurmaniacs tend to band together until 
all committees are amalgamated in one great Conspiracy against the wretch who 
happens to be the Chosen Architect for the Job... What "Job"? After the umptiest 
session the magistrates are in revolt en masse and want to slash down all top 
floors, reduce the length and width of the winning Project and environmentalists 
and ecologists start to quizz and query the very suitability of the area for that 
kind of rural development and the rurality of the Project for that sort of area. 
Soon Architect and brainchild are shouted down and/or laughed out of court by 
all and sundry, because of the brutalism, the self-consciousness of his postmod­
ern style. It's meek in its monstrosity, it's monstrous in its meekness. Someone 
for decency's sake finds in it a redeeming feature by slicing down its groundfloor, 
what remains wouldn't need any cellarage, and thus, the project pleasantly dis­
appearing under the trees, the threat of deforestation has been eliminated. 
Consequently, once all blueprints have been zeroed to the ground, there will be 
no need to decide which site would be more suitable for the Project: a project, 
after having been duly and solemnly cancelled, does not need a site any more.
There are hundreds of committees in Busdurmania, all very active, the main 
aim of which is to prevent the desecration of the land by the corrupt practices of 
the building trade.
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There is an admirable way of the Busdurmaniacs to preserve the girlish sweet 
slenderness of a pregnant woman and, at the same time, tó allay all doubts as to 
the paternity of her child. At the sixth mpnth of the pregnancy she and her hus­
band enter a polyurethene cubicle—an invention of a great Busdurmaniac magi­
cian—and in the cubicle, lined with TV-screens and with all nature-programme 
features, all animal copulations on, the man is transmogrified into a woman, 
"his" womb inflated by the foetus which skids over into "daddy” from its moth­
er's womb. After a further three months' pregnancy and in the presence of its 
mother’s Penis (by courtesy of her husband) in full erection, Dad gives birth to 
his child (there cannot be any doubt as to its paternity). And then, as if by the 
waving of a magic wand, daddy is re-transmogrified into his original self (end of 
erection) while his wife, though bereft of her temporary Penis of which she was 
only the hostess, but lovelier than ever, slender as if no pregnancy had ever 
touched her, cuddles in her arms her newborn baby.
In order to keep my city planning Project alive, I am making the supreme sacri­
fice, I marry one of the daughters of the magistrate who is the all-powerful chair­
man of the executive committee. 1 shall bear my child the Busdurmaniac way: en­
ter the cubicle, go through the motions, my transmogrification takes place as usu­
al, I lend my Penis to my wife who assists my labours with a stout erection, we all 
are happy, I admire my baby whose paternity is "beyond doubt" and my in-laws 
are overjoyed with their grandchild. The miracle happens, cranes, bulldozers, 
scaffoldings are appearing on the site. For one year the construction of my Master 
Project is in full swing. Then the rot sets in. Slackness, lack of discipline, shortage 
of bricks. First the scaffolding starts to disappear, then, in the absence of scaffold­
ing, the higher storeys being unclimbable to, all the building teams disappear too.
Storey by storey, dismantling being impossible, demolition takes place the 
cheapest way: during the night, by hooligans posing as "vigilantes". My daily 
visits to the Town Hall as well as my daily rows on the site do not make the 
slightest difference. One day, with no cranes, no girders, no nothing and even 
the fences torn down, I'm being politely told that my visits of "supervision" are 
no longer necessary.
"But what about my building?"
"What building?"
I have a good look through the dirty window of the cabin: no building.
"Where there is no building, there is nothing to supervise".
Soon it comes to the planting of trees and bushes, the site is being re-afforested 
and restored, as if the area had never been disturbed. Then comes the "mowing- 
in" ceremony—dozens of lawn-mowers mow away in all directions while the 
burgomaster cuts a ribbon with his golden scissors and declares "that splendid, 
that magnificent edifice, a glorious addition to the highlights of our beloved 




In a huge marquee, erected in honour of a visiting prince, Busdurmaniacs toast 
the new development—a Monument of ancient Busdurmaniac building craft. My 
doubts reach a crisis point: I start to doubt the paternity of my own child, the 
child I bore to my lovely wife; my incredulity starts in her delicate soul a slow 
estrangement: the breach is not to be healed.
I make preparations for my departure but a strange coincidence turns my 
leaving into a rout. Because of a nationwide railway strike, all airtraffic con­
trollers are called out in sympathy, and seamen and ferryboat companies are 
locked in a mortal battle of time-honoured disputes, my only way out is by 
Public Rickshaw. I hire the rick and his vehicle up to the border and dispatch my 
seatrunks by mail.
The mix-up is inevitable, I am landed with the toolkit of a taxidermist and 
several stuffed marsupials and copulating mongooses which are no use to me, 
while all my folk-art collections, laces and bobbins, horse's blinkers and bites, 
mule-saddles, plastic potteries, bakelité ocarinas and clay-pipes go round the 
globe until, like disintegrating hardware from outer-space well before the im­
pact, every little bit melts into thin air.
THE KING OF FRANCE
(19 January 1989)

















This is the king of France.
I beg your pardon?
The king of France speaking. Louis XIX.
(don't believe my ears. Slightly disconcerted)
Sire! Je suis bahu et ahuri—
Don't talk rubbish please, stick to your English.
I do, your Majesty, I do! What can I do for you?
You, do for me? It's the other way round.
You mean...? It's past midnight, come to the point please. 
I'am. The point is that you're just the bloke we need.
In what way?
Well. You're a writer, are you not?
I think so. In one way—yes.
More than in one way: so I was told.
Or misinformed. Just as I might be this very minute. 
Misinformed, you? And how?
Are you really the king of France? I wonder.
For one thing this is an ex-directory number—
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Yes, I know. But we kings have a time-honoured privilege.
A secret list compiled from all ex-directory numbers of the world. 
A privilege of the métier?
You may put it that way. A trade prerogrative. Goes back to 
ancient times when we kings too had our own guild, blazons, 
halls, trumpets, pennants, and all.
A trade, Sire?
Just like yours. Scribble, scribble, eh? Another damned thick book. 
The way of the world—
Yours must be the busiest of all, Sire. With all those monuments 
to unveil, ribbons on new bridges to cut, guildhalls to dedicate, 
royal boxes to fill, cheering crowds to wave, seagoing vessels 
to launch, wars to declare: a king's timetable. Chock-a-block.
Not a moment to spare. How did you manage to ring me?
That's why I had to wait till after midnight, sorry about that, 
otherwise someone else would have done it for me: we personally 
never dial, never carry any money, no need for that—
Oh yes, it makes all the difference. What a blessed state to be in! 
Would you like to be king?
Me? Good Heavens!
Not even for a moment?
God forbid.
You fibber. Why not?
It would ruin my career as a writer. Spoiling my game.
But talking of fibbing—
Yes...?
Who is the fibber, I wonder. Calls may go astray in the network, 
some practical jokers may present themselves as the king 
of France and how should I know—
Well, I'm hurt. Deeply hurt. It's so true to life: harbingers of good 
news are rarely believed—
Harbingers of what good news...?
Listen mister. Soon you will have this Instrument sent to you 
by Royal Mail, an Extraordinary Royal Courier of mine will hand it 
over and you will be deeply ashamed for what you have just said 
and will regret it. I do not take it as a slight or lése majesté, 
for you are not in the know but I am­
in the know of what?
"Sire", please! I do not expect a subject to kowtow on the 
telephone but a proper address I wouldn't mind before I break the 























To break what, your Majesty?
The matter of fact is that dans mon Académie someone died 
recently. An immortel of sorts, a nonagenarian and completely 
gaga, some philosopher but harmless as a philosopher can be and 
ludicrously innocuous. We're supposed to be forty all in all, and a 
seat is vacant. It will be voted upon but the Throne has its special 
influence—
Immortality? Never crossed my mind.
It crossed mine—
But why me?
Now don't be cross, but kings too have their crazy games when 
tortured by ennui. Living in a palace is one—even the loo is too 
far: and there are aggravating circumstances like—
Like what, Sire?
Like an excruciatingly long and sleepless night. On such a night 
anything might take one's fancy—
I still do not see where I'm supposed to come into it. Did you come 
across one of my books, have you ever read anything by me?
Me? Never. But that's the beauty of it! On one of those 
excruciatingly long nights in my bedchamber, tossing an' turning 
in my State Bed with its curtains drawn, I took my secret 
Directory of all Ex-Directory numbers of the world, shut my eyes, 
opened the book and put my finger at random on the list. It was 
your name I randomized.
A sort of Sortes Virgilianae?
A sort of Sortes Virgilianae, if you like. With my index finger under 
your name, I opened my eyes and read, "occupation: author". 
Lucky hit, I said to myself and laughed heartily, that's exactly the 
bloke we need pour 1'Académie Frangaise, a harmless philosopher 
who's ludicrously innocuous. His name is somewhat weird and 
the language he is writing in, cela m'est du Hongrois, is a kind of 
weirdo too, but he will do, never mind his eccentricity, that was 
never an obstacle to becoming one of the immortels, and anyway,
I will exert my Royal Prerogative...
But I do not qualify, being a sale méteque—
Never mind that, who cares. We will see to it. What about Algeria 
where you were born—
In Algeria? I? Never.
Don't you woriy, we'll see to it. Algiers then—




Pages from a Dream Diaiy
King Never heard of 'im.
I Sire!... Are you really, VÉRITABLEMENT the king of France?
King Most certainly bien sur, I am.
I And you don't know who Camus was?
King There is such a sea of subjects. He hasn’t been presented in Court.
I Well, being the rogue element he was, I bet he wasn't—
King What did you say?
I It was just an aside, out of context of our dream: ad spectatores,
sort of—
King Good. Algiers then; whereby you've been ethnicly cleansed and
redeemed. You qualify.
I A joke which is turning sour. A night caller, I do not know who
he is, who overstays his welcome.
King Now, now. Recalcitrancy won’t do. It's irrelevant, it's simply not
done in my Court.
I I'm not in your Court and you're no king of France.
King Don't be abusive. Listen! Listen! Do not ring off on me,
it's preposterous!
I Yes I will. And goodbye—
King (his voice turns falsetto, becoming more and more desperate)
Listen! Listen! I have sterling proof of it! You're speaking to His 
Most Catholic Majesty, the King of France, listen for God's sake—
I The King of France my foot—
King Listen! Christ! This is your last chance!... Jesus!
I And your Royal Prerogative with the immortels of the French
Académie: not on your nelly! —
I slammed down the receiver and waited, beside myself with rage. Just as I
expected. Within minutes the phone rang again. I lifted it and "Hullo",
I snorted into it, angrily. Cooing, an angelic voice answered—
Voice This is the Queen of France speaking...




F e r e n c  M o l n á r
Budapest, July 23, 1914
Eighty years have passed since Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the thrones 
o f Austria and Hungary, was assassinated at Sarajevo by a young member of a 
secret society o f Serbian nationalists. An Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was sent 
to the Serbian government on July 23, followed within a week by the outbreak of 
the First World War. In a Budapest newspaper, Ferenc Molnár (1878-1952), the 
celebrated playwright of later years, described his impressions o f the fateful day 
on which the ultimatum was sent.
♦  ♦  ♦
Three o'clock in the afternoon. Unbearable heat. Somebody says, "This isn’t that nice, dry, scorching heat, the kind you can even enjoy... God knows what 
this is." We sit on the terrace of the café and everything is unbearable—the wait­
er, the coffee, the newspaper, everything. At the next table there is talk about a 
swimming pool. The heat presses down on your head like a tight hat. You re­
move your straw hat and your feeling is that another hat remains on it, warmer, 
heavier, tighter. All around, everybody has unbuttoned his jacket and his vest, 
some even the collar. A waiter passes by with a lemon sherbet. A weary voice: 
"For me too..." Another: "There'll be an ultimatum by week's end... and Serbia 
will cave in, I tell you..." The heat is so awful that it is impossible to sit or stand 
or read or smoke. Really, the thing to do would be to go home. A voice: "...to un­
dress, to take a bath, to stay undressed till evening..." A friend suggests that we 
go to Margaret Island. We leave.
Sitting in the fiacre with our heads uncovered, we keep staring glassily at the 
skies where a gray veil covers the sun and now another, dirty yellowish brown, 
is drawn across it. The air is motionless. We seem to be slowly swimming in hot 
lead. Yet another veil is dropped over the sun. The toll collector at the bridge 




Budapest, July 23, 1914
On the island, three of us in a room. Our host has stretched out on the bed, pipe 
in mouth. We all smoke silently, our clothes are all over chairs and tables. 
Gradually, darkness falls beyond the windows, where huge trees stand unbeliev­
ably immobile. It is now certain that a storm is coming. I once saw a steer slaugh­
tered in a village. The animal refused to enter the slaughter-hall and had to be 
manhandled, horns tied down, head forced upward, but it kept resisting. The 
butcher stepped aside to pick up an axe. At that moment the steer suddenly be­
came transfixed, petrified. I recall its perfect immobility awaiting the blow and ac­
cepting death, as I look at those stately trees with their myriad leaves motion­
less—like a painting. I cannot see anything as yet, but they already sense the ap­
proach of lightning and tempest from the distance. Somewhere far away the 
sound of thunder. Here a slight breeze passes, the trees sigh. Again, thunder. We 
are watching. One of us says quietly: "It's coming closer..." We all think about the 
hard times in which we live—we feel the pressure of some strange anguish 
against our breasts. A bell tolls faintly in the older quarter of Buda. In the wake of 
a shrieking gust the sky turns pitch dark. Raindrops begin to drum on the tin 
roof. A horrendous clap is followed by reverberating thunder, and twelve giant 
trees lean to one side: the storm has ambushed them from behind the building. 
They rebound, but the wild wind renews its attack and as their power wanes, the 
trees sway to and fro like blades of grass. The gale goes through them like a giant 
comb, pressing the dense grove to one side and literally combing it back and 
forth. All branches and leaves lean in the same direction, like hair carefully 
combed sideways. Boughs are cracking, a window falls and glass is shattered, 
some voices are heard. The wind throws curtains of water over the combed for­
est, four or five in quick succession. The thunder is now incessant. At times the 
sounds of that bell come through from Buda, driven by the gale. Curtains of water 
now swing back and forth, veils of rain swish over the grove. The yellow wall of 
the house is turning brownish. From somewhere in the distance the long, long 
scream of a woman reaches us. A tremendous thunderclap, followed by a cacoph­
ony of creaking and grating noises all around is now heard. But the flow is no 
longer steady, only some flying rags of rain, battle flags of water, wave over the 
whining multitude of leaves. Somewhere from the direction of the inner city a bu­
gle sounds: probably firemen are rushing to some buildings that have collapsed.
The heat in the room is unbearably intense; we open the windows and the 
sharp sounds of the subsiding storm reach us together with a bit of cool breeze. 
The skies have cleared somewhat. The janitor says that the storm has uprooted 
some thirty trees. By the time he finishes telling us everything, the rain is com­
ing down quietly and the skies are brightening up in a yellowish gleam. The bu­
gle keeps sounding from the direction of the city.
Six o'clock.
We are walking through the ravaged island. I have to go into town, where a 
friend of mine has received an urgent telephone call from the Prime Minister's
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office. We hurry on. The island's telephones are out of order. Workers are al­
ready sawing up the fallen trees. We pass by a capsized boathouse which lies on 
one side in the Danube, half under water, recalling similar pictures in the British 
press of the shipwreck of the Empress o f Ireland.
The sun refuses to come out, the air is oppressive, everyone is in a bad mood. 
What could the Prime Minister be worried about? Not war, we trust. At the edito­
rial office a letter is waiting for the editor: he has to go to the office of Premier 
Tisza at ten-thirty for an important statement for the press. What could it be 
about? My friend is walking up and down in the room, smoking nervously. 
Terrible weather, eclipse, trees torn out, thunder, lightning, bells, bugles, noc­
turnal conference, war... Nerves are taut. Yet, after all, we are living in a marvel­
lous century. Not long ago we were reluctant to enter it, but now that we are 
right inside it we are breathing it in voraciously, greedily, wholeheartedly. War? 
Nobody knows what's coming. At midnight, we will know. We sit in silence. 1 
close my eyes. That far-away sound of bugle echoes very faintly in my brain.
Nine o'clock.
We have heard some details of the devastation caused by the storm. Some peo­
ple were killed, but somehow even this seems unimportant now. We all talk 
about the nocturnal conference. Ominous remarks float around. "We will be 
pushing into Serbia..." Within a couple of hours it's all over town that Tisza 
called in twenty-three newspaper editors. Everybody keeps glancing at his 
watch. A strong wind blows, the skies are a sharp, shining, transparent blue 
which ends abruptly, somewhere about the rooftops black clouds are swirling. 
In looking up, you feel you are inside a deep, dark well, above which the cloud­
less segment of the skies shines like a silver-and-blue glass dome. The black­
ness keeps spreading on the horizon, as if a thick, rolling, loathsome substance 
were oozing out of the earth. Telephones are ringing. In the crowded café, the 
whole staff of the Esti Kurír sits at a long table, at the ready. I have never heard 
so few jokes from a bunch of newsmen as this evening. Not one, in fact.
Half past eleven.
A huge motor car stops in front of the café. At the newsmen's table everyone ris­
es and stands rigidly in sudden silence. Here and there a few men jump up. 
There are surprisingly few women here tonight. People are hurrying after the 
newspapermen, watch them climb into the car or spring onto its step and hold 
on to the body; it takes off with an obscene blast and leaves behind a word that 
suddenly links people to each other: "War!" This short, strange word that 
sounds like thunder is now carried back into the café where everyone is stand­
ing by his table. It whirrs and rumbles in macabre crescendo, merging with the 
din caused by chairs being pushed back simultaneously. A single, feverish, 
drawn-out wail goes up: "War!"
Some people race down the avenue, a dandy jumps onto a hansom and yells 
at the coachman, the vehicle starts with a jerk but the passenger remains on his
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feet. Half-grins of fear and confusion are on many faces. Down the length of 
Elizabeth Boulevard one riot squad after another flashes by with shrieking 
sirens. Some wave at them from the sidewalk for no perceptible reason. The 
skies have once again become dark: a cold wind tugs at the puny trees bordering 
the Boulevard. On Oktogon Square clutters of people are arguing and the word 
leaps from one group to another and back again, grim and unfamiliar-sounding: 
"War!... War!..." Everyone is aroused and agitated. Nobody knows anything.
Two o'clock past midnight. Everyone knows everything.
The regulars of casinos and bars now crowd into the large cafés. The arguing is 
over, replaced by subdued murmurs rooted in fatigue. Scattered all around are 
lithographed handbills produced and distributed by the reporters who had been 
at the long table. It is now the deadline that preoccupies everybody, Saturday 
evening at six. "Do you know all the conditions?"—"Of course I do... a while ago 
a newspaperman jumped on the billiard table and read them off..."—"Will all of 
them be accepted, d'you.suppose?"—"Whaddayamean all?"—"Yeah, all!" A voice 
at another table: "Each point?" A very strong voice at the window: "...at six on 
Saturday, and unless all of them..." The consensus is that bargaining is out. In 
comes a journalist and suggests: "...some points... not all..." This is taken as an 
insult, everyone coldly or hotly demands full compliance with each and every 
point of the ultimatum.
A few are leaving, and some call after them. One yells "How can you sleep at 
a time like this?" One yells back "I'll try!” Another, "Should I stay up till six 
o'clock Saturday?" This is the first jocular remark made tonight. I am very tired, 
but I just don't feel like leaving as long as anybody stays. Still, after a while a 
colleague and I agree to go to the editorial office of the Pesti Hírlap.
The streets are desolate, silent, even the winds are exhausted. The windows 
of the office glow in the night: the first copies off the press are being 
spotchecked. The machines are steadily droning in the basement. Reporters 
wearily wave goodnight to each other at the entrance. "Saturday ... six...", the 
phrase like a password for a decisive encounter stays with us through the night. 
A few labourers gather around the gate, waiting for the morning paper. They too 
mumble about Saturday. The great scoop of the night has been pushed into the 
background by the expectation focused on Saturday. We go home.
Three o'clock, near dawn.
Same room and same host as in the afternoon during the thunderstorm. He is 
stretched out on the bed as before, smoking a pipe as before. Deep, pervasive, 
soothing silence hangs over Margaret Island. Not even ships are sounding their 
horns as they usually do. The uproar of the day, the tumult of the night, all is 
now behind us in this peace and quiet. I have a headache. Everyone around us is 
asleep. I wonder if the Prime Minister is asleep too. It is about half past three 
now, dawn is due. Perhaps the King is about to waken up. What could he be 
thinking? I say goodbye and go to my hotel room, open the window, turn off the
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light and peer out toward the tail of the island, toward Újpest, where the sun is 
about to rise. The skies are transparently green, something like the lovely light 
green of the sea. Thoughts are crowding into my mind from many different di­
rections as I stare out into the dawn. Suddenly a bugle brays from the Buda side, 
but it’s not the drawling tone of a fireman's trumpet: this is the fresh, crackling 
sound of an army bugle. Soldiers camped along the Danube are being roused. 
And now the sun rises over Újpest, lusterless, cold, brick-red, a startingly large 
disk. The skies are turning red. I lie on the bed and watch. For twenty years I 
have been living in the belief that I was born in a poor, small country of monoto­
nous repose, far from the grand passions of great nations, in a peaceful, cul­
tured, inventive, untroubled era. And now I go to sleep in the knowledge that I 
am at the centre of the world and that everything that agitates mankind is raging 
through my homeland. I feel that this excitement, this suddenly boiling existence 
is worth two lifetimes—a gift from God to those of us who had thought that our 
destiny was merely to watch, from a nook, the tremendous drama of life in this 
world. Even the storms are different, the joys greater, the tragedies deeper than 
they were when I was a youngster. Everything that is big and fascinating and 
world-shaking is happening right around this nook of ours. What an unbeliev­
able day this has been... Several months have passed on this Thursday.
Translated by Andor C. Klay
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I g n á c  R o m s i c s
Détruire ou reconstruire 
l'Autriche-Hongrie?
F r e n c h  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  in t h e  D a n u b e  R e g i o n  
a t  t h e  B e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  2 0 t h  C e n t u r y
I n recent centuries French policy towards the Danube region has been determined 
by France's struggle with her eastern 
neighbour or neighbours. The nations of 
Eastern Europe (or the Danube region) 
have always been judged by the position 
they took towards France in this rivalry. 
Consequently, from the beginning of the 
modern age France supported any force, 
whether headed by Prince Gabriel Bethlen, 
Prince Francis II Rákóczi or Lajos Kossuth, 
which, directly or indirectly, frustrated the 
German cause. Reasons of geography and 
actual strength naturally set a limit to this 
support. On some occasions the French 
used these Hungarian rebels as simple 
pawns in their own game, unscrupulously 
dropping them at the crucial moment; the 
last instance of this was at the end of the 
1850s when certain Hungarian exiles, in­
cluding their leader, Lajos Kossuth, were 
exploited and then abandoned by Napo-
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leon III. This bitter experience was 
summed up in a saw that was to become 
one of the corner-stones of Hungarian po­
litical philosophy: Le Dieu est haut et la 
France est loin.
France's assessment of a Habsburg 
Empire, including Hungary, placed on a 
new constitutional basis in 1867, was de­
termined by the Austrian and Hungarian 
attitude to the unification of Germany. As 
long as it was reasonable to assume that 
the Dual Monarchy, while maintaining an 
independent foreign policy, would contin­
ue to play a moderating and balancing role 
as regards the Second German Reich, 
Palacky's famous epigram ("If the Habs­
burg Empire did not exist, it would be nec­
essary to invent it”) met with approval in 
France. By the 1880's, however, after 
Bismarck had succeeded in establishing a 
system of alliances aimed primarily at iso­
lating France and at drawing the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy into this system 
through promises of support for her inter­
ests and designs in the Balkans, the stand­
ing of the Danubian -Empire in French eyes 
noticeably declined. Around the year 1900, 
this made itself manifest in the prolifera­
tion of critical views and in growing inter­
est in both pan-Slavism and various Slav 
schemes to reorganize the Monarchy on a 
federal basis. By the time the Great War 
broke out, a plan to break up the Monarchy
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into nation-states had already taken shape. 
By the time the war ended, this had be­
come the accepted aim of French foreign 
policy. My purpose here is to discuss the 
origins of this plan, and the way in which it 
became official French policy. I shall refer 
to a number of books and essays reflecting, 
and also influencing, contemporary French 
political thinking, as well as to documents 
in the Quai d'Orsay Archives and, of 
course, to the relevant literature.
The first highly influential proponent of 
both the pan-Slav idea and of a federal re­
organization of the Monarchy as possible 
means to counter German expansionism 
was Louis Léger (1843-1923), who taught 
Slavonic studies at the Collége de France. 
He was thoroughly familiar with the litera­
ture on the Balkan region and on the terri­
tories inhabited by western Slavs within 
the Monarchy; he had also travelled there. 
By 1917, he had written over twenty books 
on subjects ranging from Slavonic lan­
guages and literatures to the history of 
Eastern Europe and of Russia.
Of all the Slav nations, he was most 
closely associated with the Czechs; by 
1911 he had visited Bohemia on six occa­
sions. He learned to speak Czech and pro­
moted Czech culture,- something appreci­
ated by the Czechs in a number of ways. In 
1871, immediately following France's de­
feat by Prussia, Léger started work on 
Correspondence Slave, a journal whose 
goal "était l'union intime de nőtre pays 
avec la race Slave pour contenir les insa- 
tiables ambitions de l'Allemagne."1
From the very start, Léger enthusiasti­
cally supported the idea of changing the 
dualist structure of the Monarchy into tri- 
alism—both in the Czech and the South 
Slav version. He devoted his 1882 visit to 
the Balkans to the study of thé Illyrian 
Republic established during the Napoleo­
nic era. By dint of great effort, he was able 
to discover the marks these few years had
made on the infrastructure, the adminis­
tration and the way people thought. He 
published the following version of a con­
versation, which allegedly took place be­
tween the Emperor of Austria, visiting the 
provinces just after they had been liberat­
ed from the French, and a local escort 
member of his entourage.
"Who built this bridge?" the Emperor 
asked his guide.
"Your Majesty, the French."
"Who planted these trees?"
"Your Majesty, it was the French."
"Who paved this road?
"The French."
"Truly," the Emperor added smiling, 
"it's a shame then they did not stay 
longer".
This chapter concluded that a "Yugo­
slav" unit of five million people within 
Austria-Hungary, based on the Illyrian Re­
public but also including Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina, was desirable.2
By the early 1910s, Léger no longer 
merely wished to replace dualism by trial- 
ism but urged a federal state organized 
along ethnic lines. Léger, like R.W. Seton- 
Watson, Wickham Steed and others, made 
much of the deficiencies, errors and sins of 
Austro-Hungarian national minorities poli­
cy. He never made a secret of the fact, 
however, that what mattered to him was 
the security of his own country. If federal­
ism and universal secret suffrage were to 
be achieved, then the Slavs, thanks to their 
numbers, would dominate the Empire and 
"Austria would surely leave the Triple 
Alliance, and move closer to France and 
Russia," Léger wrote.
Pan-Slavism itself was only important 
to Léger because it admirably comple­
mented how he saw France's national se­
curity. The halting of German expansion 
was in the common interest of both the 
Slavs and the Latins, Léger wrote; for this 
purpose, the two "races" had to suspend
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their conflicts and unite against the com­
mon enemy. This logic eventually led him 
to the idea of "Great Slavia", the common 
homeland of every Slav, the ancient dream 
of all pan-Slav ideologists. However, Léger 
did not elaborate on this idea before 
1917.3
France's other leading specialist in the 
Habsburg Empire, who taught history at 
the Sorbonne, was Ernest Denis (1849- 
1921). Together with his students, includ­
ing Louis Eisemann, he addressed the 
same problems in the period preceding the 
outbreak of the First World War. "It is 
fashionable to predict the imminent disso­
lution of the monarchy of the Habsburgs", 
Denis wrote in 1903 in a work discussing 
the history of Bohemia after the Battle of 
the White Mountain. He went on to add 
nevertheless, that "the necessities which 
led to the creation of Austria in the six­
teenth century have not disappeared." 
Therefore, whatever grievances the Hun­
garians and the Poles, the Czechs and the 
South Slavs might have, the preservation 
of Austria-Hungary was in their common 
interest.4
In his L'Europe et la question d’Autriche 
au seuil du XXe siede, a journalist, André 
Chéradame, went so far as to claim that 
the Habsburg Empire's real enemy was not 
Russia and pan-Slavism, but Germany and 
pan-Germanism. Therefore, the interests 
of France and Russia actually demanded 
the consolidation and not the dissolution 
of Austro-Hungary. That was the external 
condition for an Austro-Hungarian recov­
ery, the internal condition being "federal­
ism, the sole form of government which 
assures respect for the Austrian peoples; 
this is in the interest of humanity." 
Chéradame took the federating of Austria 
as inevitable and that this would also lead 
to a change in the empire's foreign policy. 
The earlier German-Italian-Romanian ori­
entation would be replaced by a French-
Russian-Bulgarian orientation, and thus 
raise the military potential of the latter al­
liance to a level that would exclude the 
possibility of future armed conflict.5
Naturally, works predicting—in some cases, dreaming about—the disintegra­
tion of Austria-Hungary were also pub­
lished. Probably the best known of these is 
a 1884 political travelogue, Patrie hon- 
groise, written by Madame Edmond Adam 
(1836-1936), a notorious Germanophobe 
and republican. Madame Adam was con­
vinced that on the day of reckoning the 
Danubian empire held by the Austrian- 
Germans would side with Germany. She 
anticipated that the liberal and patriotic 
Hungarians (whose separatism she wel­
comed for the same reason) would take 
the opposing stance. She supported the 
creation of a sovereign, strong and united 
Hungary within the country's historic bor­
ders. While recommending generosity in 
the treatment of the Slavs, she desired that 
all Slav separatism be ruthlessly repressed. 
Indeed, Madame Adam was actively in­
volved in the preparation of the Franco- 
Russian alliance in 1891. However, she re­
jected any thought of a "Great Slavia", 
dreamt up by Léger, just as she rejected 
pan-Slavism or the extension of the 
Russian sphere of influence to the Danube 
region. This would have run contrary to 
France's national interest, in the same way 
as Germany's Mitteleuropa plans. She, 
therefore, called on the national minorities 
to listen to reason, be loyal to the Hunga­
rian state, while asking the Hungarians to 
show a generosity worthy of the spirit of 
Wesselényi and Petőfi.6
Another kind of dissolution was pre­
dicted, and supported, by J. E. Pichon in 
1913, writing under the pseudonym Jules 
Chopin. Pichon, who taught French at the 
Czech University of Prague (after 1901) did 
not believe that the Habsburg Empire
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would be able, or willing, to preserve its 
freedom of action in the face of German 
pressure, nor that the reorganization of 
the dualist state along federal lines, and 
the resulting Slav dominance, was in the 
French interest. His article rhetorically 
asks what the consequences would be if 
the latter were realized. "The Slavs are cer­
tain to turn towards the great Slav empire, 
towards Russia, as Bulgaria, Montenegro 
and Serbia already do. Such an alliance 
between Russia and Austria would pose an 
even greater danger to the balance of pow­
er in Europe than an alliance between 
Austria and Germany." Therefore, there 
was no alternative to the "abolition of 
Austria". However, in discussing the new 
states to replace Austria-Hungary, Pichon 
deviated from Madame Adam's line of ar­
gument, choosing instead to radicalize the 
plans of Léger and others by predicting the 
modest rise of a number of "homoge­
neous, free and independent small states: 
Bohemia, Austria (Lower and Upper), 
Galicia, Dalmatia, etc. To avoid them be­
coming the plaything of the great powers, 
they would obviously have to form a close 
alliance, as the Balkan states had just 
done. Palacky's observation on the neces­
sity of the Habsburg Empire was not ten­
able in the long run, Pichon argued in con­
clusion; instead, history would confirm the 
truth of Palacky's message addressed to 
the Reichsrat in Frankfurt on the prospects 
of Bohemia’s becoming a German state: 
"We were there before Austria, and we 
could well be there after her."7
Madame Adam and Professor Pichon 
were not really influential before the Great 
War. Informed French political and public 
opinion was convinced that, in spite of all 
its shortcomings and internal weaknesses, 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was still 
the best guarantee of the balance of politi­
cal power in Central and Eastern Europe; 
France's interests lay in the transforma­
tion and modernization of Austria- 
Hungary, not in its disintegration. In the 
months immediately following the out­
break of the war, the situation changed 
somewhat in that more publicity was given 
to those proposing, demanding or simply 
predicting the dissolution of Austria- 
Hungary. Yet, however, arguments for its 
preservation and modernization continued 
to be heard.
The two disappointed champions of a 
federal empire, Louis Léger and Ernest 
Denis, became the two most active propo­
nents of the idea of carving up Austria- 
Hungary into a number of nation-states. 
"Austria failed to fulfil its historic mis­
sion." "Having become the advance guard 
of Germany", who thus finally gained ac­
cess to the Mediterranean, "Austria must 
disappear." These were Léger's words at 
the end of 1914 and the beginning of 
1915.8 Similar views can be found in 
Denis's writings. In his La Grande Serbie, 
he wrote: "The Habsburgs could have per­
formed the job of keeping Germany under 
surveillance, but they have refused it and it 
is too late in the day to return to it. The 
Habsburgs must disappear. The first con­
dition of stability for a new Europe is the 
suppression of Austria."9
However, when it came to minor de­
tails, the two differed. At that time, Léger 
still envisaged three successor states: 
Austria-Hungary (German and Hungarian 
ethnically and linguistically); a new king­
dom to include Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 
and Slovakia, and a great south Slav con­
federation under a Serbian protectorate. 
Of the remainder, Galicia was to be shared 
between Russia and Poland, Transylvania 
was to be annexed by Romania, and 
Bukovina to be split between Romania and 
Russia; the Trentino, Trieste, Pola, and the 
Italian littoral were to go to Italy. 10
The map of the Danube Basin, as re­
drawn by Denis, showed three significant
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departures from Léger's version. First, in­
stead of a dualist state, Denis envisaged 
two independent countries: Austria and 
Hungary. Second, on historical, geographi­
cal and economic considerations, and out 
of respect for Hungarian "sentiments", 
Denis preferred to see Transylvania in 
union with Hungary, albeit with a wider 
political autonomy. Third, he reformulated 
the more than fifty-year-old plan of a Slav 
corridor between Pozsony (Bratislava) and 
Zagreb, which until then had only been a 
pan-Slav pipe-dream. This was the only in­
stance when "violation of the ethnic prin­
ciple is unavoidable due to overriding con­
siderations". In fact, Denis had two such 
"overriding" considerations: one was the 
Czech interest in obtaining access to the 
Mediterranean and the wish to establish .a 
passage between the western and south­
ern Slavs; the other was the need to sepa­
rate the Germans from their "servants and 
lackeys", the Hungarians.11
Later that same year (1915), Denis pub­
lished his book on the history of Serbia. In 
its final chapter he outlined the borders of 
the future "grande" south Slav state. By 
and large, the line he drew between 
Hungary and Yugoslavia was identical with 
the future Trianon frontier. In the East it 
followed the line of the River Maros, Arad 
and Szeged remaining in Hungary; it cut 
through the Bácska at the latitude of 
Szabadka (Subotica) and, winding north­
ward, reached the Danube at Baja. It fol­
lowed the River Dráva towards the conflu­
ence of the Mura and Dráva.12
Naturally, it would be extremely diffi­
cult to try to establish in retrospect how 
much public support Denis and Léger ac­
tually enjoyed back in 1914 and 1915. 
Nevertheless, it is revealing that Edith 
Marjanovic, who analysed the French 
press from this angle too, was able to find 
only four articles which speculated on the 
transformation of the Habsburg Empire,
rather than its dissolution. Three of these 
envisaged a trinity of Austria, Hungary and 
Bohemia, and the fourth argued for a fed­
eration with four members, the addition 
being Croatia with the adjoining south 
Slav territory. A majority of journalists, in­
cluding Stephen Pichon, the editor of Le 
Petit Journal, who later became foreign 
minister, speculated on the dissolution of 
Austria- Hungary.13
Both Léger and Denis, and especially 
the latter, not only wrote books but also 
contributed to the press and were public 
speakers. From May 1915, Denis edited 
the journal La nation tchéque in coopera­
tion with Eduard Benes. It played the same 
role in the Latin countries as New Europe, 
edited by R.W. Seaton-Watson and pub­
lished in London after 1917, did in Britain 
and America. On March 16, 1916, Denis 
presided over a meeting of intellectuals at 
the Sorbonne, which specifically called for 
the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire 
and the creation of Czechoslovakia. 
Speaking as a member of the committee 
set up in 1916 to work out the French war 
aims, he again argued for dissolution.14
The French government proclaimed a policy for dissolution considerably later 
and in a much less straightforward man­
ner, always with an-eye to the actual mili­
tary situation. Initially, France’s war aims 
were limited to the recovery of Alsace- 
Lorraine, at most the annexation of- the 
Saar and the left bank of the Rhine as well 
as the re-unification of Poland, with some 
sort of autonomy for the country. The lat­
ter was flatly rejected by France's ally, 
Russia.16
In the interest of strengthening their 
own camp, the Allied powers accepted as 
justified Serbian, Italian and Romanian de­
mands for certain Austro-Hungarian terri­
tories in a number of secret agreements in 
1915 and 1916. This, however, did not im-
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ply the end of the Empire, merely a vast re­
duction in its size and strength. (Transyl­
vania, Bukovina and the Banat were 
promised to Romania; South Tyrol, Gori- 
zia, Istria, and Northern Dalmatia to Italy, 
and the rest of the south Slav territories, 
with the exception of Croatia and Slovenia, 
to Serbia. These promises were hardly 
well-considered. They appeared more like 
improvisations in a game of give-and-take, 
rather than the foundations of a new 
European order.
There is ample evidence that in the ear­
ly years of the war French foreign policy 
favoured the preservation of Austria- 
Hungary, rather than its destruction. 
Reporting to Paris on a conversation with 
Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, the Russian 
foreign minister, in January 1915, Maurice 
Paléologue, the French ambassador in St 
Petersburg, wrote: "The Austrian question 
is the only one where we have to antici­
pate certain differences of opinion with the 
Russian government. As long as Germany 
and Italy exist, we will be interested in 
maintaining Austria." Léger's memoran­
dum of April 2, 1915, in which he dealt 
with the Czech issue and recommended 
giving the Czechs either full independence 
or the same status as the Hungarians, was ' 
described by a Quai d'Orsay official (prob­
ably Laroche, later to be one of the key 
French figures at the peace conference): 
"... there is nothing new in it; it evokes his­
torical memories and lists the Czechs' as­
pirations, with no arguments whatsoever 
and with no great precision." Even 
Berthelot himself, who was probably more 
sympathetic to Benes than any other 
French diplomat, advised Paléologue on 
August 8, 1916, in connection with recruit­
ing a Czech legion: "The time has not 
come yet to decide on the fate of 
Bohemia." When Benes, then secretary of 
the Czechoslovak National Committee in 
Paris, asked the French government in
December 1916 to support the establish­
ment of a wholly independent Czechoslo­
vak state, he was given similarly evasive 
answers by Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Aristide Briand. These answers, 
together with the drafts drawn up in pre­
paration for the meeting, unequivocally 
show that France firmly rejected any com­
mitment to an independent Czechoslova­
kia or the abolition of Austria-Hungary. Fi­
nally, one should mention the 1916 re­
commendations of the Comité national 
d'études sociales et politiques. After long, 
heated debate, the committee concluded 
that France's interests lay in the federation 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and not in 
its abolition.16
It has occasionally been argued that 
"during the first years of the First World 
War the French Government came round 
to supporting the dissolution of the Dual 
Monarchy and the independence of its 
Slavic or Romance nationalities or their 
annexation to their national parent states", 
and that "the French military planners 
were also prepared at the end of 1914 to 
dissolve the Dual Monarchy".17 This is ei­
ther exaggerated or based on a misunder­
standing. The origin is a document dated 
December 31, 1914, in Bordeaux, which 
was wrongly assumed to express the opin­
ion of the French High Command. It was 
in fact prepared by a Romanian refugee 
from Austria-Hungary; it was filed by the 
high command and was circulated without 
any comment, merely as a report on the 
state of the enemy's morale.18
To sum up, it can be concluded that in 
the first half of the war France had no 
clear and long-term Danubian policy. In 
the interests of victory, France—like the 
other allied powers—made various, and to 
some extent conflicting, promises (Serbia 
versus Italy); it tolerated the activities of 
exiles representing the national minorities 
of Austria-Hungary in Paris, so much so
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that after 1916 it permitted recruiting 
amongst Czech prisoners of war. Never­
theless, France never expressly urged the 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. The 
fundamental dilemma was thus left un­
decided.
This same uncertainty, or even deliberate ambiguity, characterized the joint decla­
ration, at President Wilson's request of 
January 10, 1917, in which the Allied 
Powers made their first attempt to formu­
late a concerted Danubian policy. This 
much cited text mentioned Austria-Hun­
gary’s responsibility for starting the war, 
and the "liberation of the Italians, of Slavs, 
of Romanians, and the Czecho-Slovaks 
from foreign domination" was declared to 
be one of the war aims of the signatory 
powers. Some historians, such as Kalervo 
Hovi, already mentioned in connection 
with the document dated December 1914, 
interpreted this as a commitment to the 
break-up of Austria-Hungaiy. Others, such 
as Edith Marjanovic, Zbynek Zeman or the 
American David Kelly, are of the opinion 
that the expression "liberation from foreign 
domination" actually referred to federalism 
and political autonomy for the national mi­
norities.19 The latter interpretation is con­
firmed by the fact that neither the break-up 
of Austria-Hungaiy nor any independent 
south Slav or Czech state was mentioned 
in the French memorandum which was the 
basis for the joint declaration by spelling 
out the conditions for peace from the 
French point of view. In the memorandum, 
the sole Habsburg dominion mentioned by 
name is Croatia, but only in connection 
with the division between Croatia, Serbia 
and Montenegro of what was left of 
Dalmatia after Italy took its share.20
Even if we were to accept Hovi's view 
that French war aims in late 1916 and early 
1917 included the break-up of Austria- 
Hungaiy and the creation of Czechoslo­
vakia and Yugoslavia, it would still be 
wrong to assign too much importance to it. 
Even if it had been official French policy, it 
proved to be a rather short-lived policy. 
Romanian defeats at the end of 1916 and 
the February 1917 revolution in Russia, to­
gether with the new Austro-Hungarian 
Emperor Charles's intention to sign a sepa­
rate peace, seemed to vindicate those who 
saw France's interests lying in the modern­
ization of Austria-Hungary, rather than in 
its dissolution. The French High Command, 
which, interestingly enough, showed a 
great deal more initiative in the prepara­
tion of long-term policies than did the 
Ministiy of Foreign Affairs, submitted two 
such memoranda in the first half of 1917.
Both memoranda explored possible 
ways of countering Germany's Mitteleuro­
pa policies and both speculated on the 
survival of Austria-Hungaiy. In their de­
tails, however, the two plans showed sub­
stantial differences. Unconcerned with the 
possibility of the Slav territories’ splinter­
ing off, one of the plans called for the an­
nexation of Prussian Silesia and southern 
Germany by Austria, in order to form a 
strong Catholic confederation as a re­
straint on northern Protestant, agrarian 
and militant Prussia.21 (The same plan was 
discussed by a committee discussing the 
French war aims in 1916. Strongly oppos­
ing Denis, the industrialist Francois 
Wendel argued that it was an abuse of the 
national principle to use it for the sole 
purpose of "suppressing the Habsburgs” 
and "regrouping under this heading the 
seventy million Germans of Austria and the 
Reich". "We need an Austria sufficiently 
important not to become Berlin's satellite; 
an Austria without Bohemia, Transylvania, 
Galicia etc., but enlarged by southern 
Germany."22)
Dusting off the prewar proposals for a 
federal Austria, the High Command recom­
mended in their second memorandum the
52
The Hungarian Quarterly
transformation of Austria-Hungary into a 
confederation of national and ethnic units.
In its current ("dualist and feudal") 
form, Austria-Hungary must, indeed, "dis­
appear". If, however, it was simply left to 
disintegrate, then that would only make 
life easier for Germany; the small indepen­
dent states, each without access to the sea 
and all jealous of each other, would literal­
ly fall over one another to win the favour 
of their powerful neighbour. Therefore, the 
task—and the slogan—was not "delenda 
Austria", but "constituenda Austria!" This 
was to be effected as a voluntary union of 
nation-states, independent and democrat­
ic, but still under the Habsburg sceptre. 
The proposed new empire would consist of 
five geographical units, four national and 
one multi-ethnic in character: Austria, 
Bohemia (the Moravian and the Czech ar­
eas without Slovakia), "Hungary minor", 
Croatia (the Empire's Croatian, Slovenian, 
Serbian, and Dalmatian territories), and 
Transylvania. Austria-Hungary was to lose 
the Bukovina and Galicia: the former 
would be shared between Romania and 
Russia, and the latter between Poland and 
Russia. The promises made to Serbia and 
Italy in 1915 were to be kept only in part. 
Italy's demands for the Tyrol and Gorizia 
were to be granted, but her claims to Istria 
and northern Dalmatia were to be turned 
down, on the grounds that these territories 
were vital to the Habsburg Empire. In the 
memorandum's view, the union of the var­
ious South-Slav territories of vastly differ­
ent cultural background in a single state 
would have been an even greater mistake. 
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
southern Dalmatia (up to Cattaro/Kotor) 
were to go to Serbia, but not those integral 
parts of Austria-Hungary inhabited mostly 
by Catholics. The nearly fifty-page docu­
ment concluded: "After three years of war 
it is about time to think more about us and 
less about others; the glorious peace, so
deserved by France, should not be delayed 
by minor details such as the more or less 
intransigent demands of the Serbs or the 
Romanians".23
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was well 
aware of these two memoranda from the 
High Command; they eventually came to 
form the basis of the negotiations which 
France and the Entente conducted with 
Emperor Charles in 1917.
The pro-Austria-Hungary and pro- 
Habsburg notions put forward by the High 
Command and other conservatives and 
monarchists were strongly attacked both by 
Denis and Léger and by their radical free- 
thinking and to some degree Free Mason 
friends, as documented by Francois Fejtő. 
In his next book, written in 1917, Léger had 
harsh words for "naive Catholics who, con­
fronted by a Lutheran Prussia, dreamt of an 
ultramontane Austria as a counterweight." 
Cariying on from his 1915 position, he 
drafted plans for a great pan-Slav confeder­
ation to be made up of Poland, Czechoslo­
vakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, with Ro­
mania and Greece having the option of 
joining. A Slav corridor running across wes­
tern Hungary would have secured the con­
nection between the northern and southern 
blocs. Instead of the narrow strip of land 
proposed by Denis in 1915, this Slav corri­
dor gradually spread to a width of eighty to 
a hundred kilometres, with Lake Balaton as 
its eastern boundary.24
Denis also continued his propaganda 
campaign. "There is only one solution: the 
replacement of the Dualist Monarchy by a 
series of independent states, primarily the 
Serbo-Croat kingdom, which would be 
joined by the Slovenes, and which would 
extend to the right bank of the Danube; 
and the Czechoslovak state that would 
reach the left bank, flanked by Poland to 
the north and Russia to the east," he em­
phasised in a book on the Slovaks, pub­
lished in 1917.25
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The conference held by the Free Masonic 
Lodges of the Entente and neutral coun­
tries on 28-30 June, 1917, expressed views 
similar to those of Denis and Léger. 
Speaking at the Conference, André Lebey 
summed up the war aims endorsed by Free 
Masonry in four points. These were:
-  the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine
-  the restoration of the unity and indepen­
dence of Poland
-  the independence of Bohemia
-  the liberation of the oppressed national 
minorities of Austria-Hungary, either with­
in the state or in new states established by 
national referenda.26
Despite all the efforts by radicals, 
Slavophiles, Free Masons, and politicians 
representing Austro-Hungarian national 
minority exiles, the French government re­
fused to commit itself to a definite policy 
on the future of the Danubian empire right 
up to the end of 1917. This is confirmed by 
Benes's memorandum of December 12, 
1917, on sabotage within Austria-Hungary, 
responding to a request from General 
Foch. Anticipating the failure to obtain a 
separate peace, the French High Command 
planned to organize sabotage on a grand 
scale in the Austro-Hungarian Hinterland. 
They hoped for the support of the national 
minorities. Showing some indignation, 
Benes made it clear that he, as well as the 
other national minority representatives, 
wished to see the Entente follow a "clean 
and precise political course" in their deal­
ings with Austria-Hungary. In their view, 
the Entente had deserted Serbia, Romania 
and the national minorities of Austria- 
Hungary, since it had argued for its "feder­
al transformation" in negotiations for a 
separate peace. Why should they take 
risks, Benes asked, when "these nations 
see the Entente hesitate to accept the prin­
ciple of their national independence and 
that the statesmen of the Allied powers are 
engaged in a policy of coming to an
arrangement, trying to make Austria un­
derstand that she can be saved, even 
favouring pacifist intrigue to her profit, try­
ing to separate her from Germany."27
A s far as Great Britain and the United States were concerned, Benes's criti­
cism was justified. In London and in 
Washington, the death-sentence on Aust­
ria-Hungary was not finally pronounced 
until the spring or summer of 1918.28 In 
the case of France, however, Benes’s criti­
cism was no longer justified, as the French 
government, after long hesitation, had fi­
nally made up its mind to support the divi­
sion of the Habsburg Empire at that very 
time. This decisive move, which began in 
late 1917, was sparked off by two events: 
one was the October Revolution in Russia, 
with the result that France lost its most 
important continental ally, and the other 
was the change of government in France 
on November 17, in which Clemenceau re­
turned as premier and Pichon as foreign 
minister. Unlike those they replaced, the 
two were both in favour of the dissolution 
of Austria-Hungary; the Russian revolution 
only confirmed them in their position.
The first obvious indication of the re­
turn to that idea and its elevation to gov­
ernment policy was the memorandum of 
November 26, 1917, from Pierre de Mar- 
gerie, head of the Political Section at the 
Quai d'Orsay. This document dealt with 
the Polish question, or, to be more precise, 
it discussed whether a new Poland could 
contain Germany. However, the document 
also touched on the other countries of the 
region. It concluded that the most impor­
tant eastern bastion in the defence against 
the threat of expansionism would be 
Poland, supported by an "enlarged Roma­
nia". The document then went on to sug­
gest that the defence "against tentative 
German expansionism" could readily be 
complemented by "the establishment of
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new states—likely to complete the bastion 
against German expansion on the eastern 
side." There can be no doubt that these 
new states were to be established on the 
territory of, and as a replacement for, 
Austria-Hungaiy. Still, Margerie fully rec­
ommended encouraging such a develop­
ment. In the weeks that followed, the head 
of the Political Section repeatedly expand­
ed on this idea in other contexts as well, 
adding that the new policy enjoyed the 
support not only of Pichon, but also that of 
Clemenceau and General Foch.29
Another indication of the change in 
French policy was the High Command's 
plan for wide-spread sabotage in Austria- 
Hungary; further confirmation came on 
December 16, 1917, when Pichon signed 
the decree on the establishment of a 
Czechoslovak army under the command of 
the Czechoslovak National Committee in 
Paris.
T he new direction French policy took to­wards Austria-Hungary, in late 1917, 
was made final by three events in the 
spring of 1918: the separate peace be­
tween Germany and Russia, signed at 
Brest-Litovsk in March; the final collapse 
of separate peace negotiations with the 
Emperor Charles in April (the Sixtus Affair); 
and the agreement on close economic co­
operation, pointing towards a tariff union, 
between Austria-Hungary and Germany 
and concluded in Spa on May 14-15, 1918. 
From the aspect of French national securi­
ty, it would have been difficult to decide 
which of these three events was the most 
catastrophic. Not only did Russia withdraw 
from the war, she also gave a free hand to 
Germany in the Ukraine, the Baltic region 
and in Poland. Austria-Hungaiy was 
strengthening its ties with Germany rather 
than moving away. Everything seemed to 
justify the fears of Léger, Denis and their 
associates. Fence-sitting no longer made
sense; the policy of the Quai d'Orsay be­
came unequivocal and clear in late 1917, 
especially so after the spring of 1918. 
Drawing a laugh, Clemenceau summed up 
the essence of the new policy in the Senate 
on April 19, 1918: "Les Autrichiens sont un 
peuple en décomposition; ce sont 
d'aimables décomposés, ce ne sont pas 
des méchants gens...."30
In the spring of 1918, in line with her 
new policy, France asked her allies to in­
clude in their war aims (along with the 
sovereignty of Poland) the independence 
of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the 
recognition of the Czechoslovak and South 
Slav exile committees as governments. (At 
the conference held in Rome in April 1918, 
the "oppressed nations” of Austria- 
Hungary put forward the same demand.) 
Due to delaying tactics on the part of Great 
Britain and the rigid opposition of Italy, 
which was concerned with Yugoslavia be­
coming a rival, France was unable to 
achieve this until the summer of 1918. In a 
joint declaration published on June 3, 
1918, the European allies came out only 
for the independence of Poland. In the 
case of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
they continued to refrain from assuming 
concrete obligations, only going as far as 
assuring these peoples of the favourable 
view they took of Czechoslovak and 
Yugoslav national aspirations. Thus, on 
June 29, it was France alone which recog­
nized the Czechoslovak National Council 
headed by Masaryk and Benes as the offi­
cial representative of the Czech and the 
Slovak nations and the basis of a future 
Czechoslovak government. Great Britain 
deferred doing so until August 9, and the 
United States waited still longer, until 
September 3. (As a résult of an Italian veto, 
Yugoslavia was not granted similar recog­
nition until the very end of the war.)31
In late 1918 and early 1919, following 
preliminary recognition of the potential
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member states that were to make up the 
anti-German "bastion" zone in eastern 
Europe, France tried to ensure that her 
new allies in the Danube region would be 
strengthened and Austria and Hungary 
would be weakened. The new borders in 
the Danube Basin evidently resulted from 
a compromise between Czech, Romanian 
and South Slav politicians on the one 
hand, whose excessive claims openly dis­
regarded the ethnic principle, and the 
American, Italian and British delegates on 
the other, whose more modest proposals 
had a higher regard for the actual ethnic 
proportions. Save for the wholly unjustifi­
able claims, such as the idea of a Slav cor­
ridor which even the French eventually 
abandoned, the French politicians and ex­
perts speaking at the plenary sessions and 
in the committee meetings of the peace 
conference either supported the various 
Czech, Romanian and Yugoslav demands 
or tried to act as arbitrators. For this rea­
son, the lion's share of the blame for the 
fact that some ethnically Hungarian re­
gions (such as the Csallóköz, the strip of 
land between Szatmárnémeti/Satu Mare 
and Nagyvárad/ Oradea, or the northern 
Bácska) were also detached from Hungary, 
rests with France. The crucial factors in 
the French approach concerned strategy 
and national security, with ethnic or eco­
nomic considerations having much lower 
priority.32
It would be difficult to determine which 
one of the three Danubian countries was 
considered by France—whose main concern 
in Eastern Europe continued to be Poland— 
to have the greatest potential. Benes un­
doubtedly had the best personal connec­
tions and inspired the greatest confidence 
in Paris; nevertheless, the new Greater 
Romania seemed to acquire the status of 
primus inter pares. From a strategic point of 
view, Paris looked on this country as the 
southern ’bastion of the Eastern European
cordon sanitaire. In terms of economic im­
portance, Romania was treated "as a virtual 
French colony of over fifteen million inhabi­
tants, where we can develop our trade and 
industry". In culture, French politicians 
wanted to reorganize the entire educational 
system on the French pattern, attaching 
high hopes to the "intellectual education of 
Romanian youth".33
The new policy, which was consistently applied after late 1917, right up to the 
signing of the Hungarian peace treaty in 
June 1920, was briefly questioned only 
once: in the spring of 1920, following the 
Hungarian peace delegation's arrival in 
Paris, when bilateral talks were initiated 
with the French. The fact that the 
Hungarian initiative received a favourable 
reception partly resulted from personal 
changes at the top of the French govern­
ment and partly derived from the new situ­
ation, as has been pointed out by a French 
historian, Pierre Renouvin, as well as by 
two Hungarians, Mária Ormos and Magda 
Ádám. The government which had en­
dorsed, and implemented, the concept of 
radical change in the Danube Basin lost 
power in January 1920. Poincaré, Clemen- 
ceau and Pichon were replaced by politi­
cians such as Dechanei, Millerand and 
Paléologue, who even in the final phase of 
the war were in sympathy with the idea of 
modernizing Austria-Hungary rather than 
its dismemberment. Naturally, the new 
leaders did not want to reverse its break­
up, something that would have been im­
possible at that stage. They were, however, 
gravely concerned by the fact that the re­
gion's geographical centre, Hungary, was 
left out of the system of alliances emerging 
in the Danubian Basin, and that Hungary 
was receiving such unfair treatment at the 
peace conference. Therefore, the new lead­
ership was willing to consider the 
Hungarian proposal offering substantial
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economic and political concessions to 
France in return for allowing Hungary to 
keep those border regions which were 
overwhelmingly Hungarian.34
This was all, however, that the new 
leadership was willing to do in the matter 
of revising a policy, consistently imple­
mented after the end of 1917. Indeed, it 
was by no means clear whether the will to 
go further existed at all. The Council of 
Ambassadors, meeting in London in re­
sponse to Apponyi's speech in Paris and to 
memoranda submitted by the Hungarian 
peace delegation, discussed Hungary's 
new borders again at the very time secret 
Franco-Hungarian negotiations were tak­
ing place in Paris. A more consistent im­
plementation of the ethnic principle was 
primarily supported by the Italian delega­
tion; they favoured leaving the Csallóköz 
with Hungary and granting wide-ranging 
autonomy to the Székelyföld in Transyl­
vania. Initially the British, too, (including 
Lloyd George) showed a willingness to 
modify the text of the peace agreement 
and the provisionally determined borders 
of Hungary. In contrast, the French dele­
gation stood firmly by the earlier decisions 
of the peace conference to the very end. It 
should be pointed out, however, that 
France was represented in London by 
Philippe Berthelot, a close friend of Be- 
nes's and an old acquaintance of both 
Denis and Léger. There is no reason to as­
sume, however, that Berthelot advocated 
these views against the wishes of his new 
superiors. His detailed reports35 on the 
progress of the negotiations arrived on 
Paléologue's desk every morning; had 
Paléologue wished to do so, he would 
have no doubt instructed Berthelot to 
modify his unyielding views. Berthelot 
never received such instructions, probably 
for very good reasons. This silence can be 
explained by the fact that the new French 
government envisaged economic coopera­
tion and political reconciliation between 
Hungary and her new neighbours as basi­
cally falling within the framework of the 
Treaty of Trianon. (The necessity for such 
a reconciliation was given a growing em­
phasis in the spring of 1920.) In addition, 
the letter appended to the peace agree­
ment shows that the partnership of 
Millerand and Paléologue was just as re­
luctant to go further than vague promises 
as their predecessors had been. The ap­
proach is reflected in the instructions is­
sued by the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to ambassadors between March 
and June, 1920, generally signed by 
Paléologue himself.36 My conclusion is, 
therefore, that no reversal or significant 
modification took place in France's foreign 
policy on the Danube region; all that hap­
pened was that the possibility of revising 
these policies was considered—without 
any consequences or corrections.
No substantial revisions were made 
during the next fifteen years either. The 
two cornerstones of France's policy to­
wards Hungary (and the Danubian Region 
in general) were the observation of the 
Treaty of Trianon and the prevention of a 
Habsburg restoration. Nothing changed 
right up to the last third of the 1930s, when 
the East-European "bastion" established in 
1919-1920 was rendered completely inef­
fective by the dynamism of the reviving 
German economy, producing a scenario 
that the French High Command had 
warned about back in 1917. The small na­
tions of the region engaged in ruthless 
competition for the benefits offered by the 
German market, and consequently for 
Germany's political goodwill as well, re­
gardless of sympathies or good relations 
established earlier. With the re-emergence 
of the dreaded Mitteleuropa, the funda­
mentals of the new European order drawn 
up in 1919-1920 became. questionable in 
part, and in part lost significance; at the
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same time, the guarantees to the states of 
the Little Entente gave way to schemes 
aiming at the integration of the entire re­
gion. On November 19, 1939, the Hunga­
rian Minister in Paris reported: "The inten­
tion to weaken Germany was also mani­
fested in their plans to organize the East- 
European states with the aim of forming a 
counter-weight against Germany. Their 
starting point is that the dissolution of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the 
gravest mistake of the Treaty of Versailles, 
and that after the current war a substitute 
arrangement must be found to replace it. 
This problem is attracting much attention 
in political circles here, although no one 
really knows what should be done. Some
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G y ö r g y i  K o c s i s
The Distant Lights 
of the European Union
An I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  E n d r e  J u h á s z
O ne of the yardsticks by which the new Social-Liberal coalition will be mea­
sured at the end of its term, four years 
hence, is likely to be whether it will have 
been able to meet its promise of taking 
Hungary to the very threshold of joining 
the European Union. Endre Juhász, 50, 
was appointed in the post-elections re­
shuffle as Secretary of State and President 
of the Office of European Affairs, operating 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade. Earlier, he had played a leading 
role in working out the Association 
Agreement between Hungary and the EU.
Q. The new government programme in­
cludes plans for the further development" 
of the Association Agreement, its "revision 
and amendment if necessary" so that "the 
association might be more advantageous to 
the Hungarian economy than it has thus 
far been". Should this be understood as im­
plied criticism of the Association Agree­
ment?
E. J. When the Association Agreement was 
signed in 1991, I had a feeling myself that
Györgyi Kocsis
is on the staff of Heti Világgazdaság, 
an economic weekly.
the country's position could be improved 
further, even though some two thirds of 
Hungary’s industrial products were ex­
empted from customs duties by the 
Community. As a result of further negotia­
tions, in June 1993, the Community took 
new measures to shorten the timetable for 
lifting customs barriers against Hungarian 
exports towards the Community: customs 
duties for 93 "sensitive" products would be 
abolished two years ahead of the original 
plan, that is, by December 31, 1994, and 
those levied on steel and textile products a 
year earlier than planned, at the end of 
1995 and 1996 respectively. With the ne­
gotiations advancing as rapidly as they do, 
if we were to initiate some sort of acceler­
ation in this area, the barriers would fall of 
themselves by the time we got anywhere at 
all. Therefore I can see no possibility for 
further improvement for industrial prod­
ucts. The situation is different in the agri­
cultural sector, where the Association 
Agreement did not envisage free trade 
even in the long run, and all it included 
was customs duty and import levy prefer­
ences, though these involve at least two 
thirds of our agricultural exports. In the 
meantime, the Uruguay Round of GATT, 
which covers all of world trade, has ended: 
the member governments have agreed on 
the elimination of the non-tariff barriers, 
or on their tariffication in agricultural
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trade. Since the Association Agreement 
was made on the basis of the old trade 
policy system— according to which the EU 
operates a system of import levies and 
Hungary an import licence system— the 
mutual concessions will now have to be 
transformed. Another important point is to 
carry over into the Association Agreement 
the concession in the agricultural trade 
agreement that we have with the four EF- 
TA nations which are now joining the EU. 
While discussing them, we will try to en­
large those concessions.
Q. When are discussions on this to begin ?
E. J. They will have to begin this autumn, 
and will hopefully be finished this year, al­
though there is no guarantee for that, giv­
en the speed at which the Union works. 
The speed also depends on whether re­
sults of the Uruguay Round of GATT and 
the accession of the EFTA countries will 
actually come into effect on January 1 next 
year, since the agreements will have to be 
first ratified by the parliaments of the 
countries involved.
Q. Significant pressure is expected from 
Socialist politicians and from some leaders 
of industry—Suzuki, for instance—that the 
asymmetry in favour of Hungary already 
present in the Association Agreement 
should be widened by protection measures 
limiting imports. Are these ideas realistic?
E. J. Clearly, competition can be expected 
to intensify as our own obligations gradu­
ally come into force. Up to now, a quarter 
of the industrial imports from the EU have 
been duty-free. From 1995 on, however, 
the abolition of customs duties on "sensi­
tive" products will begin. My own personal 
opinion—since no government position 
has been taken on this yet—is that any re­
striction on imports can be considered on­
ly within the framework of the protection 
measures allowed by the Association 
Agreement; any other attempt on our part 
would run into veiy strong resistance and 
would fail; it would also fundamentally up­
set our timetable for integration. On the 
other hand, there are possibilities for tak­
ing measures against dumping, subsidies 
and market disruptions, for the protection 
of infant industries or industries undergo­
ing restructuring, as well as for the protec­
tion of sectors where serious social prob­
lems might occur. We have been negotiat­
ing for more than one year now with the 
EU on measures of this kind which con­
cern 17 products—I am not at liberty to 
name them, but they account for a mere 2 
per cent of our imports from the EU—and 
these negotiations are likely to end in a 
compromise. It is, indeed, a question of in­
terpretation as to what should be consid­
ered, for instance, an industry undergoing 
restructuring. The EU will accept such a 
restriction only if we have a specific pro­
gramme to support our claim that an in­
dustry is actually being structurally trans­
formed: that is, inefficient capacities are 
being eliminated, new investments made, 
and products and technologies modern­
ized. It is not enough for a manufacturer 
simply to say that his activities are ad­
versely affected by imports.
Q. In disputes of this kind, the justice of 
the Hungarian claims would be judged by 
the very people who may suffer disadvan­
tage as a consequence of the outcome. 
Who can guarantee the impartiality of the 
decisions?
E. J. One must come to terms with the fact 
that the objective of economic diplomacy 
is not the quest for justice but the recon­
ciliation of interests. There is no third 
power above Hungary and the EU to which 
appeal could be made. These negotiations,
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H u n g a r y  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n
During the sixties Hungary's relationship with the European Economic 
Community was characterized by tension and even confrontation. Hungary, 
under the political influence o f the Soviet Union and complying with the re­
quirements of the Council o f Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), did not 
recognize the Community as an entity under international law and as a new 
political factor on the international scene. Soon, however, this policy proved 
to be counter-productive: without normal relations Hungary's trade and 
economic interests were harmed. During the seventies the country tried to 
adjust to reality; while still opposing a comprehensive trade agreement, the 
Hungarian Government was ready to conclude agreements in specific sec­
tors (certain agricultural products, steel, textile and apparel). After the fail­
ure o f the negotiations between the CMEA and the Community, Hungary felt 
free to go ahead on its own. Accordingly, in 1988 it established diplomatic 
relations with the Community and concluded a trade and economic cooper­
ation agreement which was intended to govern a wide range o f issues. This 
agreement, however, just meant the normalisation o f the relations.
After Hungary committed itself to the establishment o f a pluralistic 
democracy and market economy, the Community decided to offer a relation­
ship o f a new quality. In April 1990, at its Dublin summit, the leaders o f the 
Twelve declared their readiness to establish an association with Hungary 
and with two other countries o f Central Europe, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Following exploratory discussions, official negotiations for the conclu­
sion o f the Association Agreement, later called the Europe Agreement, be­
gan in December 1990 in Brussels. While there was agreement at the level o f 
political intentions and objectives, reconciliation o f conflicting trade and 
economic interests turned out tó be extremely difficult. The discussions, in 
ten negotiating rounds, had gone through several "crisis" situations. The 
major sources of difficulties were market access for sensitive Hungarian in­
dustrial products, agricultural concessions, movement o f labour, establish­
ment by Community nationals and companies in Hungary, financial assis­
tance from the Community and the extent o f the asymmetry (how long to 
postpone the implementation o f Hungarian commitments).
therefore, are a highly intensive struggle 
about who can argue better. And if we run 
out of arguments, we must accept that our 
claim will not "go through".
Q. Two years have passed since the entry 
into force o f the trade provisions o f the
Association Agreement, and although the 
year 1992 saw fairly good results in foreign 
trade, last year Hungary's export trade all 
but collapsed. That seems to support the 
critics o f the agreement, who argue that the 
EU has profited a great deal more from the 
association than Hungary has.
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Moreover, the Community seemed reluctant to regard the Association 
Agreement as a preparatory phase toward full integration and to accept ref­
erence to Hungary's membership in the text of the agreement. The Commis­
sion conducting the negotiations for the Community twice had to ask for a 
new or modified negotiating mandate from the Council.
By November 1991 the negotiators had gradually formulated the com­
promise solutions; the agreement was initialled on 22 November 1991, then 
signed on 16 December 1991. The Europe Agreement is designed:
■ to set up institutionalized political dialogue aiming at an increasing 
convergence of positions;
■ to establish a free trade area between Hungary and the Community in 
industrial products by the end of the year 2000, to provide mutual 
preferential market access and concessions in agricultural trade;
■ to make progress towards realizing between the Parties the other eco­
nomic freedoms on which the Community is based (freedom of move­
ment of services, labour and capital, right of establishment)
■ to promote economic, financial and cultural cooperation on the 
widest possible basis
■ to support Hungary's efforts to develop its economy and to complete 
the conversion into a market economy.
The preamble of the agreement states that "the final objective of Hungary is 
to become a member of the Community and that this association, in the 
view of the Parties, will help to achieve this objective."
The trade and trade-related provisions of the Europe Agreement, by 
means of an interim agreement, have been in force since 1 March 1992, 
while the Association Agreement itself—after a long ratification process by 
member states—entered into force on 1 February 1994.
At their Copenhagen summit meeting in june 1993, the Community lead­
ers decided to grant accelerated liberalization for the products of the associ­
ated countries and confirmed that they share their objective of becoming 
members of the Community.
On 1 November 1993 the Maastricht Treaty entered into force and the 
European Union was born.
On 31 March 1994 Hungary formally submitted its application for mem­
bership in the European Union.
E. J. The agreement cannot create goods 
that can compete in the market. True, ear­
lier on we used to be more optimistic 
about the performance of the Hungarian 
economy. The situation is well illustrated 
by the fact that, last year, Hungary was 
able to fill, on average, only 30 per cent of
its quotas for textile and clothing exports 
to the EU. On the other hand, however, 
that may also indicate that our negotiating 
tactics were not bad at all: we wanted to 
achieve quotas as large as possible. Here 
is an element which is always somewhat 
contradictory: if we are able to utilize the
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quota to the full, it may mean that the ne­
gotiators were not successful enough, if 
the quotas remain unexploited, then the 
economic leadership may come under crit­
icism. Nevertheless, the advantages of the 
agreement are shown in the fact that a 
growing proportion of Hungary's exports 
go to the EU countries. In 1992, when 
there was still an upswing in exports, 
Hungarian exports to the EU increased 
14.4 per cent in value, against an increase 
of 7.4 per cent of our total exports; but this 
figure might also be compared to the 3.1 
per cent growth of our exports to the EFTA 
countries or the 6.3 per cent growth in 
Hungarian exports to the United States. In 
the first half of 1994, the growth of 
Hungarian total exports was 7.8 per cent, 
but growth in our exports to the Union 
was 13.7 per cent. There are many 
Hungarian companies which would have 
practically gone out of business without 
the Association Agreement, since the EU 
countries had been maintaining heavy re­
strictions on their products.
Q. According to some critics, the agree­
ment is too restrictive regarding the so- 
called rules of origin. Hungarian goods 
cannot be delivered duty free to the EU un­
less the value of Hungarian content in them 
is at least 60 per cent. This prevents 
Hungary, they object, from increasing ex­
ports by processing material purchased 
cheaply in the East.
E. J. The goal of both parties is that con­
cessions should be enjoyed by products 
manufactured in the countries involved. It 
is not in our interest to lose customs rev­
enues while, say, all kinds of goods from 
Hong-Kong could be imported from an EC 
country duty free. This would simply mean 
abusing the free trade agreement. It might 
perhaps be profitable temporarily, but its 
long term economic effects are dubious.
The present rules encourage foreign in­
vestors moving their operations to 
Hungary to rely heavily on Hungarian 
labour and suppliers if they want to export 
to the countries of the EU. This is highly 
desirable from the point of view of job 
creation. On the basis of the rules of ori­
gin, imports from the EU countries are 
treated as "originating" products, i.e. 
"Hungarian" products. Therefore the so 
called cumulation is possible. However, 
the critics are right to say that the EFTA 
countries are excluded from this cumula­
tion, even though we have free trade 
agreements with them. Fortunately, this 
problem will be solved when the EFTA 
countries join the EU. But negotiations 
should continue to ensure cumulation 
with the Visegrad countries.
Q. The government programme includes 
efforts to tap the financial resources of the 
EU to a greater extent than so far. What are 
the chances?
E. J. I do not think that we can achieve an 
increase on a major scale. We have al­
ready received annually about 100 million 
ECUs of non-repayable grants within the 
PHARE programme, I hope this figure will 
grow by an annual 10 per cent until 1999. 
Although PHARE is frequently criticized, I 
am convinced that the majority of the ob­
jectives financed by it thus far have been 
useful. Who could deny, for instance, that 
a market economy needs a well function­
ing stock exchange, an adequate customs 
organization, statistical system or quality 
testing institutes? All these institutions 
have received heavy support from PHARE. 
It is a fact, though, that we would like to 
see certain changes: a greater role for the 
Hungarian government in decisions re­
garding the use of funds; plans should be 
made in terms of not one but several 
years ahead, and a growing share of the
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money should be spent on projects that 
genuinely develop the economy, encour­
age investment and improve the infra­
structure.
Q. Some critics maintain the PHARE pro­
gramme was nothing but a source of huge 
fees for Western advisors. Cases are men­
tioned when the Hungarian authorities, at 
the urging of the EU, had one more study 
or investigation made even though they 
had known for a long time what the solu­
tion should be—but the money had to be 
spent not on that solution but on paying 
the experts sent by the EU.
J. E. It has to be admitted, though, that in 
many areas there simply is a shortage of 
Hungarian specialists who are fully fluent 
in a foreign language and who have a 
proper knowledge of market economies 
and adequate contacts with institutions 
and companies in the West. I doubt that, 
for instance, in privatization, we could 
have advanced as far as we have without 
the assistance of foreign advisors. On the 
other hand, it cannot be denied, that a cer­
tain self-interest is manifest on the part of 
the Union. There might be occasions when 
the Community, on launching an aid pro­
gramme, does take care that it should also 
create opportunities for business for its 
own companies. But that applies not only 
to the European Union. Other donor coun­
tries do the same.
Q. On April 1, 1994 the previous govern­
ment submitted its application for mem­
bership in the EU. However, the criteria for 
fill membership are not set out anywhere. 
Some of the present members had fully- 
fledged modern economies when they 
joined, while others—Spain, for instance— 
managed to catch up during the ten-year 
transition process. How high is the hurdle 
that Hungary has to clear?
E. J. Hungary is a third variant. By the time 
of its accession, which is expected around 
the year 2000, it must reach a certain level 
of integration, and the rest of the road may 
be covered within the walls of the Union, 
with temporary exemption from certain of 
the criteria. Full membership, in fact, 
means, that the member country under­
takes to adopt, within a foreseeable time, 
the complete legal system and policies of 
the EU. The exemptions that we are likely 
to need are outlined in a memorandum 
submitted to the European Commission 
just after our application for membership. 
We will obviously have to ask for exemp­
tion from certain requirements laid down 
in the common agricultural policy. There is 
a wide gap between the levels of guaran­
teed prices in Hungary and the Union. 
However, this gap might narrow in the fu­
ture as a consequence of both the reform 
of the common agricultural policy, leading 
to lower guaranteed rices and of the trend 
for higher agricultural prices in Hungary.
In all likelihood, capital flow will also 
be an exception. I do not believe that we 
will be able to completely liberalize the 
outflow of capital from Hungary in any 
foreseeable time. But even in the area of 
capital inflow it is quite conceivable that 
the Hungarian government will want to re­
tain procedures for the individual licensing 
of banks and insurance companies for 
some time to come. We will probably ask 
for exemption from a number of technical, 
environmental and health requirements as 
well. The mutual flow of labour is not like­
ly to become unrestricted all at once, espe­
cially if the Visegrád nations are admitted 
at the same time. And we will, in all proba­
bility, ask for provisional exemption from 
the so-called Maastricht criteria, among 
which are that the budget deficit of an EU 
country must not, in the future, be more 
than 3 per cent of GDP, the national debt 
not more than 60 per cent of GDP, and the
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inflation rate must not exceed the average 
of the three best-performing countries by 
more than 1.5 per cent. At the same time 
we are certain to be specially treated by 
the EU in the allocation of the so-called 
structural funds: if they do not want— nor 
should we want, in the interest of our ad­
mission—that our accession should im­
pose unbearable financial burdens on 
them, then they must apply for a transition 
period different conditions to us than they 
do to the present members or to the EFTA 
countries that are now joining.
Q. Some experts say that the difficulty of 
the former socialist countries have in join­
ing is increased because they have to shoot 
at a moving target: they must accept that 
they have to adopt the entire system of the 
Union and all its conditions at a time when 
those conditions are changing along the 
way in an unknown direction. And 
prospective new members having no influ­
ence on the modifications at all. How can 
you negotiate successfully in such circum­
stances?
E. J. Well, the target'does not really move 
all that much. The essence of integration is 
well known, and its evolution can be 
largely foreseen. The decisive factor for 
Hungary is that we have to move closer. 
We have made it clear, for instance, that 
we will not accept a standard such as 
Hungary's having the same per capita GDP 
as the EU average, or a given percentage of 
it, but the existing gap should not widen. 
Nor is it entirely true that we have no in­
fluence on the conditions of our joining. It 
was, for instance, in the process of their 
joining that the EFTA countries made the 
Union accept the notion of "Northern agri­
culture", and managed to win special con­
ditions for themselves. No doubt, basically, 
we must speak about Hungary's unilateral 
adaptation, but we would have to adapt to
the single European market even if we 
were to stay outeide. So it is better to get 
inside somehow, and then—even if to a 
modest degree—influence developments.
Q. The internal relations of the EU are also 
complex; the Germans and the British, for 
instance, take a friendlier attitude to our 
joining the Union than do the French. What 
causes these differences?
E. J. Undoubtedly, Germany's position has 
always been clearly pro-integration, al­
though it does have certain contrary inter­
ests, for example, in agriculture. In addi­
tion, it shoulders the greatest financial bur­
den within the Union, thus it must think 
twice about the new financial obligations 
the Union would undertake as a conse­
quence of its enlargement toward the East. 
The British government is sometimes ac­
cused of supporting the enlargement of the 
EU only because it would like the 
Community to move from a federal-type in­
tegration toward a form which has a greater 
respect for the authority of the nation­
states. France, on the other hand, is wary of 
possible competition from Hungary's agri­
cultural exports. The southern wing—Spain, 
Portugal and Greece—has thus far assured 
us of their full political support, although 
there may be a certain amount of fear in 
these countries that we would take too 
much of the structural funds, to their disad­
vantage. For us there is no point in taking 
sides in these disputes—in fact we must not 
do so. It is a favourable development that, 
as the resolutions of the recent EU summit 
in Corfu have shown, our admission is now 
treated as an accepted prospect, and the 
question is only when and on what condi­
tions it will be accomplished. I believe that 
Austria's membership, in 1995, helps 
Hungary a lot, since the admission of a 
country without any common border with 
the EU would hardly have been conceivable.
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Q. Does the person of the new President of 
the Brussels Commission, Jacques Santers, 
mean an advantage or a drawback from the 
point of view of our admission?
E. J. That is very hard to tell, for it also de­
pends on what sort of shape the new 
Europe is going to take—and at this mo­
ment, there appears to be a slight move­
ment away from federalism. On the basis 
of M. Santers' record, one has the feeling 
that he may not have the same large vision 
about Europe as Jacques Delors had; on 
the other hand, he promises to be more 
pragmatic, more of a technocrat. His char­
acter, his readiness to seek compromises, 
may turn out to be highly favourable from 
our point of view.
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K á l m á n  M i z s e i
Recipes for Growth
The crucial problems in the economy have been interpreted in a somewhat 
distorted way in Hungary, due partly to the 
electoral campaign in the first half of 1994. 
Furthermore, economists have tended to 
interpret the general lessons of the transi­
tion too narrowly, not taking into account 
the experience of other transitional 
economies, such as those of Poland and 
the Czech Republic. In 1993 the problems 
of macroeconomic disequilibrium intensi­
fied—the budget and current account 
deficits reached worrying levels and the 
special bank and enterprise bail-out opera­
tions (a mechanism, which restored subsi­
dies) added another more than US$3 bn to 
the national debt. Yet, the economic pro­
fession, instead of pressing the politicians 
to focus on macroeconomic problems, was 
preoccupied with the lack of economic 
growth in a situation when industrial re­
covery was already very robust indeed; the 
philosophy of a "half-turn" gained momen­
tum. Added to this, in the 1994 parliamen­
tary elections the party gaining a sweeping
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victory was that which represents in the 
eyes of the public a more generous redis­
tribution of the common pie.
The worst long-term, structural prob­
lem of the Hungarian economy is the 
heavy state debt. Hungarian policy-mak­
ers need to define the optimal economic 
policy mix by taking account of this prob­
lem and yet tiying to achieve a (sustain­
able) economic growth for the long run. 
The announced policy of the minister of fi­
nance, László Békési, is based on four 
correct, and given the voting base of the 
government, courageous premises. First, 
the recent size of the Hungarian budget 
deficit threatens us with the debt getting 
out of control in 1995. Therefore urgent 
and short-term corrections are needed. 
Second, with the recent level of institu­
tional maturity of the economy, the fight 
against inflation makes it imperative not 
only to cut the budget deficit but also to 
take administrative measures to control 
the growth of nominal wages and to 
achieve a negative real wage index in 
1995. Thirdly, a condition of sustainable 
economic growth is the expansion of ex­
ports. Finally, solidly based growth also 
presupposes a regulatory environment 
which aggressively encourages savings as 
against consumption. The joint and con­
sequent combination and reconciliation of 
these four policy principles could deal
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with the decades long dilemma of the 
Hungarian economy between the goals of 
equilibrium and growth.
T h e  K á d á r i s t  d i l e m m a
P olicy-makers must realize that the above dilemma can be handled: in fact, 
the really successful economies in the 
contemporary world (the most obvious ex­
amples are Japan and Germany) can satisfy 
the requirements of growth and macroeco­
nomic balance simultaneously. In Hungary 
this false—from the point of view of long­
term success—dilemma is rooted in the 
political history of Kádárism. The growth 
model of socialist Hungary was exhausted 
in the 1970s. After that the Kádárist philos­
ophy, born in fear of a repetition of 1956, 
tried to deal with the dilemma by allowing 
overconsumption instead of the economi­
cally more rational alternative of dynamic 
systemic reforms. (On the other hand, for 
Hungary the Ceausescu-type "solution", 
i.e. drastic cuts in consumption for the 
purpose of keeping investments high, was 
obviously not available either.) This policy 
inevitably pulled the country into the trap 
of external indebtedness. The great burden 
of the post-communist period is that, after 
the taxi drivers' blockade against certain 
price measures in late 1990, the Antall 
government also became "Kádárist", that 
is, it postponed and never in practice real­
ized the necessary reforms concerning ma­
jor items in the budget and thus could not 
reduce the budgetary deficit.
In the current situation the country's 
deficit cannot exceed the level where the 
national debt would further grow in pro­
portion to the GDP. In fact, the govern­
ment should start to massage down the 
debt as soon as the economy starts on a 
solid economic growth course. A very re­
cent study by the World Bank reckons that 
if there are no urgent budgetary adjust­
ments, inflation could get out of control 
and reach the level of 50 per cent by 1996. 
This shows the urgency of stopping over­
spending and, in a broader perspective, of 
discontinuing the Kádárist heritage of eco­
nomic policy thinking.
The magnitude of the budgetary adjust­
ment in the government's original pro­
gramme is not at all unique in an interna­
tional perspective. The obvious example in 
Eastern Europe is the Polish stabilization 
in 1990. In Hungary it is rarely mentionéd, 
because it does not fit into the Hungarian 
stereotypes, that in Poland, after eigh­
teenth months from the beginning of the 
stabilization programme, industry started 
its robust growth; since then Poland has 
had the fastest growing industry in 
Europe. Although this growth started at a 
very low level and was supported by a gen­
erous restructuring of Poland's interna­
tional debt, what we need to focus on is 
the dynamics of the process. Without any 
particular growth stimuli, with a "simple 
minded" monetarist policy, Poland was 
able to turn around and make its economy 
more dynamic. Something similar has 
happened in the Czech Republic: again, no 
growth stimuli but a very consistent effort 
to maintain macroeconomic equilibrium 
and to keep wages at competitive levels 
was sufficient to contain the decline of 
GDP in 1993 and to achieve a healthy 
growth in 1994.
Hungary does not need a budgetary and 
wage correction of the magnitude of the 
Polish shock therapy of 1990. To some ex­
tent the international conditions for policy 
correction are better now than in the last 
couple of years, as the economies of main 
European trading partners (Germany, Aust­
ria and Italy) have started to grow again. 
Thus for Hungary it will be enough to apply 
a more modest dose of the Polish recipe to 
overcome the false dilemma of macroeco­
nomic balance or growth.
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S h r i n k i n g  r e a l  w a g e s
I f the four policy principles listed above drive economic policy in the next years, 
from 1996 the Hungarian economy will be 
able to grow without threatening the re­
quirements of macroeconomic equilibri­
um. Why are shrinking real wages inevit­
able in order to achieve growth? Explain­
ing this to the public will be the most cru­
cial task of the new Socialist-led Hunga­
rian government. In the election campaign 
it was only László Békési who painted a 
realistic picture of the state of the econo­
my; most of the others left the people un­
der the false impression that falling real 
wages in the early 1990s were due to the 
erratic policies of the Antall and Boross 
governments. Contrary to this illusion, the 
truth is that after the justified restrictions 
of 1990-91, Hungarian economic policy 
became too lax and thus started to under­
mine the reserves not only of the day but 
also of the future.
The budgetary adjustment measures 
need to be accompanied by income poli­
cies for several reasons. Real wages have 
increased in 1994 due to the lax income 
policies of the Boross government in the 
period before the elections. This cries for 
an adjustment, otherwise the unfavourable 
recent trends in inflation and in the cur­
rent account could be reversed only 
through an overlong period. Besides this, 
income policy measures would improve 
the short-term competitiveness and liquid­
ity position of the enterprise sector and 
thus the number of bankruptcies would be 
fewer, and in turn the pressure on the gov­
ernment to bail out troubled banks and 
enterprises would be less severe. As men­
tioned earlier, national debt has increased 
by more than US$3 bn in consequence of 
such bail-out operations in the past three 
years. This practice has generated rent 
seeking behaviour in the enterprise sector
and in an indirect way has restored subsi­
dization in the economy. As the Polish and 
Czech examples clearly show, in a transi­
tional economy the most efficient short­
term way to lower the rate of inflation is 
cutting real wages, thus squeezing domes­
tic demand and breaking inflationary ex­
pectations. In the recent Hungarian de­
bates, anti-inflationaiy policies are often 
portrayed as the obsession of selfish tech­
nocrats. In reality there is no more "effi­
cient" source of socially unjust polariza­
tion of wealth than inflation, since differ­
ent social groups have highly differing ac­
cess to protective instruments against the 
rapid growth in prices. The desire to push 
down inflation to one digit levels is not a 
technocratic obsession, but is dictated by a 
sense of genuine social responsibility. The 
example of the Czech Republic shows that 
this is not an unachievable goal, but politi­
cians need courage to take measures 
which will be unpopular in the short run.
Both successful post-socialist stabiliza­
tions, the Polish and Czech ones, energeti­
cally used the weapon of restrictive in­
come policy. One should look with special 
attention at the Czech example: against 
advice to the contrary and loud social 
demagogy, Klaus contained the growth of 
nominal wages with an iron hand, often 
resorting to very tough administrative 
measures. The result of the sustained ef­
forts of the past three years appear now: 
the curve of the inflation rate in the Czech 
Republic has separated from the Hungari­
an one for the first time since the econom­
ic transition in the region started; it will be 
around 10 per cent in 1994.
Czech economic policy does not fit into 
the Hungarian stereotypes and therefore it 
is being somewhat misinterpreted: Hunga­
rian economists repeat again and again 
that in the Czech Republic "restructuring 
has not yet started". I think this is a half 
truth: the Czechs have indeed chosen a
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more cautious path of structural reform 
than the Hungarians in many respects and 
the sequencing of different reform mea­
sures is also different. However, for us, 
Hungarians, it is more important to con­
centrate on that half of the Czech story 
from which we can learn a positive mes­
sage. Against all the gloomy predictions, 
the sustained balancing of the budget and 
holding down of wages have created the 
fundamentals for healthy and sustainable 
Czech economic growth. Thanks to a con­
sistent monetarist economic policy, the 
Czech economy has started on a growth 
path which will soon catapult them (be­
sides the Poles) into the vanguard of eco­
nomic growth in Europe. One may well 
wonder which approach is more "socially 
sensitive": one which leads to further ac­
cumulation of the debt mountain, claiming 
that the social burden of transition would 
otherwise be unbearable, and thus nar­
rows the long-run chances for growth, or 
one which, in the period of transition to a 
market economy, also helps to improve 
competitiveness through the instruments 
of income policy and thus generates high­
er growth and, consequently, higher levels 
of employment. (The low level of unem­
ployment in the Czech Republic is not only 
the function of slow restructuring but also 
of higher competitiveness due to held- 
down wages.)
It is true that the Czechs, like the Poles, 
were in a sense in a better starting posi­
tion than Hungary, since they started the 
era of bold economic reforms without sig­
nificant debts. However, repeating this 
truth does not help much: the task ahead 
of us is to find a solution in this more diffi­
cult situation instead of making things 
worse. My conviction is that the governing 
coalition must try to hammer together a 
broad social pact around the necessary ad­
justment measures. The socialists may get 
encouragement from the fact that the most
obvious historical example, the Moncloa 
Pact secured the leading role of he 
Socialist Party in the Spanish moderniza­
tion for an extended period of time. The 
Hungarian agreement should harmonize 
the three goals of sustained growth, 
macroeconomic equilibrium (which also 
means steadily diminishing inflation) and 
growing real wages. At the same time, this 
pact should not get the country into the 
trap of a strong trend towards corpora­
tivism because this would, in the longer 
run, jeopardize economic and social mod­
ernization even if in the short run it could 
reconcile the three goals. At the same time 
the opposition parties, in spite of their rel­
ative weakness in the current parliament, 
should be involved in the drafting of a 
broad national pact; this would help the 
development of democracy and would be 
beneficial to the governing parties.
What the trade unions have to consider 
is that, in case of growing macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, real wages inevitably de­
cline in the long run—as many inter­
national examples, including that of some 
neighbouring post-communist econo­
mies—clearly indicate. Many laymen ask if 
it could be the other way around, i.e. first 
increase real wages and then adjust the 
production. However, that is exactly what 
has happened in Hungary since the middle 
of 1993 with the well-known result of 
growing macroeconomic tensions. Society 
has to pay a heavy price for this: economic 
policy is forced to step on the brake and 
make more painful adjustments than it 
would do if previous policy had been more 
cautious.
E x p o r t  o r i e n t e d  g r o w t h  f r o m  1 9 9 6
I n the case of a small economy it is clear that exports should be the motor of long 
term growth. Some analysts try to achieve 
this first of all through frequent devalua­
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tions. A much more intelligent, and again 
more beneficial, approach is to force ex­
port growth by a good mixture of strict 
and predictable macroeconomic policy, 
competitive wages and appropriately set 
exchange rates. On the other hand it is im­
portant that the economic policy does not 
fall into the mistake of the macroeconomic 
policies of 1992-93: then the exchange 
rate policy had to bear a disproportionate 
burden in the anti-inflationary fight, since 
fiscal policy was irresponsibly expansive.
The Békési programme now offers a 
chance to put the Hungarian economy on 
a sustained growth path. However, the 
path is going to be long and thorny. A
large number of politicians in the govern­
ing party still do not want to face the reali­
ties of the Hungarian economy. They are 
still voting down the painful measures 
suggested by the Minister of Finance 
thereby making the period of adjustment 
longer than necessary, consequently the 
economic recovery will be modest even in 
1996. Macroeconomic austerity measures 
will thus be inevitable even in this period. 
Moreover, the difficulty with which the 
necessaiy short-term measures are born 
makes all the more burdensome the task 
of concentrating on solutions which can 
enable the state to disengage partly from 
the social welfare systems, n
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G á b o r  H a l á s z
Schooling and Social Change
I n the summer of 1993, parliament passed a set of three acts on higher edu­
cation, schooling and vocational training. 
The main goal was to adjust education to a 
subtler, more pluralistic view of social 
structure, to the needs of a parliamentary 
democracy and a market economy. 
Legislation was meant to strengthen a 
process of transformation started earlier, 
and to impel entirely new changes. The 
following will attempt to outline the cur­
rent situation and the changes taking 
place in public education in Hungary in the 
light of these laws.
The past of schooling was determined 
by the country's social and political sys­
tem, by its belonging to the Soviet bloc. 
Education was, for decades, subordinated 
to the demands of a planned economy, 
that is, to the labour needs arising from 
forced industrialization and to the need to 
spread Marxism, the dominant ideology. At
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the same time, however, the development 
of the school system and the raising of ed­
ucational standards was always given high 
priority. As a result, the system of school­
ing that emerged was fairly highly devel­
oped, but, from many respects, distorted 
and ill-suited to the needs of a modem, 
open society.
Compulsory schooling begins in 
Hungary at the age of six and lasts to the 
age of sixteen. Before entering school, 
nearly 90 per cent of 3 to 6 year olds at­
tend kindergarten. Since the mid-1940s, 
the backbone of compulsory education 
has been the eight-year general school, 
which is completed by 80 per cent by the 
age of 14, and by another 15 per cent at 
15. The latest education act raised the 
duration of general school from eight to 
ten years.
After finishing general school, 95 per 
cent of the pupils go on to some medium 
level educational institution. About a quar­
ter go on to general secondary schools, 
and a third to vocational secondary 
schools. These schools take four, some­
times five years and finish with a maturity 
examination entitling those passing to en­
ter an institute of higher education. The 
others go on to some form of shorter vo­
cational training, the majority in three- 
year schools providing a skilled worker 
qualification. Because of the relatively high
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dropout rate, the number of those leaving 
the school system possessing a qualifica­
tion of some kind is a great deal lower 
than the number of those entering it. Of 
any generation, only a tenth enter the 
labour market with a higher education 
diploma and a fifth with secondary school 
education of full value. Nearly a third of 
school-leavers have no higher qualifica­
tion than the eight years of general school 
completed, or even less than that.
Given its financial potential and the 
state of the economy, Hungarian society 
spends, by international standards, rela­
tively highly on the operation and develop­
ment of the school system. While the 
country's GDP has declined in the past 
couple of years, the share falling to educa­
tion has actually grown: in 1989, 4.9 per 
cent of GDP was spent on education, in 
1992 the figure was 7.1 per cent. This fig­
ure does not show the amount of money, 
also growing, which families spend on 
their children's education.
Until very recently, schooling was con­
ducted on the basis of detailed, centrally 
determined curricula. New curricula were 
last introduced in 1978. In the second half 
of the 1980s, as a result of reforms then 
launched, schools were given a consider­
able amount of autonomy. Many schools 
initiated local innovations regarding their 
curricula. According to expert estimates, 
prior to the passing of the new education 
acts, at least a third of all schools deviated 
to some degree from the central curricula 
in force at the time.
The research done in Hungary under 
the auspices of the International Associa­
tion for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement (I.E.A.) throws some light on 
the efficiency of education in Hungary. 
According to a 1991 survey, in tests mea­
suring reading skills, Hungarian students 
achieved 7th to 10th place among 14 years 
olds from 27 countries. They perform even
better in the science subjects: according to 
a 1983 survey, Hungary was placed 3rd 
among 19 countries in biology and 
physics.
A great deal of discussion is going on 
today in every country on how to direct 
the educational system and on the rela­
tionship between central and local au­
thorities. Hungary is reckoned to be de­
centralized.
Of primary and secondary level 
schools, 95 per cent are owned by local 
authorities enjoying a high degree of inde­
pendence. These authorities decide on the 
establishing of schobls or on changing 
their character, they appoint principals, 
determine their budgets, and approve their 
basic documents. Every school has 
statutes of its own, and the new education 
act rules that they must work out their 
own educational programme. The majority 
of schools have autonomous control over 
their budget. The employer of teachers is 
the principal, and the teaching staff has 
extensive rights in determining the system 
and operation of the school.
With rare exceptions, teachers working 
in the primary and secondary schools have 
higher education degrees: children up to 
13 years old are taught by teachers gradu­
ating from a four-year training college and 
older ones by graduates of five-year uni­
versities. Today more than two thirds of 
kindergarten teachers have also graduated 
from an institution of higher education. 
Teachers' salaries, as in many other coun­
tries, fall well below the level of other pro­
fessions with qualifications of a similar 
standard but, especially in country areas, 
can nevertheless be regarded as relatively 
high compared to average earnings. The 
teaching profession in Hungary is very ac­
tive: there are many professional organiza­
tions which play an active part in shaping 




I n the countries of the former Soviet bloc, the field of education was not unaffected 
by the dramatic political changes that fol­
lowed the year of 1989. With the disap­
pearance of central economic planning 
and the monolithic ideology, the emer­
gence of a market economy and democrat­
ic political institutions, the educational 
system found itself in a radically new so­
cial environment.
In Hungary that transformation took 
place with fewer conflicts and less turbu­
lence than in some other countries of the 
region. The reason was that efforts to dis­
mantle some of the elements of rigid cen­
tral economic planning had already begun 
here in the 1960s, and were, in the 80s, 
followed by some cautious political re­
forms. After 1985, for instance, the previ­
ous system of inspection, which also had 
in part a political role, was abolished, and 
schools were granted the right to approve 
or reject the appointment of principals by 
secret ballot (this right has recently been 
annulled by a decision of the Con­
stitutional Court). In the 1980s, central de­
cisions had a smaller and smaller part in 
the shaping of vocational training, and the 
increasingly independent firms had an ever 
greater say.
The great political realignment that 
took place in the year 1989-1990 entailed 
a modification of the fundamental legal 
framework of education. In 1990 the state 
monopoly of education was abolished by 
an amendment to the law; so too were the 
obligatory teaching of Marxist ideology 
and of the Russian language. Nearly all the 
new political parties that emerged agreed 
that the autonomy of schools and lo­
cal communities should be further in­
creased. Their educational policies empha­
sized that the Hungarian educational sys­
tem ought to be brought closer to 
European norms, and that schools should 
give priority to the educational principles
of democracy.
Numerous new, alternative initiatives 
took place: several private schools sub­
scribing to a particular educational philos­
ophy were established, a number of 
church institutions, abolished after the 
war, started up anew, and educational in­
novations were introduced by the staff in 
many state-run schools.
The new freely elected parliament of 
1990 saw a majority of seats won by the 
national conservatives. One of the first 
steps taken by that parliament, one that 
had a direct bearing on public education, 
was the passing of a local government act. 
A high degree of political and economic 
autonomy was granted, even by interna­
tional standards, to the nearly 3,000 elect­
ed authorities. It became their responsibil­
ity to provide primary and secondary edu­
cation, and practically all the country's 
schools went into their ownership. This re­
sulted in the establishment of more than 
2,000 independent local educational au­
thorities, covering every community, from 
small villages with a single school to large 
cities.
This is a very high number by interna­
tional standards. The first free elections for 
the local authorities were held in the au­
tumn of 1991, and saw a victory for the 
opposition liberal parties in the cities and 
for previous leaders standing as indepen­
dent candidates in smaller villages.
In the first four years of democracy in 
Hungary, a decentralized system of educa­
tion emerged, in which control at the local 
and national level was split between op­
posing political forces. Schooling evolved 
in a precarious balance between these po­
litical forces. This was what determined 
most measures concerning educational 
matters in those four years, and the new 
education laws came out of the same con­
text. The actors involved in educational af­
fairs had to learn the rules of the democra­
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tic game of reconciling conflicting inter­
ests and seeking compromises, a learning 
process that was far from simple or free of 
conflicts, but which, on the whole, can be 
regarded as quite successful.
It hardly came as a surprise that the re- 
evaluation of the educational role of the 
churches gave rise to most clashes. In the 
years following the Second World War, the 
churches were all but entirely forced out of 
education; apart from the institutions for 
training minimum numbers of future cler­
gy, they only had the right to maintain a 
few secondary schools, and within the 
state system they had no, or a very limited, 
opportunity to provide religious education. 
Following the political change, the denom­
inations naturally demanded the restora­
tion of their role in education and the re­
vival of religious education on school 
premises. This purpose was met by the 
1991 act on the restoration of church 
property, including church schools, to 
their former owners. Giving back function­
ing schools to the church and reintroduc­
ing religious education, however, met with 
resistance on the part of many who were 
not church members and was not unani­
mously welcomed by the pious either. This 
resulted in a number of local conflicts, 
some of which severely tested the young 
institutions of democracy.
The renewal of the substance of educa­
tion was further complicated by the fact 
that the still centralized system of curricu­
lum regulation had to be adjusted to an in­
creased measure of local school autono­
my. The blueprint for a national basic cur­
riculum had been drawn up even before 
the political changes. Then, between 1990 
and 1993, a series of drafts, sometimes 
following very different principles, became 
public. Although views are now somewhat 
closer to each other, a national consensus 
regarding the reform of the curriculum has 
still not been reached. One of the reasons
is that different political groupings take a 
different view as to what is desirable in ed­
ucation. Another is that there are great dif­
ferences between them where the desir­
able structure of the schools system is 
concerned.
A major breakthrough occurred in 1990 
in that area as well. Hungarian students 
previously had to change schools for the 
first time at the age of 14 (which, for those 
entering vocational training also meant 
choosing an occupation), today they have 
the opportunity to move across to a sec­
ondary school offering general education at 
the age of 10 or of 12. The 1990 Education 
Act made it possible for secondary schools 
to start up lower forms a well. The result of 
this is that, beside the earlier four-year sec­
ondary schools for 14 to 18 year olds, there 
are now also six- and eight-year secondary 
schools taking students from the age of 10 
or 12 to 18 years of age.
In addition, the school structure had to 
meet another major challenge. Because of 
the collapse of the majority of the so- 
called "giant socialist plants", a great 
number of the training schools for skilled 
workers linked to those plants also ceased 
to exist. Those institutions used to take a 
considerable share of the school-leavers in 
any year. Consequently, it became increas­
ingly difficult for 14 year olds finishing pri­
mary school to continue at secondary lev­
el. The situation was made worse by the 
fact that large cohorts bom in the mid- 
1970s reached secondary school age pre­
cisely at that time.
Educationalists, as well as Hungarian 
society in general, are divided in their 
judgement of the ongoing structural 
changes. Some welcome the appearance of 
new secondary schools taking on 10-12 
year olds, seeing this as a sign of the im­
proving quality of education, an attempt to 
meet more differentiated demands on the 
part of their pupils. Others are worried
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that these changes may lead to social seg­
regation, to a great deal of waste in the 
pool of national talent, and to a decline in 
the number of those taking a secondary 
education. As long as these questions re­
main unanswered, there can be little hope 
of major curriculum reform.
One of the major changes in the past 
couple of years that also had a crucial ef­
fect on education was the settlement of 
the legal position of public servants and 
those working in public institutions. 
Parliament passed an act on public ser­
vants in 1992, bringing in new regulations 
regarding the employment and incomes of 
teachers. Earlier, teachers' salaries had 
largely been determined through local bar­
gaining; the new act means that a national 
salary scale has come into force, which 
lays down salaries on the basis of age and 
qualifications.
T h e  n e w  e d u c a t i o n  a c t s
Two of the new education acts passed in the summer of 1993 have a direct bear­
ing on schooling: the Public Education Act 
and the Vocational Training Act.
The Public Education Act reaffirms the 
constitutional rights established in the 
process of democratic change: it guaran­
tees the freedom to found a school and the 
freedom to choose a school, and it guar­
antees the assertion of the freedom of 
conscience. In harmony with ethnic and 
national minority legislation passed earli­
er, it confirms the right of ethnic and na­
tional minorities to instruction in their na­
tive language and to the foundation of 
schools of their own. It ensures the right 
of teachers, parents and students to have a 
say in the decisions of schools and of 
those running the schools.
The act reaffirms the principle of 
shared responsibility. All three major fac­
tors in education, that is central govern­
ment, local authorities and individual 
schools, have equally extensive responsi­
bilities: they are all entitled to set goals 
and to devote resources to them. Any fur­
ther development of public education is 
only conceivable if the three cooperate.
The responsibility of the central au­
thorities concern mainly the running and 
development of the system as a whole; in 
the operation of individual institutions, 
the determining role is played by local 
communities, teaching staffs and the 
"users" of the schools. The Regional Edu­
cational Centres, subordinated to the gov­
ernment, are meant to support central 
control; however, they have no authority 
status. Local participation in decisions is 
taken at the school level and ensured by 
elected bodies established for every 
school, in which proportional representa­
tion is given to the operator of the school, 
the teaching staff and the parents. In 
some matters, these bodies even have the 
right to overrule school decisions.
The democratization of decision-mak­
ing in public education has been aided al­
so by the establishment of another two na­
tional consulting bodies. One is the 
National Board of Public Education, made 
up of representatives from higher educa­
tion, the sciences and the teaching profes­
sion, concerned mainly with curriculum 
and textbook issues. The other, the 
National Board of Educational Policies, to 
be set up with the participation of school 
maintainers, central government agencies 
and those representing the interests of 
parents, students and teachers, will have a 
role in the reconciliation of interests re­
garding education policy. Mention should 
also be made of the National Board of 
Vocational Education, a tripartite consult­
ing and decision-making body of employ­
ers, employees and government, operating 
for some years now: the activity of this 
body has now been codified.
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One of the most important changes is that 
the duration of general education has been 
raised from eight to ten years. This obvi­
ously entails the transformation of the en­
tire system of vocational training, especial­
ly in its shorter forms. While students 
could previously enter highly specialized 
three-year vocational training schools at 
the age of 14, in the future, short, special­
ized vocational training will only be avail­
able for over-16s, and its duration will be 
much shorter than before. This means that 
students will start vocational training after 
a broader general education, and that 
training will be able to adapt to the chang­
ing needs of the economy much faster.
The Education Act, on the other hand, 
left the problem of the schooling structure 
more or less open. It remains possible for 
students to enroll in eight-, six- or four- 
year general secondary schools at the ages 
of 10, 12 or 14. From the tenth form of the 
longer primary schools, however, there is 
no road leading to secondary school; from 
there students can only move into short 
vocational training courses. Thus the law 
permits the parallel development of a vari­
ety of vertical school structures; it is up to 
the local authorities to decide on them. 
This means that two different school struc­
tures in two neighbouring towns may de­
velop, should local authorities so decide.
In defining the content of teaching, an 
important feature of the new act is that 
content regulation has been adapted to the 
existing conditions of local and school au­
tonomy. As opposed to the earlier, single, 
highly detailed central curriculum, a "mul­
ti-tier" regulation will come into force. 
This will be built upon the following ele­
ments: (1) basic curriculum principles to 
be issued by the government (these, in 
fact, were published in March 1994); (2) a 
system of objectives setting out the skills 
and abilities to be achieved by a specific 
age; (3) national frame curricula related to
the various school types and educational 
approaches; and, (4) local curricula devel­
oped by the schools and approved by their 
operators. Thus only the framework is de­
termined centrally, the actual classroom 
work is done on the basis of local curricu­
la worked out by the school. All this, how­
ever, will only come into force when the 
pertinent new regulations are completed 
and introduced. Until then, schools and 
parents will have to accept a kind of tran­
sition, a state where the old central curric­
ula are no longer obligatory, while the new 
ones will only come into force later.
The new act has introduced major 
changes concerning how teaching is orga­
nized in the schools but these, too, will be 
introduced gradually. The annual number 
of teaching days has been set at 190, 
which is more than earlier. At the same 
time, the number of compulsory classes 
permitted in a single day has been restrict­
ed in forms 1 to 3 to no more than four per 
day, and even in secondary schools stu­
dents must not have more than six a day.
The restrictions imposed on instruction 
time, more severe than before, are partly 
meant to protect students from being 
overburdened, and partly signal the 
changes taking place in the state's finan­
cial obligations. For the new law also en­
visages changes in the finances of educa­
tion. If the law goes into force in an un­
changed form, then from 1995 on, the cen­
tral government will take responsibility 
only for moneys disbursed on salaries by 
the schools. Everything over and above 
that will have to be covered by the local 
authorities from their own funds. The 
state, however, will only provide for 
salaries which are needed to fulfill the 
obligations prescribed by law; for purposes 
other than those, even the money for 
salaries will have to be covered by the lo­
cal authorities. Up to the completion of the 
final secondary school examination or the
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first vocational qualification, parents and 
students will continue to receive the basic 
services free of charge; service beyond 
that, however, will have to be paid for in 
the future.
The new act has also redefined the 
conditions for private education. Thus pri­
vate teaching establishments are eligible 
for government support only if they have 
signed contracts with local or national au­
thorities, whereby they undertake public 
obligations. In this case, they are entitled 
to the same support as that received by 
schools run by the central or local authori­
ties. In return for which they, too, have to 
provide basic services free of charge.
P r o b l e m s  a n d  p r o s p e c t s
The new education acts are expected to result in several major changes in the 
Hungarian education system. These acts 
have made it possible for public education 
to adapt to the needs of a democracy and a 
market economy in a manner that is easy to 
follow for anyone, within a full legal frame­
work. However, there are several areas in 
which the effect of the new acts is still diffi­
cult to judge. The reasons for this is partly 
that a number of the measures will come 
into force only later, and partly that some 
may be amended by future governments of 
a different political hue. In addition, public 
education has, or is likely to have, prob­
lems that can only be solved by further leg­
islation or government measures.
One of the most basic issues still open 
is that of the curriculum. Mention has al­
ready been made of the government's ac­
ceptance in early 1994 of the principles of 
a new Basic National Curriculum. That 
document has a variety of functions. First, 
it outlines the fundamental social goals 
and values that must be followed in the 
creation of the frame curricula, local cur­
ricula or textbooks. Secondly, it sets down
what the future document defining the 
age-related requirements must contain, 
and the examinations to be set in public 
education. Finally, it describes in detail the 
areas of knowledge that have to be taught 
at school. Here, it should be pointed out 
that no specific subjects are prescribed, 
only areas of knowledge as, for instance, 
"man and society", or "nature"; these, in 
principle, can be freely translated into con­
crete subjects by the schools.
The issuing of the Fundamental Prin­
ciples of the Basic National Curriculum, 
however, leaves a number of questions 
open. At the moment, it is impossible to 
know, for instance, whether the same ob­
jectives will be formulated for all children 
between 10 and 14, or whether they will be 
formulated according to the type of school 
attended. Nor can it be known for certain 
in what depth or detail the frame curricula 
for the various school types will determine 
the content of education, in other words, 
how much freedom will actually be grant­
ed to the schools.
Effective teaching depends mainly on 
the textbooks and teaching materials used 
directly by teachers and students. There has 
been evolution in this market during the 
past couple of years too. New textbooks 
and teaching aids are being produced and 
marketed by a large number of publishers. 
That market, however, still carries much 
uncertainty even today. It is difficult to 
gauge demand, and, because of the changes 
in financing, both producers and distribu­
tors find it hard to make long term plans. 
Nor is the quality of the product always en­
sured. A properly functioning mechanism of 
professional critique, testing and further 
development for textbooks and teaching 
materials, so characteristic of highly devel­
oped market economies, is still lacking.
The most important force in the renewal of 
education is perhaps the teachers them­
selves. Most experts agree that there are
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Top o f  t h e  f o r m
For the first time in Hungary, indeed in the whole of Eastern Central Europe, fifteen students sat for the International Baccalaureate, and did 
very well in it, by any standards.
The school concerned, the Karinthy Frigyes Gimnázium in a Budapest in­
dustrial suburb, teaches six subjects in English (with English as the language 
of instruction). On average, one out of twenty applicants is admitted to a 
preliminary year in which they are taught English, attending twenty lessons 
every week. Admittance to the preparatory course is based on an IQ test.
In the first year they are taught Physics, Mathematics, Biology, History, 
Geography in English by teachers who have a mastery of the language.
The results achieved by the school is also noteworthy. Around 95 per 
cent of the students are admitted to a university course, better than those 
from the Fazekas Gimnázium, which was previously considered unbeat­
able.
Students prepared for the International Baccalaureate, taken at the end 
of the 1993-1994 scholastic year, on the basis of a two-year curriculum. Of 
the seventy students who finished their second year, fifteen were selected 
to take this two-year course, which was supported by the World Bank.
Maximum points attainable at the International Baccalaureate are 45. 
The Hungarian students achieved an average of 39.5, more than half scored 
over 40. The lowest score was 34 and the average for all students was 39.3 
(25 is the pass mark).
The Centre supplied the results of all students who took the examina­







English Upper 5.38 6.40 + 1.02
Histoiy Lower 4.20 5.60 + 1.40
Histoiy Upper 4.71 5.67 +0.96
Geography Upper 4.53 5.89 + 1.47
Applied chemistry Basic 4.89 6.75 + 1.86
Physics Upper 4.44 5.75 + 1.31
Physics Basic 4.12 6.67 +2.45
Mathematics Upper 4.36 5.67 + 1.31
Mathematics Basic 4.15 6.22 +2.07
As the table shows, these Hungarian students scored 1.52 points more than 
the world average in every subject, not counting Hungarian.
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still many untapped resources in teacher 
training in Hungary. Three major problems 
are mentioned most frequently. One is the 
gulf between the university and non-uni­
versity training of teachers. This prevents 
the high theoretical standard of university 
teaching and the practice-oriented quality 
of the non-university training from com­
plementing and corroborating each other. 
Another problem, not independent of this, 
is that at the universities, teacher training 
is carried out by tiny departments of peda­
gogy, which are ill-suited to their function 
within the university structure. As opposed 
to most countries, and despite a few exper­
iments, there are no faculties or schools of 
education of any considerable import in 
Hungarian universities. Finally, the exces­
sive conservatism of teacher training in 
Hungary is also frequently mentioned, as is 
the absence of modern, child-centred edu­
cational methods and activating, motivat­
ing educational approaches which take in­
dividual differences into account.
The majority of teachers, of course, can 
only refresh their knowledge and renew 
their methodology while engaged in their 
daily teaching work. To be able to do that, 
they need a system offering a wide choice 
of in-service teacher training and educa­
tional support services. This is especially 
true when—as is the case in Hungary— 
schools have a large measure of indepen­
dence in professional matters, and teach­
ers are expected to play a key role in the 
renewal of education. Partly for financial 
reasons and partly because its importance 
is not properly recognized, in-service 
teacher training and pedagogical services 
in Hungary at the moment are not func­
tioning satisfactorily. The County Pedago­
gical Institutes in all nineteen of the coun­
ties were an important element; their 
staffs, however, had to be heavily reduced 
in recent years because of the lack of cen­
tral political and financial support.
With the issue of the curriculum re­
maining unsettled, developing the content 
of school education is necessarily limited. 
At least as much of an obstacle, is, howev­
er, the unsettled question of the schooling 
structure. Since the law permits the exis­
tence of several vertical structures side by 
side, in other words, secondaiy schools 
may be dealing with primary schools cov­
ering 4, 6, 8 years, or indeed even 10 years, 
it is impossible to know the length of pri­
mary education cycles for which curricula 
should be planned or textbooks written.
Beyond the fact that hardly any major 
curriculum reform is conceivable as long 
as the issue of the school structure re­
mains open, there are some other ques­
tions that cannot be answered today. One 
of the most important of these is whether it 
is right to exclude those youngsters who 
have taken the prolonged primary school 
up to their 16th year from secondary edu­
cation. The 9th and 10th forms of primary 
school are not regarded legally as sec­
ondary school classes, nor do they enable 
those completing them to move on to sec­
ondary school. The new Examination of 
Basic Education to be completed at the age 
of sixteen, introduced by the new act in 
1993, opens the door only towards short 
vocational training. This may have the un­
desirable result of creating a "dead-end" in 
the education system; it may subsequently 
hamper the further extension of secondary- 
level schooling, a condition, according to 
several analysts, for the development of 
Hungary's economy and its catching up 
with prevailing European norms.
Indeed, the problem, not spoken of 
most of the time, which underlies the ma­
jority of disputes concerning educational 
policy in Hungary, is that of the further ex­
tension of secondary school education. 
Demographic forecasts, barring a consid­
erable growth in the ratio of students en­
tering secondary school in the near future,
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tell us that the numbers completing sec­
ondary school is likely to decline from to­
day's 80,000 to 60,000. That would not on­
ly threaten the economy with a shortage of 
labour with a secondary education but al­
so endanger the development of higher 
education. If one is to accept that the fu­
ture development of the economy and so­
ciety requires maintaining the present 
number of those completing their sec­
ondary education, then the need for a fur­
ther extension must also be accepted.
The above described changes in the 
school structure, confirmed by the new 
acts, may greatly hinder the further exten­
sion of secondary school education. If 
lower forms taking on younger children 
are opened by the secondary schools, then 
these schools will have fewer places left 
for children of each cohort. On the other 
hand, if a growing proportion of children 
enter terminal primary school classes 
which do not lead towards secondary edu­
cation, then the number of those eligible 
for admission to secondary school will fall. 
Finally, the experts warn that the quality of 
vocational training will also suffer if, at a 
very young age, the best students enter 
general secondary schools from which 
there is no option to move over into voca­
tional training before they have completed 
their secondary studies.
The further progress of the educational 
system may be determined to a great ex­
tent by the evolving system of shared re­
sponsibility and financing. The fact that 
these issues receive much more attention 
today then earlier is a great help. As has 
already been mentioned, schools are run 
by more than 2,000 local authorities, 
which decide on questions as important as 
the opening or closing down of schools, 
defining their educational profile or the 
development of a vertical system of 
schools. That number is too high, and the 
problem of coordination between all those
local units is unsettled. This is all the more 
important because the prolongation of 
general education and the changes in the 
connecting points between primary and 
secondary education mean that in many 
places the entire system of services must 
be thought over again. This requires a 
great deal of planning, and a weighing up 
of the conditions and possibilities, some­
thing that the smallest villages are hardly 
capable of doing on their own.
Coordination between local government 
and local educational planning can be car­
ried out in a variety of ways. According to 
some, the local communities must be given 
complete freedom over whom they associ­
ate with, and in what way. Others believe 
that towns should take responsibility for 
the educational services in surrounding vil­
lages, or that their responsibility should be 
borne by the 19 counties of Hungary, which 
have no authority today. Still others advo­
cate a smaller number of governing units, 
larger in size than the counties. Reviving 
the pre-war traditions of educational ad­
ministration, the new acts have created 
eight Regional Educational Centres directly 
subordinated to the Ministry of Education. 
As opposed to the pre-war model, and con­
trary to certain intentions to recreate them, 
however, they were not given a role in 
planning and in inter-community coopera­
tion. But they could not be given such a 
role, since that would mean that the plan­
ning and development of education would 
be separated from the planning and devel­
opment of other public services; it would 
also mean that the entire process would be 
removed from the control of democratically 
elected political bodies.
Decision-makers will also have to think 
hard on how to handle the finances of ed­
ucation. The system brought into force by 
the new education acts implies a glaring 
contradiction which will have to be sorted 
out sooner or later. The contradiction
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stems from the fact that while decisions 
concerning the employment of teachers 
(for instance, the number, qualifications 
and age of those employed) are still made 
locally, the direct financing of salaries has 
been taken on by the central government. 
In other words, if the system comes into 
force, the money will be provided by agen­
cies who have no direct influence on the 
total allocated.
There are three ways to do away with 
that contradiction, although it is still un­
clear which of those will be chosen by the' 
decision-makers. One is that, following the 
French model, decisions concerning the 
employment of teachers will also be 
moved up higher, to the level of the central 
government (that solution is advocated 
mainly by those who support the "Chris­
tian national" forces). Another is trying to 
influence the decisions of local employers 
by imposing tighter controls and regula­
tions on them. The third, finally, is a return 
to the earlier system of full local and 
school responsibility regarding employ­
ment (a solution advocated mainly by the 
supporters of the liberal parties).
The private sector has an increasing 
importance in modern educational sys­
tems. This is also true of Hungary, which 
has not only seen a rapid rise in the num­
ber of private and church schools but also 
witnessed a veritable explosion in the role 
of the private sector in vocational training,
retraining for the labour market, and in 
short-duration forms of training for special 
needs. There is, in society, a strong de­
mand for private and church teaching, a 
demand which is visibly on the rise. It has 
been mentioned already that the latest leg­
islation has set out the legal framework in 
which private education can function. It 
appears, however, that this framework 
does not always support the development 
of schools that are run neither by the state 
nor by local authorities. A major obstacle 
is that regardless of the size of the de­
mand, these schools become eligible for 
government support only if the central 
government or the local authorities can be 
persuaded to sign contracts with them. 
There is, however, nothing to force the au­
thorities to do this. On the other hand, pri­
vate schools are eligible for government 
support only if they do as public schools, 
and this impinges on their character, the 
very reason that brought them into being.
Public education in Hungary today is 
undergoing momentous changes, and 
those changes are far from being conclud­
ed. The first hurdle—that of developing a 
legal framework conforming to the rules of 
democracy—seems to have been success­
fully cleared. At the same time, there are a 
great number of unsettled problems that 
will have to be answered by Hungarian so­
ciety and by the makers of educational 







E l e m é r  H a n k i s s
Holding the Pass
M y  D a y s  a s  a M e d i a  C h a i r m a n *
Please don’t believe me. This will be a very 
personal and biassed account. About a bloodless 
war, which may offer some lessons to those 
who are interested in the trials and tribulations 
of a new democracy. And also in the fun one 
may have in building democracy.
An u n c e r e m o n i a l  e n t r y
On a beautiful August morning in 1990, I woke to the strange and slightly nauseating feeling that 1 was chairman of Hungarian Television. A chairman 
malgré moi. After thirty years of quietly sitting at my desk or teaching at various 
universities, this was an absurd, and at the same time, a traditional East Central 
European situation. For want of somebody better, people are called to do some­
thing outside their own professional field. The wrong man in the right place? 
The right man in the wrong place?
In truth, however, on this beautiful morning 1 was not too much concerned 
with this aspect of East European social history. I was much more puzzled by a 
small but not unimportant detail. I had heard actors say that one of the most 
important skills in their métier was to know how to walk onto a stage. The prob­
lem to solve was to get from my desk at home to the desk in the office of the 
chairman of Hungarian Television. The physical distance was no more than two 
miles. But how to work out the logistics of a not too ridiculous and possibly un­
ceremonial entry?
a) Am 1 supposed to ask them to 
send an official car for me? One of 
those black Russian cars which had 
been used by aparatchiks for forty ig­
nominious years? Ruled out.
b) Shall I take my own car? My wife 
has already taken it.
c) Take a tram and the under­
ground as I have done for decades in 
my normal life? Of course.
Elemér Hankiss
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* ■  This piece was written in the summer of 1993. In order to bring the chronology up to the pre­
sent, a few footnotes have been added in September 1994. (For an account of the Media War, see 
NHQ 127, Autumn 1992. The Editor.)
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d) How to dress? This was not a real problem since I did not have any of those 
suits that a real, serious manager would wear on such occasions. The uniform of 
East European intellectuals, jeans and a pullover, was the only available alterna­
tive. (In the first two years of their existence, East Central Europe's new democ­
ratic parliaments were full of these convulsively nohchalant jeans-and-shirt or 
jeans-and-pullover intellectuals; later they were finally convinced that they 
would not be reelected if they did not squeeze themselves into business suits 
and matching neckties. (The colour of the ties had begun to change in the last 
years of the ancien régime; first from flaming red to dark red and burgundy, and 
then to blue and grey; as a latest development, colourful post-modern 
arabesques have also appeared on younger parliamentarian ties.)
e) How to keep serious when I meet the first people in the building and have 
to play the role of chairman of this huge institution with more than three thou­
sand employees? (In my research team there had never been more than ten of 
us.) I decided not to keep serious.
From the underground station, it was a short walk to the late 19th century 
building of Hungarian Television, which had been the Stock Exchange until the 
end of the Second World War, the grandiose and long flight of steps leading up 
to the main entrance, and here they are already, the choir that will follow, mo­
tionless, ceremoniously in black, all the hectic running about, into and out of 
the building, for the coming two years. I mean the security guards, benevolent 
old, retired policemen, pot-bellied and slab-sided, who will be forced out of their 
solemn passivity only in the last episode of the Media War, which will break out 
soon.
Now, on this first morning, they ask for my staff ID. I have none, I reply, but I 
happen to be the chairman of this institution. After a moment of embarrassment, 
they make way. I go up to the third floor.
The chairman's suite, red carpet, plants, sunshine. I knock at a big white 
door. A thin, elderly lady, with flashing eyes and icily cold manners. She had 
been the secretary of several of my aparatchik predecessors and is convinced 
that I shall sack her immediately. She escorts me to my office, a typical office of 
the 1980s, a mixture of bolshevik puritanism and tasteless pomposity, the book­
shelves displaying the Balshaya Encyclopediya and Lenin's Collected Works 
(Stalin's opera omnia had already been removed).
I tell the secretary that I have nothing against her. She may stay if she wants 
to and if I am satisfied with her work. The first sign of feebleness? The first false 
step? Should I get rid of the old guard immediately? Or should I keep the best to 
run the business? (At that time, I did not consider these questions too seriously. 
Luckily. If I had, I should have got entangled in an endless and hapless contro­
versy that has been resounding ever since all over East Central Europe. In a few 
weeks I decided to ignore everybody's past and to base my human resource pol­
icy on ability and achievement.)
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The only consolation in this big, lurid office is a small terrace and the view onto 
one of the beautiful squares of late nineteenth centuiy Budapest. Just across the 
square, the fin de siede building of the National Bank, with the white facade of 
the American Embassy beside it. In the coming two years I shall show my more 
distinguished visitors the legendary walk on top of the US Embassy building 
where, according to popular belief, Cardinal Mindszenthy took his morning and 
evening constitutionals in the years he enjoyed the hospitality, and the sanctu­
ary, of the US Embassy.
T h e  t r a p
H ow did I get into this situation? After the collapse of the communist system in 1989, when the mills of democracy began to grind, we did not have too 
much choice. By we, I mean people who belonged, in some way or other, to the 
opposition to the communist regime.
The first free elections since 1947 were held in Hungary in March and April 
1990. After the elections, the MDF, the main party in the coalition, with only a 
slight parliamentary majority, had to make a pact with the strongest opposition 
party and agree upon the main rules of the game. One of the first points of this 
pact was that they would pick two independent persons for the positions of 
chairmen of Hungarian Television and Hungarian Radio. This was not easy, 
since in the buoyant years of 1988-1989, and in the heat of the 1990 electoral 
campaign, few people could resist the temptation to jump headlong into party 
politics. After forty years of forced passivity, people had all the reasons to be im­
patient to do something for their countiy. Let alone the fact that rising to the 
position of a leading politician became, almost overnight, the most glamorous 
and attractive social role, which could bring not only power but fame, prestige, 
and a new identity after so many years spent in anonymity, if not in anomia.
It was in this situation that in June 1990, after the elections, the prime minis­
ter and the leader of the main opposition party came to me and my friend, Csaba 
Gombár (we are both political scientists and were teaching at Eötvös University 
in Budapest), and offered us these jobs. They told us that we were proposed as 
two independent persons, who were supposed to be able to keep a middle 
course and ensure the impartiality of the two institutions. At that time, in the 
post-revolutionary euphoria, all political parties seriously believed in the sancti­
ty of the principle of the freedom of the press. They did not know yet how an­
noying the practice of this freedom would soon become for many of them.
For several weeks we said no, no and no. But finally we gave in and told them 
that we would accept the nominations under the condition that the bill just be­
ing submitted to parliament on regulating the appointment of the chairmen was 
modified. Under the communist regime, the Council of Ministers had the right to 
appoint the chairmen of Radio and Television (under the almost overt and im-
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perative control of the Party Politburo). We made it clear that we would not ac­
cept appointment from the hands of the Prime Minister because we did not want 
to be dependent in any way on him or on the government. Our point was accept­
ed and included in the bill. According to the new act, which became the founda­
tion of the independence of the two institutions in the coming two years, the 
Prime Minister has only the right to nominate his candidates, who—after hear­
ings in a parliamentary committee—are, or are not, appointed by the President 
of the Republic.
Even with this amendment, we accepted these positions only for six months 
or, more precisely, until a new Media Act was passed and our successors found. 
This was in July 1990. There is still no Media Act in Hungary. We have had a 
Media War instead.1
T h e  M e d i a  W a r
A fter our appointment in August 1990, the honeymoon (if there was any) with the governing parties came to a quick and early end.
Csaba Gombár is a soft-spoken, gentle man, with a timid smile which can be 
mistaken for a sign of weakness. Which it is not. On the contrary. Actually, he 
unwittingly misled the government politicians with this smile—if they had 
looked for somebody who can be used, influenced, intimidated—because behind 
this boyish appearance there is a strong and courageous character. As for my­
self, I may be less modest and less soft-spoken, but I do happen to be rather 
sensitive to independence and allergic to people who want to tell me what to do.
The gentle or not gentle revolutions brought to East Central Europe the long 
expected freedom of the press but they have not liberated the electronic media 
from the control of those in power. There has been, of course, a substantial 
change in the character and intensity of control. But the fact remains that in 
most of these countries public television (which had been under the tight con­
trol of the communist party before the revolution) became government televi­
sion or chairman's television after the first free elections, with changes in gov­
ernment being routinely followed by brusque changes in the leadership. There 
have been good and bad reasons for exercising control over the media. Among 
the good, or at least not entirely wrong reasons, is the argument that the ex­
tremely difficult process of transition to democracy and a market economy calls 
for common goals, national unity, a broad national support for government 
plans and policies. And since television and radio are indispensable for the suc­
cess of these mobilizing strategies, the new governments felt it was inevitable 
and legitimate to suspend their pledge to the spirit of the freedom of the press 
and to extend their control over the public media. Those of a more nationalist 1




kind may have added the slightly spurious argument that "public television is 
owned by the nation and, consequently, it has to be run by the government 
elected by the nation."
For two and a half years, Hungary was a happy and unhappy exception to this 
rule. In many ways. For two years and a half Hungarian Television and 
Hungarian Radio were the only independent public television and radio corpora­
tions in East Central Europe and, what is more, they were the most independent 
public media in Europe. They were almost absurdly independent. Due to the new 
act regulating the appointment of the chairmen and due also to the absence of a 
new Media Act, which would have created a balance between independence and 
social control, the two newly-elected chairmen had practically absolute control 
over their institutions. One might almost say that if they had decided to trans­
form their institutions into, say, shoe factories, it would have been quite difficult 
to legally stop them from doing so.
Actually, they set out in a less (or more?) absurd direction. They made an at­
tempt to transform their formerly party controlled institutions into European 
type public television and radio corporations, with a high level of public respon­
sibility, impartial news and current affairs programmes, and a wide range of ed­
ucational, cultural and entertaining programmes. They did and did not succeed. 
They did, because by 1992 their programming could stand its ground against the 
best European public television, in spite of a much weaker financial background. 
On the other hand, they failed, because after more than two years of successful 
resistance, they were finally defeated by party politics.
This was not a big surprise, since almost all the power had been on the side 
of the governing parties and the government, with all their legislative and execu­
tive means. Though we, too, had some protection and some important partners. 
We could, first of all, rely on the letter and spirit of the law. Second, in the 
course of the Media War, we were given more and more support by the greater 
and, in my opinion, better part of the printed media and by the opposition par­
ties. And, last but not least, we had the power of being independent. Our adver­
saries knew, as well as our friends, that we personally were not interested at all 
in keeping our positions, we did not want to accumulate power for ourselves, 
and that we would be happy to go back to our own profession as soon as possi­
ble. We could not be blackmailed or intimidated into bad compromises or con­
formism.
T h e  f a c t s
J uly 1990. The two candidates for chairman were proposed by the Prime Minister and, after being heard and unanimously approved by the Cultural 




December 1990. Conflicts with the governing parties and the government be­
gan. Government politicians did not see any "guarantees" in the individuals 1 
had appointed to leading positions in Hungarian Television. They cut our sub­
sidy by half.
From January 1991 on. We began a radical reorganization of Hungarian TV, 
with the aim of transforming it from a rigid bureaucratic state institution into a 
modern and flexible television corporation, one which is like a commercial tele­
vision company in its organization and management but retains its public values 
and duties intact. Right-wing groups and the governing parties began to attack 
us on various counts. For instance:
a) We are "commercializing" national television. The facts.- We developed our 
commercial activities in haste, founded a joint company with one of the world's 
greatest media agencies and doubled our income from advertising within one 
year (and so we were able to survive in spite of the budget cuts, and to the dis­
may of our governmental adversaries).
b) We are "Americanizing" national television. The facts: We began to screen 
Dallas and other American series. But the proportion of domestically and 
European made productions has remained much higher in our programming 
than in most European public television corporations.
c) We pay our stars more than the salaiy received by the Prime Minister. The 
facts: Our stars did earn more than the Prime Minister, just as their counterparts 
earn more in all western countries. But after having lived for a thousand years in 
highly hierarchical societies, it was difficult to understand and swallow the fact 
that the king earns less than the jester.
d) Our journalists and programmes are biassed against, and too critical of, 
the government. The facts.- In the first month after the elections in 1990, this was 
at least partly true. In the first half of 1991, however, our overall programming 
was already well balanced, with some pro-government and pro-opposition pro­
grammes still remaining.
e) By reorganizing the institution, we have ruined the old workshops and as a 
result, jeopardized thedominance of Hungarian national cultural values in the 
programming. The facts: We dismantled the large departments and replaced 
them with a number of small producers' units, which were to compete for com­
missions from two channels. The outcry came from those who lost, sailing un­
der nationalist and pro-government flags.
From April 1991 on. Prime Minister Antall, supposedly under pressure from the 
right wing of his party, began to propose various persons as vice-chairmen for 
Hungarian Television and Hungarian Radio (with the less and less veiled inten­
tion of having somebody there through whom the government could exert its in­
fluence). For almost a year, he was not able to have his way.
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From May 1991 on. Government experts excavated an old (1974) decree of the 
then communist Council of Ministers, which gave the Council the right to "su­
pervise" Hungarian Television. The Prime Minister used this—to say the least, 
anachronistic—decree as one of his main instruments (or weapons) in the ensu­
ing Media War.
November 1991. I started a new evening news programme on Channel 2 to 
counterbalance the more and more right wing tendencies of the evening news 
programme of Channel 1. In the budget debate in December, we were punished 
by having practically all our subsidy cut.
1 March 1992. The Prime Minister finally succeeded in forcing vice-chairmen on 
the two institutions.
3 March 1992. The new vice-chairman made the mistake of seriously overstep­
ping his authority on his very first day in office and so inadvertently he gave me 
the opportunity, and the excuse, to suspend him from his position. This led to a 
long and passionate legal controversy between the Prime Minister and myself. (I 
shall come back to this controversy in a moment.)
May and June 1992. Not being able to win the legal argument, and presumably 
under greater and greater pressure from his party's right wing, the Prime 
Minister proposed to the President of the Republic to dismiss me and the chair­
man of Hungarian Radio from our positions. After parliamentary committee 
hearings, the President turned down the proposal.
August 1992. István Csurka, vice-president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF), published a soon to be notorious pamphlet, in which he drew the out­
lines of a populist and nationalist ideology and programme, with xenophobic 
and anti-modernist overtones. This made the nationalist versus European, con­
servative versus liberal, controversy even more passionate and absurd. In 
Mr Csurka's mythology there was a Judeo-bolshevik-liberal-cosmopolitan con­
spiracy against the Hungarian nation. Csaba Gombár and myself were unmasked 
by him and some of his followers as chief agents of this conspiracy.
September 1992. The craze went even further when hunger strikes were staged 
by nationalists against me and my colleague at the Radio. And when right-wing 
groups organized demonstrations against the President of the Republic, Csaba 
Gombár and me in the streets of Budapest. A crowd of about 15,000 requested 
my resignation in my favourite square in front of the Television building. A week 
after, a counter-demonstration of about 60,000 people protested against these 
attacks and in support of human rights and basic democratic values.
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September and October 1992. I dismissed the editor in chief of the main news 
programme (a former Communist Party secretary turned the mouthpiece of na­
tionalist and populist forces) and the editor in chief of our main foreign news 
magazine (a former member of the Communist Party praesidium in Hungarian 
Television, who, after 1989, became the untouchable hero of the nationalist 
forces in Hungary; apart from that, he is a gifted journalist). Csaba Gombár had 
taken similar steps in the Radio a few weeks earlier.
November and December 1992. In retaliation, the Prime Minister started disci­
plinary proceedings against me and then suspended me. I protested immediately, 
and questioned his right to initiate such a procedure and to suspend me since, in 
my reading, he was and could not be my employer. (Such a dependency would 
be against the law and would jeopardize the freedom of the press.) I brought a 
suit against the Office of the Prime Minister for what I saw as an illegal act. The 
first trial was held and adjourned in February 1993. It will be an important test of 
the independence of the Hungarian judiciary whether thequdges will be able to 
rule against the government, if we can prove our case, which we shall.2
December 1992. In the debate on the 1993 budget, the parliamentary majority 
voted for a paragraph according to which the budgets of Hungarian Television 
and Hungarian Radio were incorporated into the budget of the Prime Minister's 
Office as from January 1, 1993.
27 December 1992. The Media Bill collapsed in Parliament.
6 January 1993. With reference to these two events (budget and Bill), we (Csaba 
Gombár and myself) submitted a letter to the President of the Republic asking him 
to relieve both of us of our offices. To this day, he has not accepted our request.3
6 March 1993. According to the Prime Minister, through our "resignation" we 
ceased to be chairmen of the two institutions. According to the President of the 
Republic, we did not resign, or if we did, he has not yet accepted our resigna­
tion. So we have to continue to consider ourselves chairmen of these two insti­
tutions. Whom to believe?
E a s t  E u r o p e a n  a b s u r d i t i e s
E astern Europe has a long and brilliant history in absurdities even without Kafka, Broch, Capek, and Mrozek. K. und K. absurdities were followed in the 
1920s and 30s by Hungarian, Czecho-Slovak, and Polish national absurdities,
2 ■ The judge in charge of the case has kept adjourning the trial ever since.
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and later by the murderous absurdities of bolshevism. The Media War in 
Hungary has made its modest contribution to the arsenal of post-velvet-revolu­
tion absurdities.
At that time I thought that I had the unique privilege of being the first 
Television chairman against whom a parliamentary deputy had staged a hunger- 
strike. I was mistaken. A few weeks later I was told by English colleagues that a 
couple of years ago a Welsh member of the Westminster Parliament had started 
a hunger strike demanding Welsh-language broadcasting by the BBC. He got it. 
His Hungarian counterpart was less successful. He did not get anything outside 
warm hugs from Mr. Csurka and company.
The demonstrations I have mentioned above also had an aura of absurdity. 
To conclude this brief survey of media-absurdities, let mq come back to my pre­
sent schizophrenia. As I write these lines, I am flying over the Atlantic and I have 
no idea who or what I am. I hope not, but I may still be chairman of Hungarian 
Television. But perhaps I am not any more. It may be said perhaps that de jure I 
am and de facto 1 am not. Or would it be more precise to say that, according to 
one interpretation of Hungarian law I still am, and according to another inter­
pretation, I am no longer? To explain this ambivalence or plurivalence, I have to 
refer to the last act of the Media War or Media Comedy.
On the 6th of January 1993, we, Csaba Gombár and me, wrote a letter to the 
President of the Republic asking him to relieve us of our duties as chairmen of 
these two institutions. We gave the following reasons. First, after the failure of 
the Media Bill in Parliament last December, and since there is no hope of the 
passage of a new Bill until after the general elections of 1994, we feel ourselves 
released from our promise to stay until a Media Act has been passed. Second, by 
losing their financial independence under the new Budget Act, our institutions 
have lost their hard-won autonomy and have become again East European, gov­
ernment-controlled state media. Their organizational re-transformation back in­
to what they had been before 1989, in the bad old days, is well under way. Third, 
we do not want to assist in the destruction of two of the most important au­
tonomous institutions in our new democracy.
The Prime Minister eagerly jumped at the opportunity. In a letter of the 20th of 
January, he wrote that he accepted our "resignation” and entrusted the running of 
the two institutions to the two vice chairmen. Next day, on the 21st of January, the 
President of the Republic issued a statement according to which a) we did not re­
sign, b) it is his exclusive right to accept or not to accept our request to be dis­
missed, c) if the Prime Minister proposes our dismissal, and that is his sole right, 
d) he will consider the proposal and make his decision in due time. It is not tragic,
3 ■ He did not accept our request until almost two years later, in July 1994, when the new govern­
ment had promised that it would submit to Parliament a new Media Bill guaranteeing the indepen­
dence of the two public media.
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and it is not exceptional, that in a country like or unlike Hungary the Prime 
Minister and the President of the Republic do not agree on some important matter 
and even quarrel publicly. From France to the former Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, 
there are numerous examples of such conflicts. These conflicts are, of course, more 
dangerous in emerging, fledgling, fragile new democracies.
Tragic it was not, but absurd it was, the situation in which we were forced to 
decide whether the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister was right. 
And it would have been nonsensical and cruel if each of our several thousand 
colleagues, managers, producers, cameramen, editors, security guards, cleaning 
women, and others had been forced to decide day by day whom to obey—us, or 
the new men delegated by the government.
We did not want to involve innocent staff in this ordeal and we did not want 
to get entangled in vicious squabbling degrading to all the parties concerned. 
Having pondered all the pros and cons, we published an open letter on the 20th 
of January 1993, in which we explained our dilemma. We stated that we consid­
ered ourselves the lawful chairmen of these institutions but would not exercise 
our rights until the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, or 
Parliament, or the Constitutional Court, or a Court (I have mentioned that I 
brought a suit against the government) has cleared up this mess. This was our 
latest, and I hope last, action in the Media War.
T h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  g a m e
W hen the Prime Minister saw that he could not prove and win his case legal­ly, he looked for direct political ways and means to bring me and my col­
league to our knees. In May 1992 he asked the Cultural Committee of Parliament 
to investigate our "ability" to run these two institutions. With a government ma­
jority in this Committee, he did not take too much risk.
Csaba Gombár and I chose different strategies. He went to the hearing and 
read a short statement saying that he did not accept the authority of the 
Committee because it was not a neutral body—and walked out. Scandal. Next 
week I walked in with five experts and thousands of documents and announced 
that I was happy to be there and to be able to discuss important matters with 
them, distinguished politicians. Hilarity. "But," I added, "I shall force you to take 
these hearings seriously, since parliamentary hearings in a decent democracy 
should be taken seriously. I shall make your lives miserable in the coming days.
I shall do my best to make it very difficult for you to pass judgement without 
considering the facts, figures and evidence which I shall submit to you." And the 
hearings lasted for thirty hours and three long days.
During the hearings, deputies from the governing parties first argued that I 
had not observed some rules and laws while transforming and managing 
Hungarian Television. When we proved that they were wrong, they tried to con­
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vince the public, and themselves, that Hungarian Television did not do enough 
to serve the interests of the Hungarian nation, that it had become too interna­
tional, Americanized, commercialized, "anti-magyar". When we proved through 
figures, statistics, analysis that the contrary was true, they finally lost their tem­
pers, swept all the documents, figures, pieces of evidence off the table and re­
treated to the ultima ratio of party politicians: "We, the governing parties, have 
lost confidence in you and this is sufficient reason to propose your dismissal, 
even without any further facts, evidence, or, arguments."
It was an interesting exercise in learning democracy. It was almost moving to 
see how governing party MPs, or at least some of them, struggled with their con­
science. To see how they tried to squeeze their party interests (and their an­
tipathies for this meddlesome chairman) into the strait-jacket of legal rules. By 
that time, almost the whole country was watching the events of the Media War, 
which were reported on a daily basis by the written press, the Radio and the 
Television. And those who watched may have understood, for the first time in 
their lives, that democracy was not an abstract construct or a couple of sublime 
ideas but, simply and very practically, a well-defined set of rules of the game. They 
could realize that a democratic policy needs well-defined rules agreed upon by all 
the interested parties and the willingness of its citizens to observe these rules, 
even if their momentary interests would be better served by breaking these rules. 
Hundreds of people have admitted, and hundreds of thousands would certainly 
agree, that these hearings were an elevating and traumatic experience for them. It 
was a fascinating and disturbing sight to see how politicians first made enormous 
efforts to attain their goals within the framework of the democratic rules of the 
game—and how tragic it was to see their final failure and self-humiliation.
Half a year later, in January 1993, the same ceremony was repeated but, by this 
time, without the personal drama of some of the participants. By that time, after 
having been more than two years in office, government politicians seemed to 
have lost their former timidity and innocence. They seemed to have realized 
more and more that they had the power to have their own way. With the nation­
al congress of the MDF approaching,they had increasingly lost their tempers, 
and some among them went out of their way to prove their unrelenting patrio­
tism to the forces of the right. In the disciplinary procedure he started against 
me, the Prime Minister appointed the Minister of Justice as commissioner and 
three other ministers as members of the disciplinary committee. After making, 
with lordly nonchalance, one legal and formal mistake after the other, they 
played the cynical comedy of a formal trial to an end.
This was a real scandal that resounded through the country. The minutes of 
the trial were published (in a form and under circumstances reminiscent of the 
good old days of samizdats) and they became a bestseller overnight; in one of the 
Budapest theatres, actors read passages from it with the audience roaring with 
laughter and indignation; the Media War had turned into a kind of tragi-comedy.
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Some journalists went so far as to label the procedure the first show trial since 
the free elections in Hungary in 1990. This was, of course, a metaphor which 
stretched similarities far too far. It is true that the whole process was motivated 
by the political will to get rid of two broadcast media chairmen. It is true that 
the whole case was prefabricated and judgement had been passed before the 
trial. It is true that the disciplinary committee passed judgement without con­
sidering the hundreds of facts and pieces of evidence that proved the inno­
cence of the defendant, etc. But everything else was different. All this took 
place in a democracy, in 1993, and not in a dictatorship in 1953. The stakes 
were much lower. Instead of the hangman, cheering crowds and sympathizing 
journalists greeted the condemned who appealed the verdict and stated that 
he would go to Strasbourg, to the Court of Human Rights, if he does not find a 
truly independent court of appeal in Hungary. I do hope that he will.
L e s s o n s  l e a r n t
The Media War has done much harm to the country. It has become a stupefy­ing case of public hysteria and paranoia, a public ritual of hatred and preju­
dice, a tragi-comic and mythical war between nationalist and anti-nationalist 
passion and rhetoric. An issue that has absorbed far too much political and so­
cial energy, that has delayed the legislative work of parliament, that has generat­
ed hatred between the political parties and has reduced their ability and willing­
ness to soberly negotiate and compromise.
But it has yielded at least as much profit too, if not much more. I have just re­
ferred to the lesson taught by the parliamentary hearing in June about the impor­
tance of the rules of the game in a democracy. And we, liberals and conservatives, 
politicians and media people, people in government and people in the streets have 
learnt a lot also from other episodes of this conflict. Let me give some examples.
Don't fear conflicts
After having lived for several decades in the artificial peace and lukewarm compro­
mise of Kádárism, from which conflicts were paranoically and hermetically exclud­
ed, the Media War was among those events which taught us that conflicts—if they 
are kept within boundaries—play an indispensable and useful role in democratic 
societies. Don't fear them and don't seek them. But use them as an important po­
litical instrument. You may even generate conflicts if, in the given situation, they 
may give momentum to public and political life, if they may bring to the surface la­
tent and lingering antagonism, if you think they may help locate and reveal prob­
lems which may have been ignored or swept under the carpet, if they help crystal­
lize, handle and mediate social interests. The record of the Media War in this re­
spect is mixed. It helped both reveal and disguise underlying, real social conflicts.
95
Personal
Tell them they are mistaken
After centuries of various forms and degrees of serfdom, the Media War helped 
people realize that in a democracy even he who holds the highest post is not an 
all-powerful monarch: he has some rights and does not have other rights. This 
must have been a pleasant and liberating surprise. People were able to witness, 
with a shiver, the fact that a simple citizen can stand up and say in public: 
"Mr Prime Minister, I have to tell you, with all due respect, that you are mistak­
en." And nothing happens. No siren-wailing police cars coming, no courts mar­
tial convening, no jail doors slamming. Nothing.
The power of law
People could experience also, most of them for the first time in their lives, how 
powerful law may be in a democratic society. They could see that two fragile public 
institutions, which could rely only on the letter and spirit of the law, had been able 
to protect their newly won autonomy against extremely strong pressures and at­
tacks coming from the side of the government and the governing parties for two 
years. It must have been a bewildering and fascinating experience for them that 
even the powerful, who could have obtained their goals by force, did observe the 
law even though it curbed their intentions and interests.
Responsibility
After 1989 it came as an uneasy surprise how difficult it is to be a democrat—in 
a democracy. This was a real surprise since it had been comparatively easy to be 
a would-be democrat in a dictatorship. After 1989 we have had to learn that 
democracy cannot be imported, it cannot be bought off the peg. And that it is 
not brought about and established overnight by a first and single free election. It 
may be generated only in the course of a long and tedious learning process, in 
which everybody has to take part and has to take up his or her responsibilities.
The fact that we have a government responsible to parliament does not mean 
that everybody else is relieved of all responsibilities. That we can go on living in 
the Heaven and Hell of childish irresponsibility which we enjoyed, and suffered 
from, in the four decades of communism. When it was easy and legitimate to 
blame the communists for everything miserable in our lives. The Media War may 
have shown to many that there is no democracy without citizens acting with re­




People may have understood also why the existence of autonomous institutions 
is a sine qua non of modern democracies. At one point, the Media War triggered 
off a heated controversy over the best political model for the country. The Prime 
Minister, a historian of 19th century British parliamentarism, believed in the su­
periority of the Westminster-type democracy in which the party, or party coali­
tion with a majority in Parliament, has practically absolute power while it is the 
government in office.
In another model, that of 20th century pluralistic democracy, the interests of 
a complex contemporary society can best be intermediated and integrated by the 
interaction of a wide range of autonomous institutions, among which the gov­
ernment is only one of the most important ones. But other independent 
institutions—Parliament, local governments, the judiciary, the Constitutional 
Court (if there is one), the Central Bank, the National Accounting Office, the me­
dia, the various institutions and bodies of interest intermediation—also play an 
indispensable (and not subordinated) role.
This decentralized and interactive model may be especially important for a 
country like Hungary, the social and political development of which had been re­
tarded and distorted by centuries of highly centralized authoritarian regimes, 
even if between 1867 and 1948 this was a democracy of the authoritarian kind.
In 1992, Hungarian Television and Radio became, in their stubborn fight for 
autonomy, major actors in a society protesting against the centralizing efforts of 
the government. This dimension of the conflict elevated the Media War, for a 
couple of months, to the rank of a major political confrontation. The country 
was watching, with fascination, impatience, or anger, but certainly not without 
learning an important lesson, the ups and downs of this conflict. The lesson that 
there is no ready-made model of democracy, that each country has to work and 
fight out the best model for itself.
T h e  p a g e a n t r i e s  o f  d e m o c r a c y
W e could learn also, with no less surprise, that even scandals and political circuses may play a positive role in the public life of democracies. If they 
are not too frequent, or too great, and if they provide good theatre, they may 
add the necessary publicity and limelight to the struggle of political actors. And 
they may generate a sort of catharsis and contribute to the necessary cleansing 
of public life.
The Media War did produce its own scandals, public ceremonies, and coups 
de theatre. It forced us to enter the stage, to play our part, to deliver scene­
shaking monologues, profit from the dramaturgical mistakes of our adversaries. 
Let me admit, feeling ashamed, that I, myself, played various roles in our Made
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in Hungary Media Tragi-Comedy. I played the role, for instance, if not of the 
Flying Dutchman, but at least that of the Flying Chairman. And played also the 
role of an uncompromising man (which I am not in real life) who is ready to go 
to the barricades for his ideals if it is inevitably necessary (am I...?).
In the first months of 1992, I went on a kind of sabbatical and taught at 
Stanford University as a visiting professor. (I had signed a contract with the uni­
versity long before I became chairman of Hungarian Television and—after a de­
lay of more than a year—I finally had to meet my obligation.) On a beautiful 
morning in early March I got a phone call from Budapest. My colleagues report­
ed that the new vice-chairman (who had been appointed as a "politically inde­
pendent" person) turned out to be the man of the government (or even more 
that of the populist right wing group within the governing party). In the very first 
hours of his being in office, he started reorganizing the institution. Thus he 
gave me the opportunity to intervene. I immediately sent a fax to the new vice- 
chairman, with copies to the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic, in 
which I suspended him and took the first plane back to Budapest. (I spent the 
next four months commuting between the Television building in Budapest and 
the Stanford campus, flying back and forth eveiy fortnight, teaching here and 
managing there, so that at the end I knew all the individual polar bear families 
in Greenland. The spectacle of this flying to and fro, to the mysteriously faraway 
land of happy California one week, and back to the gloomy battles of the Media 
War in Hungary next week, gave a kind of mythological, or theatrical, dimension 
and glamour, and strong publicity to our fight. And we needed this latter badly.)
When I came back to Hungary first, the Prime Minister was polite, icy, and fu­
rious. He urged me to suspend the suspension because, according to his inter­
pretation, I did not have the right to suspend his appointee. After having con­
sulted with my lawyers, I answered that according to our interpretation of exist­
ing laws and regulations, I did have the right to suspend him. A bitter legal battle 
ensued, which finally went to the Constitutional Court. The court issued a judge­
ment of such virtuoso complexity and ambiguity that both sides could interpret 
it as supporting their case. The Prime Minister asked the President of the 
Republic for my dismissal on the basis of this statement. And the President of 
the Republic refused to sanction it on the basis of the same judgement.
The scene for another show was set by the Prime Minister himself. When he 
suspended me on the 6th of December he, or his aides, added that I should not 
enter the building Until the disciplinary committee has passed its judgment. This 
was heaping mistake on mistakes. First, the suspension was unlawful or at least 
legally controversial. To take it for granted and act accordingly, before a court 
has ruled on the case, was unlawful or at least a case of prejudgment. Second, 
there was no sound legal basis for forbidding me to enter the building. It was an 
imprudent and futile act of vengeance on the side of the hunters who felt that, 
after two years of failures, now they are close to their quariy. They made my part
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very easy. Since I considered the disciplinary procedure, and the suspension, 
unlawful or at least not proved to be lawful, I stated that I should ignore them 
until the ruling of the court. And announced that I should go to my office next 
morning, as usual.
This was my second, but now, a ceremonial entry. I again took the tram and 
the underground since I did not want that, arriving by car, the "choir", the flock 
of security guards in black, spot me too early. I saw already from afar that—as in 
the third act of a Lehár operetta, the flight of steps leading to the main entrance 
was swarming with people. I ran up the stairs and bumped against the line of 
the guards, who—after a moment of hesitation and embarrassment, which re­
mind me of my first hasty entry more than two years before—gave way and let 
me in, into the crowd of journalists, dozens of television cameras, and hundreds 
of my colleagues, filling the great hall of the building and its galleries, laughing 
and weeping, cheering and acclaiming, not me, but themselves, and all of us, 
this fleeting moment of moral victory, the last sweet moment of our autonomy 
for which we had fought together for two years. Even if I try to be very down to 
earth and almost cynical, I have to admit that this was a great moment in my, in 
our, lives. And good theatre, too.4 **
4 ■ Between January 1993 and July 1994 the government, and a right-wing faction within the 
governing party, practically controlled Hungarian Radio and Television. After the parliamentary elec­
tions in April and May 1994, the new government promised to respect the independence of the two 
public media. Its experts have drafted a new Media Bill which is now being discussed in various 
committees. The text of the bill is still highly controversial and reflects the conflicting values and in­
terests of the two ruling parties, the Socialists and the Free Democrats.
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G y ö r g y  S z ű c s
Not to Praise, But to Bury
T h e  B u d a p e s t  S c u l p t u r e  P a r k
I n times of major historical change in­credible energies are spent by the new 
powers that be, and by ordinary people, on 
changing the external space in which they 
live. Environmental elements (coats-of- 
arms, inscriptions, statues, etc.) so familiar 
that they seem to be part of the overall 
scenery of streets and squares, suddenly 
"come alive"; some of the more enterpris­
ing may feel it is time to engage in a guer­
rilla war against them. Any investigation of 
people's relationship to environmental ele­
ments of symbolic value may lead to some 
highly interesting conclusions on cultural 
history and mass psychology. As Ortega y 
Gasset notes, "It would be more than in­
teresting to track down each and every 
outbreak of iconoclasm that has occurred 
in art and religion."
The events accompanying the Great 
War compelled a Hungarian cultural histo­
rian, Gyula Végh, to give an overview of 
the history of iconoclasm. He reports on 
the sacking of the German Embassy in St. 
Petersburg: "A few dozen workers are 
making' efforts to pry off the huge bronze
György Szűcs
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statues decorating the facade of the build­
ing. They succeed. One figure, a work by 
Eberhardt Encke, falls with a loud bang 
onto Isaac Square, breaking into a thou­
sand pieces. All this takes place in the 
presence of troops and policemen, to great 
applause from the distinguished audi­
ence." The previous, stable order of the 
country is shaken, one of its components 
(in this case, Russian-German friendship) 
suddenly turns into its very opposite, and 
the very forces meant to keep order no 
longer feel it their duty to prevent the dis­
turbance, since the institution to be pro­
tected has just lost its worth and validity. 
It is precisely the discarding of the "un­
needed" ballast that the new behaviour is 
targeted at and destruction is temporarily 
incorporated into the new order of things. 
Panem et circenses soon becomes the de­
vice and of the two, the latter is much eas­
ier to supply.
This sequence of events is stereotypi­
cal: it creates and erases objectified sym­
bols, the bulk of which have always to do 
with the legitimization of political authori­
ty or with its disintegration. No matter 
how far one goes back in time, the begin­
nings are impossible to find. The gesture 
of destruction itself has a magic impact, be 
it the erasing of a prehistoric drawing, the 
scraping off of the cartouches of Egyptian 
pharaohs or ostracism in Ancient Greece.
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Lifting the Hungarian Soviet Republic Memorial (Barna Búza).
The examples are endless, 
but right up to our times we 
can see that the person (or 
thing) and its image are fre­
quently confused with one 
another, and the destruction 
of the icon is, in reality, 
meant for the person or the 
idea the person represents.
In Hungary today the 
restoration of the country’s 
old, crowned coat-of-arms 
and the use and display of of­
fensive political symbols (the 
swastika and, in line with the 
anti-communist reflexes of 
the Antall government, the 
red star, etc.) are governed by 
laws enacted by Parliament.
Various memorial sites have 
been filled with traditional 
wooden grave markers evok­
ing the spirit of the ancient 
Hungarian past. Initially 
erected without any national­
istic overtones they were 
meant to mark the real and 
imaginary graves of the mar­
tyrs of 1956. On Lot 301, the 
resting place of the executed leaders of the 
1956 revolution, a monument by György 
Jovánovics was erected after a competition; 
it follows the classical principles of sculp­
tural forms and avoids the pathos charac­
teristic of so many monuments. Not long 
afterwards, a "Székely gate” was erected 
there by certain groups advocating the pri­
macy of what they called "national values", 
in order to counterbalance the monument 
which, in their view, lacked specific con­
tent. Monuments that had survived the 
communist regime, under which they were 
branded as reactionary and had been re­
moved, were returned to their original sites, 
(e.g. Halbig's Immaculata Column in front 
of the St Roch Chapel). A restoration pro­
cess is going on in the visual environment 
bringing back such statues as that of 
Elisabeth, wife of Franz Joseph, beloved by 
the Hungarians.
As a result of the "patching up" of the 
holes in national history, the almost si­
multaneous inauguration of tablets com­
memorating figures of widely different, 
sometimes opposing, views has become 
daily practice. (For example, in 1991, a 
memorial to Charles IV (the Emperor 
Charles I) the last, exiled King of Hungary, 
was unveiled by his son.)
The year 1989 saw the symbolic send- 
off to the previous four decades: in June 
Imre Nagy was reburied, and János Kádár, 

































































Hoisting Béla Kun. (Imre Varga).
died in July. The withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Hungary was completed by 
1990. The fate of the memorials created in 
the spirit of Social Realism and meant for 
eternity, awaited decision. Several ideas 
were mooted publicly. It was proposed 
that an open-air museum be established 
for statues of Lenin, which might even 
serve as a tourist attraction for the coming 
World Expo. The Recsk League, an associ­
ation of former inmates of the most noto­
rious forced labour camp of the 1950s, 
came up with the idea of an unusual me­
mento: the statues of Lenin and Liberation 
memorials should be re-erected on the site 
of the former camp.
There was a mood of every­
thing for sale in the air, with 
a cheerful "Regime Ending 
Party” in Budapest in 
February 1990 and the 
SocReal Ball in Szeged (7 
November 1990). Those ea­
ger to do more pulled down 
a number of statues which 
would have been removed 
within a couple of days any­
way. Those involved may 
have felt, beyond their justi­
fiable anger, that their action 
might produce lasting politi­
cal capital for them.
Well-choreographed as 
these political "happenings” 
were, the more composed 
observer's first impression 
was a sense of déja vu. 
Marx's oft-cited thesis comes 
to mind, if somewhat inap­
propriately: "The tradition of 
all dead generations weighs 
down on the minds of the liv­
ing with the weight of a 
nightmare. And precisely 
when they appear to be en­
gaged in transforming their 
own selves and the things around them in 
order to create something that never exist­
ed before, it is precisely in such revolution­
ary periods that they painstakingly evoke 
the spirits of the past for their own service, 
borrow their names, battle slogans, cos­
tumes, so that the new world historical 
scene might be staged in this respectable 
guise and in this borrowed language."
In the last half a century there have 
been two instances of iconoclasm here 
that may be accepted as legitimate calls for 
the overthrow of totalitarian regimes. The 
first was the blowing up in 1944 of the 
statue of Gyula Gömbös, a pro-Nazi, ultra­
rightist politician and Prime Minister of
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Hungary from 1932 to 1936 (János Pász­
tor, 1942); the other was the great symbol­
ic act in Budapest of 23 October 1956, the 
pulling down of the statue of Stalin 
(Sándor Mikus, 1951). The memory of the 
1944 deed is marked by a memorial stone 
up to this day, a cultural absurdity in itself, 
calling attention, as it does, to the deliber­
ate absence of a monument. In 1989 the 
eight-metre statue of Stalin was partly re­
constructed as a prop by the film-maker 
Márta Mészáros for a scene depicting its 
being pulled down in the last part of her 
Diary trilogy. The unexpected sight of the 
resurrection caused a certain amount of 
shock and confusion, but at least people 
were able to re-live the moment of the 
Great Fall.
In December 1990, those taking part in 
a "Monuments in Hungary" conference ap­
pealed to the country's conscience not to 
destroy the monuments of the communist 
decades, an unjustifiable act if they are re­
garded as historical documents. "We find it 
important, regardless of their artistic val­
ue, that they should be preserved in a 
place and man­
ner accessible to 
the public, as 
documents of an 
era. We propose 
that the removal 
or keeping of the 
public sculptures 
of the past era 








In the same 
sober spirit, pa­
ragraph 109 of
Act XX 1991 ruled that decisions concern­
ing the placing, transfer, removal and de­
molition of works of art in public areas fall 
within the competence of the elected 
councils of the given local government 
authority; in the case of Budapest, the re­
sponsibility is the city council's. At the end 
of 1991 the capital's General Assembly dis­
cussed the memorials and tablets one by 
one, voting in each specific case on their 
fate. (The issue was pressing: István Kiss' 
Liberation Memorial on Thököly út had 
been pulled down by persons unknown a 
month earlier.) Of the works finally sent to 
the sculpture park, there was some dis­
agreement concerning the statues of the 
two Soviet officers shot down during the 
siege of Budapest while trying to convey a 
truce offer. The huge figures of Captains 
Steinmetz (Sándor Mikus, 1949) and 
Ostiapenko (Jenó' Kerényi, 1951) had stood 
at the entrances to the capital, and were 
regarded by many as landmarks to which 
people were accustomed. The view that 
the two statues meant memories of the be­

































































Marx and Engels (György Segesdi) prepared for removal. 
[The poster reads: Farewell, Marx and Engels?].
The Assembly became the forum for an in­
teresting historical debate which showed 
that some action or feature of the person 
portrayed in a work of art mattered more 
than its artistic merit.
A competition for a design for the emp­
ty site offered by Budapest's 22nd District 
started in 1992. Plans were submitted by 
the three competitors invited to take part. 
All three attempted to design an environ­
ment for the sculptures collected in an em­
blematic manner.
In Lajos Jeney's design, the statues are 
placed inside a circular structure. The wall 
would come to a point at a place where it 
would be crowned by Kisfaludi Strobl's 
Liberation Memorial, currently on top of
St Gellért Hill in Buda. Jeney 
intended to evoke the phy­
sical (Berlin Wall) and spiri­
tual (monuments of victory, 
space travel, etc.) atmos­
phere of the age.
György Tokár created an 
earthwork in the shape of a 
five-pointed star in the cen­
tre of which, surrounded by 
a star of flowers, there 
would be the statues of Marx 
and Engels. The whole com­
plex would have a barbed- 
wire fence around it.
The design eventually ac­
cepted was that of Ákos 
Eleó'd, then working in the 
studio of György Vadász. He 
took the title of Gyula 
Illyés's famous poem, "One 
Sentence about Tyranny”, as 
a name for the park. In the; 
description of the work sub­
mitted for the competition: 
"beyond the reservation-type 
confinement of a mass of 
statues in a single place, the 
work aims at a proper pre­
sentation of the various works, free of 
ironic overtones (this is not an amusement 
park, anything but), and wishes to provide 
a critique of the ideology assisting at the 
birth of these sculptures by the mood of 
the park as a whole, by an emphatic use of 
certain elements described below."
A major role is played by the starting 
"scene wall" with a tympanum (Marx, 
Engels and Lenin) and by the closing 
"ending wall" (where Captains Steinmetz 
and Ostiapenko have been set). Between 
these two points there are winding, "end­
less walks" containing the individuals and 
concepts of the workers' movement. The 
monuments and tablets are contained 
within the fenced walls of paths that re-
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Awaiting re-erection. October 1992.
turn petal-style to the main route. The 
central motif of the park is, here too, a 
flower star.
Ultimately, 41 statues have been placed 
in the sculpture park, the earliest of which 




(1947), and the 
latest the statue 






manent logic of 
the plan, so that 
the park is 
closed to works 
made after that 
date.
The progress of the project was being fol­
lowed with immense interest already at 
the time the statues were being removed 
from their original sites. The press gave a 
running account of the lifting and removal 











































Views o f the Sculpture Park, March 1993. Design by Ákos Eleőd
front-page photographs. More than a hun­
dred foreign journalists arrived to report 
on the building of the "Socialist Waxworks 
Museum" or "Communist Theme Park". It 
was clear that most foreign visitors came 
with views firmly set beforehand, bringing 
along the image they wanted to see, and 
did not let themselves be influenced by 
what they actually saw.
An inauguration ceremony for the 
sculpture park (which opened temporarily 
on 27 August 1993, as it is not completely 
finished yet) was conducted to a scenario 
drawn up by Péter Bacsó, who directed the 
film The Witness. The show, with its some­
what forced humour ("The First National 
Rally of Socialist Sculptures")—the inau­
gural address, the recital of a poem, 
marches played on an accordion, and the 
ceremonial cutting of the tape by "Comrade 
Bástya", a character in Bacsó's movie— 
was one of the events in the Budapest Fair, 
a festival commemorating the day the last 
Russian troops left Hungary. The setting 
was not really appropriate for an event of 
this type because, although the sculptures 
had been put between quotation marks as 
it were by Ákos Eleó'd, he took meticulous 
care to avoid presenting them as the items 
on display in a humorous waxworks muse­
um. The Hungarian and foreign audience 
were satisfied: they had been offered a se­
quel to the previous year's performance (a 
wittier one, too), the wrapping of the 
Liberation Memorial by Tamás Szentjóby.
Like anything else, the sculpture park 
can be approached in an ironic (though 
not parodistic) manner; however the stat­
ues themselves are not really flamboyant, 
and show little of the extravagant expres­
sivity, often carried to absurd extremes, of 
the Socialist Realist (or "SocReal”) style in 
favour at the time. On the other hand, one 
cannot forget that some Soviet memorials 
are in the proximity of burial grounds, and 
many monuments were associated with 
scenes of death often familiar from news­
reels as well.
The detached observer sees rather poor 
images repeated ad nauseam (like the "girl 
with bird" motif) which, out of their envi­
ronment,' have become pathetic. If any­
thing, they have lost the fairy-tale-like 
power praised by so many poets—about 
Lenin's statue, pulled down by the enemy 
but standing in its place the next day again, 
leading the fight until the final victory.
The monuments will, for a long time to 
come, be surrounded by the misty aura of 
the history they cariy along with them­
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selves, the mood of decorative 
wreathings of May Day parades.
István Kiss's "Workers' 
Movement Memorial'' (Hűvös­
völgy, 1976) had to go simply be­
cause of its title, for the two pro­
tecting hands constitute a sym­
bol so universal that it was used 
in the 1980s even by SZETA, a 
dissident movement supporting 
the poor.
The construction of the sculp­
ture park continues, since, without 
service buildings and a suitable 
technical background, it may lose 
its attraction. As an object of study it will 
probably endure, whether from the view­
point of art or history. But historians had 
better pay attention to the present as well: 
the motives may have changed but not the 
wish to erect sculptures in public places.
The artist János Fajó has already voiced 
his disquiet: "Sadly enough, the process 
may be repeated under any ideology. 
Things can be substituted. It may not be 
really necessary to dissemble these statues
at all. It may suffice to make heads that can 
simply be screwed on and off, replaced 
with others if need be. I am afraid that in 
the new political constellation, too, every 
party, every new authority will attempt to 
cast its ideas into bronze, carve them into 
stone or mount them on a horse. There 
must be some kind of magic there. Bronze, 
stone, marble: they are a special medium. A 
medium that can be used to commit ideo­





































I s t v á n  V i d a*
János Kádár and 
the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968
I n a series of sessions held between January 3 and January 5, 1968, the 
Central Committee of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party (CSCP) decided to sepa­
rate the functions of the president of the 
republic and of the first secretary of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party. 
Alexander Dubcek, First Secretary of the 
Slovak Communist Party, was appointed 
in place of Antonin Novotny as First 
Secretary of the CSCP. Novotny’s support­
ers were replaced by four new members 
in the Presidential Council. These changes 
at the top of the CSCP, while causing 
much surprise all over the world, had a 
rather mixed reception in the Eastern 
bloc. East Germany disapproved of the 
dismissal. Nor was the change in person­
nel welcome in Warsaw or Sofia. 
Although not without reservations, the 
Soviet political leadership accepted 
Dubcek, who had grown up in the Soviet 
Union, and studied at the Moscow Party
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College, and at that time was not one of 
the reformers within the Communist 
Party. Novotny's fall was ultimately decid­
ed by Brezhnev's refusal to stand by him. 
The Hungarian party leadership wel­
comed the changes. Novotny’s dismissal 
came as no surprise to János Kádár, who 
had been informed about the internal 
strife in the CSCP by Brezhnev as far back 
as the middle of December. He had, of 
course, no way of knowing that Dubcek 
was going to be Novotny's successor.1
On January 20 and 21, 1968 (even be­
fore making an official journey to Moscow 
in keeping with the practices of the times), 
Dubcek met János Kádár, in complete sec­
recy, on a hunting trip in Slovakia. The 
purpose was to make personal contact and 
to keep each other informed. For the new 
First Secretary of the CSCP, frustrated by 
the mixed reception his election was given 
abroad, Hungary was both an example to 
be followed, and a potential ally. By the 
same token, Hungary, the country where 
after two years of preparation, reform of 
the command economy began in January 
1968, was interested in Czechoslovakia 
choosing reform, and thus preventing 
Hungary's isolation within the Socialist 
bloc. The two had already met in 1964, 
and again in 1966. Dubcek held Kádár in 




The atmosphere of this hunting party and 
that of the approximately six-hour private 
conversation that took place on the 
evening of January 20, was good. Dubcek 
spoke openly and frankly, providing a de­
tailed account of the January session of 
the CSCP, together with the reasons for 
Novotny's dismissal and their personal 
and political disagreements. He also 
briefed Kádár on the internal situation of 
the party, as well as mentioning his own 
plans and the progress made on the par­
ty's Action Programme. He also spoke 
about his personal problems and fears, 
pointing out that the changes at the top 
of the CSCP affected neither the leading 
role of the party nor its relations with 
"fraternal" parties and the international 
working class movement. According to 
the surviving documents, Kádár spoke 
only in very general terms. He mentioned 
the importance of a thoughtful handling 
of the economic, political and nationality 
problems; he cautiously supported Cze­
choslovakia's reorganization along the 
lines of a federal state. "Winning the sup­
port of the working class is of paramount 
importance," he advised Dubcek, while 
warning him that a good relationship be­
tween the people and the party had to be 
maintained, as well as between the intelli­
gentsia and the party. Kádár advised 
Dubcek to be patient; he argued that the 
largely unfavourable international recep­
tion of his appointment was due to his 
being relatively unknown abroad.
Kádár informed Brezhnev by telephone about his meeting with Dubcek and 
about the good impression Dubcek had 
made on him.
At their January 23 session, the 
Politburo of the HSWP heard and endorsed 
János Kádár's report. Members of the Po­
litburo concurred in the view that Hungary 
should continue "to make friends" with
the new Czechoslovak party leadership, 
lending cautious support to Dubcek.3
The first official and public meeting be­
tween Kádár and Dubcek took place in 
Komarno on February 4, 1968, with the CP 
Secretaries in charge of foreign relations 
also attending. These informal and cordial 
talks were focused on current foreign af­
fairs, the war in Vietnam, the German 
question, the problems of the Near East. 
On all this there was complete agreement. 
Dubcek gave an account of his two-day 
visit to Moscow as head of a party delega­
tion in late January, stressing the Soviet 
leaders' promise to give every assistance to 
the new Czechoslovak leadership. The 
CSCP also planned to hold their Fourteenth 
Congress in 1970. Dubcek revealed that the 
party wished to change its authoritarian 
style of leadership, that victims of persecu­
tion would be rehabilitated, and that steps 
would be taken to separate the party and 
the state. Dubcek's decision to put the 
question of Hungarian-Czechoslovak rela­
tions on the agenda was favourably re­
ceived by the Hungarian delegates. Kádár 
was, however, much more reserved on this 
occasion than he had been during their 
first encounter. He hardly mentioned Hun­
garian domestic affairs, or the introduction 
of the economic reforms. Nor did he com­
ment on the planned political reforms de­
scribed by Dubcek. He focused mainly on 
foreign affairs, most notably on the prepa­
rations for the forthcoming consultation of 
Communist parties in Budapest. He did 
take up the issue of the improvement of bi­
lateral relations between the two countries, 
also putting forward a few suggestions.
Once again, the Hungarian delegates 
left with a good impression. They conclud­
ed that Dubcek had "great sympathy" for 
the policies and working methods of the 
HSWP.4
The series of events commemorating 
the twentieth anniversary of the commu­
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nist takeover in Czechoslovakia were held 
in Prague on February 22 and 23; they 
were attended by Brezhnev and the other 
leaders of the East-bloc countries, includ­
ing Ceausescu and representatives of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia. At that 
time it was not just Dubcek who was 
cheered in Prague: so was the Soviet Uni­
on. Brezhnev, Gomulka and Kádár wanted 
to demonstrate to the Czechoslovak peo­
ple, and to the world, that the new Cze­
choslovak leadership and its programme 
for reviving socialism through reforms, en­
joyed united support.
On March 23, just one month after that 
spectacular demonstration of unity in 
Prague, the first meeting of the leaders of 
the East-bloc countries was held in Dres­
den. There was only one item on the agen­
da: the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia. 
Preparations were controlled from Mos­
cow by Brezhnev personally. After showing 
some hesitation, the Czechoslovak party 
leadership finally agreed to attend. Kádár 
and the top leadership of the HSWP had 
mixed feelings. At the March 19 session of 
the Political Committee, several speakers 
felt that such a meeting might damage the 
CSCP, adversely affecting its prestige, giv­
ing comfort to the opposition, party and 
non-party alike, urging radical reforms, 
and might have adverse reactions abroad. 
Finally, it was decided that, if the other 
parties requested it, then the HSWP would 
send representatives to Dresden. On 
March 19, Kádár briefed Brezhnev on the 
phone about the HSWP's reservations.5
In Dresden, the top party and govern­
ment officials of six countries sat around 
the negotiating table (The Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, 
Poland and Hungaiy). The Romanians 
were not invited, despite Kádár's insis­
tence. He also failed in an attempt to ex­
clude the Bulgarians. Dubcek briefed the 
others on the Czechoslovak situation.
Although no joint minutes were taken, the 
handwritten, and rather sketchy, notes of 
János Kádár allow one to conclude that 
basically two issues were discussed: the 
evaluation of the political situation in 
Czechoslovakia and the proper course of 
action for the CSCP to take. The keynote 
was struck by Brezhnev, who passionately 
voiced his anxieties and fears, in places 
highly critical yet never offensive. He de­
scribed the situation in Czechoslovakia as 
"counter-revolutionary". His main objec­
tion was that, with the abolition of censor­
ship, the party had lost control over the 
media, which, in turn, openly criticized it 
over the air. He expressed his dismay over 
certain signs in foreign and economic poli­
cy, indicating a shift towards the West. He 
called it revealing that demands for restor­
ing the democratic system of Masaryk—a 
bourgeois democracy, that is—could be 
expressed. Furthermore, he objected to the 
fact that Novotny had been replaced as 
President of the Republic, following pres­
sure by the media and public opinion, and 
that just one day before the Dresden meet­
ing. He made a passionate appeal to the 
Czechoslovak leaders to deal with these 
dangerous phenomena. Gomulka, who 
had been asked by the Soviets before the 
meeting to show restraint, agreed with 
Brezhnev, but the words he used were 
much harsher. "In Prague the counter-rev­
olution walks at large," he announced 
bombastically. His main objection was that 
the Czechoslovak leadership had failed to 
show resolve. "There is no governing," he 
screamed at Dubcek. Dubcek made more 
mistakes in three months than Novotny 
had in ten years, he argued. Ulbricht, who 
had also been asked by Brezhnev to show 
restraint, said nothing about a coun­
ter-revolution; he gave a lecture on the 
differences in developments in Czecho­
slovakia and East Germany and the mis­
takes made by the CSCP. He strongly criti-
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E x t r a c t  f r o m  J á n o s  Kádár ' s  r e p o r t  to  
t h e  P o l i t i c a l  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  H S W P  o n  J a n u a r y  2 3 ,  1 9 6 8
About six or eight days ago a message came from Comrade Dubcek... This 
was followed by this meeting that was actually held in two places. One was 
a well-known game reserve north of Érsekújvár; our meeting lasted three 
hours, but since no accommodation was available there, we were moved to 
a hunting lodge near Tapolcsianky, about one-and-a-half-hours away. After 
another brief shoot there, we packed up and moved to yet another house. It 
was there that I had a private conversation with Comrade Dubcek before 
dinner for two or more hours; then we had dinner together and continued 
the conversation...
The atmosphere was very good, and our conversation very frank. One of 
the things Comrade Dubcek said was that there was not another soul in the 
world with whom he would have been able to discuss the same subjects in 
the same manner, for obvious reasons.
Comrade Dubcek was in a rather "miserable" condition physically. He 
was always a thin man and he has shed another five kilos in this wrangle.
His nerves were also worn out; but no longer to the same degree now. He 
was very grateful to us for agreeing to have this talk, and those with him 
[i.e., Dubcek's entourage, I.V.] said explicitly that it is very good that we have 
come together, because Comrade Dubcek was very much in need of an in­
formal talk.
In other respects—and this also has to be said—Comrade Dubcek made 
a very good impression on me, somebody who had known him before; he 
made a very good impression on me in the sense that he displayed no signs 
of triumph or arrogance—in fact quite the contrary. In a certain sense he 
feels bitter about being singled out for this post; he is aware of the problems 
and of the responsibility, and suffers a great deal because of this.
It is my Opinion and judgement that Comrade Dubcek is, as regards all 
important issues, a true and principled Communist. This even applies to 
subjective matters, such as his judgement of Comrade Novotny. He bears no 
grudge or anything...
I told him that we were happy about his election, that we congratulated 
him and wished him good health as well as great success in his work, but I 
also mentioned to him that on the way I had decided to greet him with the 
words: Congratulations and deepest sympathy.




cized the Czechoslovak press which had, 
in his opinion, created a right-wing mood 
in the country and had made wholly un­
founded attacks on East Germany. 
Representing Bulgaria in place of Zhivkov, 
who was on an official visit in Turkey, 
Stanko Todorov sided with Gomulka. "The 
situation is complicated and dangerous; 
we in Bulgaria are worried," he declared. 
Both in content and in tone, Kádár's 
speech was different. He disagreed with 
both Brezhnev and with Gomulka on 
whether there was a counter-revolution in 
Czechoslovakia, arguing that at worst it 
was a pre-counter-revolutionary scenario. 
Kádár admitted that worrying indications 
did exist, but unlike Brezhnev, Gomulka 
and Ulbricht, he recommended a political 
solution, rather than administrative and 
police methods and the use of force. The 
party must provide leadership, he said. He 
once again stressed the importance of uni­
ty and a solid organizational structure 
within the party. He was the only one 
among the leaders present to emphasize 
the need for a struggle on two fronts, call­
ing attention to the importance of being 
on guard against conservative Stalinist 
forces. The one area where he was in 
agreement with Gomulka was cadre policy; 
on this issue Kádár, too, felt that the CSCP 
should be firmly in control.
Although from slightly different view­
points, each member of the Czechoslovak 
delegation—Dubcek, Lenart, Cernik, and 
even Bilak—disagreed wholeheartedly with 
the analysis by Brezhnev and Gomulka. 
Without disputing that the political situa­
tion in Czechoslovakia was critical, that 
the party was under pressure and was los­
ing control over the media, and that the 
right-wing trends were noticeable, the 
Czechoslovak delegation was united in the 
opinion that the situation was not 
counter-revolutionary. The mainstream 
political movements were, in their own
word, "pro-socialist” and, therefore, so­
cialism was not in danger. They claimed 
that the CSCP was able to retain control 
over social and political developments.6
János Kádár and the Hungarian delega­
tion returned from Dresden in low spirits. 
They had not liked the atmosphere. The 
one-sided and preconceived handling of 
the Czechoslovak problem by the Soviets 
was in itself an ominous sign; they were 
also disappointed by Gomulka's rigid ap­
proach. They felt that the other socialist 
countries' trust in Hungaiy was decreas­
ing. Nevertheless, the Hungarian party 
leadership continued to give open support 
to the changes in Czechoslovakia.
In an interview broadcast on March 26, 
1968, Zoltán Komócsin, the Secretary of 
the HSWP Central Committee responsible 
for foreign relations, declared that "as for 
us, we approve of the policies of our com­
rades in the CSCP," assuring the CSCP and 
"all the forces of socialism in Czechoslo­
vakia" "of the continuing support and soli­
darity of the HSWP".7 This was reiterated 
in János Kádár's speech to the Conference 
of the Patriotic People’s Front on April 18.8
A Czechoslovak delegation of party and 
government officials led by Dubcek visited 
Hungaiy between June 12 and June 15, 
1968. On June 14, the leaders of the two 
countries signed a new agreement of 
friendship, cooperation and mutual assis­
tance valid for the next twenty years. The 
Czechoslovak delegation left Hungaiy per­
fectly satisfied. Dubcek announced: "We, 
the entire delegation and myself, are satis­
fied with our visit. The negotiations with 
the Hungarian leaders raised our spirits, 
because we understand each other well."9
After the Dresden meeting, sometime in 
late March and in the first half of April, the 
top Soviet leadership changed tactics. The 
essential elements of the new approach 
were: the exercise of pressure—political, 
diplomatic, ideological and even military—
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on Prague, splitting the Czechoslovak par­
ty leadership, the formation of, and sup­
port for, a "left-wing" and pro-Soviet 
group (led by Bilak and lndra) in opposi­
tion to Dubcek, and the instigation of the 
Soviet satellites against Czechoslovakia. 
The preparations for a possible military in­
tervention most probably began in early 
April.10 Marshal Yakubovsky, the Warsaw 
Pact Commander-in-Chief, arrived in Pra­
gue on April 24, asking the Czechoslovak 
government's permission for the armed 
forces of the Pact to hold their military ex­
ercise on Czechoslovak territory.11 Dubcek 
was summoned to Moscow for May 4, and 
was reprimanded once again for the politi­
cal developments in Czechoslovakia, most 
notably the increasingly frequent attacks 
in the media on the Soviet Union. Then, on 
May 17, Prime Minister A. N. Kosygin ar­
rived in Czechoslovakia for "medical treat­
ment".12
The next round of talks held by the first 
secretaries—the first Dubcek did not at­
tend—was arranged to take pJace in Mos­
cow on May 8, in complete secrecy. (Kádár 
was invited on May 6 personally by Kosy­
gin over the telephone, and was asked to 
travel to Moscow urgently and incognito, in 
order to discuss the Czechoslovak situa­
tion.) In describing the negotiations held 
by the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders 
four days earlier, Brezhnev expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the meeting and 
branded the Czechoslovak reform move­
ment as unequivocally counter-revolution­
ary. The Soviets made it quite clear that, 
unless there were changes in the Czecho­
slovak political situation, tougher mea­
sures might follow. From the available 
sources it cannot be determined whether 
the idea of a military intervention was sug­
gested at this level; what is a fact, however, 
is that Brezhnev primarily wanted to enlist 
the support of the socialist countries' lead­
ers in putting pressure on Dubcek to allow
joint military exercise to take place in Cze­
choslovakia, something that Dubcek had 
refused in Moscow. Another heated debate 
ensued, and János Kádár was once again 
the odd man out. In disagreement with 
Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov, who all ac­
cepted the Soviet evaluation, Kádár de­
clared: "At the moment there is no coun­
ter-revolution in Czechoslovakia; what is 
taking place is a struggle to correct the 
mistakes of the past." Without denying the 
existence of certain dangerous elements in 
the Czechoslovak political situation (the 
lack of determination in the party leader­
ship, as well as the emergence of "anti-so­
cialist" forces, i.e., a non-party opposi­
tion), Kádár stood by Dubcek and his col­
leagues and disagreed with Gomulka who 
said that Bilak and his associates should 
be supported and played off against 
Dubcek. Kádár made the point several 
times that any attempt to interfere in Cze­
choslovak domestic affairs would only ben­
efit the opposition in the country. By refer­
ring to the events of 1956 in Hungary, he 
firmly pointed out that the crisis in Cze­
choslovakia would not be resolved through 
the use of military force, and that a politi­
cal solution must be found. Without actual­
ly raising any objection against the Warsaw 
Pact militaiy exercise in Czechoslovakia, he 
said that political considerations should 
overweigh everything else.
Despite the differences of opinion, the 
party leaders assented to the joint exercise 
in Czechoslovakia; furthermore, they gran­
ted the Soviet request not to support the 
Action Programme of the CSCP in their 
media and in the various social and intel­
lectual organizations in their own coun­
tries. They decided to keep in touch and, if 
necessary, to meet again.13
In late May, the unsuspecting Czecho­
slovak government gave permission to hold 
an exercise for military staffs, which then 
took place between June 20 and June 30.
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The first signs of a near-imperceptible change in the Hungarian attitude be­
came noticeable in the second half of June; 
the definite—although not dramatic—turn 
came in mid-July. This was related to the 
fact that the political situation in Czecho­
slovakia had grown tenser, the reform 
movement had become polarized, with the 
radical wing of the party showing sympa­
thy for the Yugoslav model. Meanwhile, 
the non-party opposition began to make it 
clear that they wanted to restore parlia­
mentary democracy and a multi-party sys­
tem. By June 18, approximately 70 political 
organizations had applied for official re­
cognition, although only one of them, a 
small human-rights organization, had ac­
tually been given the green light. The for­
mation and activities of an explicitly 
right-wing organization, called K-231, 
uniting former political prisoners, as well 
as that of KAN, (Club of Engaged 
Non-Party People), were events known by 
Budapest. A steering committee aiming to 
revive the SDP had held meetings. "2000 
Words" a pamphlet by Ludvig Vaculik and 
signed by several prominent public figures, 
was part of this process. It demanded po­
litical pluralism and people were urged to 
open resistance and civil disobedience; 
people were also advised to solve political 
problems locally, completely by-passing 
the CSCP.
The Hungarian party leadership found 
two things intolerable: one was an article 
by O. Machatka in commemoration of the 
tenth anniversary of Imre Nagy's execu­
tion, which explicitly declared that he had 
been innocent, and the other was the 
pamphlet "2000 Words". Machatka's arti­
cle was attacked in the daily, Népszaba­
dság, in an unusually vicious tone.14 
Vaculik's pamphlet was branded as an at­
tack on socialism and, for the first time, 
administrative measures were demanded 
on both counts.15
On Soviet initiative, the party heads of the 
five Warsaw Pact countries—after prelimi­
nary consultation—addressed the Central 
Committee of the CSCP in separate letters, 
requesting another meeting for the discus­
sion of the Czechoslovak situation. 
(Kádár's letter was delivered on July 5.) On 
its July 8 meeting, however, the Presidium 
of the CSCP passed a unanimous resolu­
tion not to attend the meeting, scheduled 
to take place on July 11 in Warsaw. For 
tactical reasons, the Presidium decided to 
recommend bilateral talks instead; at the 
same time they announced the decision to 
attend fuller conferences only if all the so­
cialist countries, including Yugoslavia and 
Romania, would be represented. Behind 
the rejection of the proposal, (which, from 
a Soviet satellite, almost amounted to an 
act of rebellion) there was the belief that, 
despite the emergence of the non-party 
opposition, their party would remain se­
curely in power: its popularity and influ­
ence on the people was increasing rather 
than decreasing, enabling them to follow a 
more independent line not only at home 
but also in foreign politics. At the same 
time, the Czechoslovak leadership was 
suspicious of the motives of the Soviet, 
Polish and East-German leaders; the 
Soviet component in the joint exercise re­
fused to leave the country after the exer­
cise had finished, ignoring Czechoslovak 
requests to do so. In fact, having tapped 
Marshal Yakubovsky’s telephone, the 
Czechoslovak leaders found out that the 
Soviets planned to stay until September.
The Presidium of the CPSU's Central 
Committee was shocked by the refusal. 
Kádár was able to sense this from a tele­
phone conversation with Brezhnev on July 
9. He made two proposals on behalf of the 
HSWP: on the one hand, he suggested that 
the CPSU agree to a separate meeting with 
the representatives of the CSCP's Central 
Committee on short notice, even within
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T h e  Jul y  1 2 ,  1 9 6 8  r e s o l u t i o n  
o f  t h e  Po l i t i ca l  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  H S W P
The Political Committee has decided to nominate Comrade János Kádár and 
Comrade Jenő Fock to represent the Central Committee of the HSWP at a se­
ries of meetings, beginning July 14 in Warsaw, to be attended by representa­
tives of the five fraternal parties.
At the meeting our delegation is to represent the already known position 
of the Central Committee and the Political Committee. A political solution 
must be found for settling the Czechoslovak situation and the representatives 
of the other fraternal parties must be warned against military intervention.
The Political Committee declares that the Presidium of the CSCP Central 
Committee has committed a grave mistake when rejecting the fraternal par­
ties' proposal for a consultation.
The minutes of the meeting held by the HSWP Political Committee on July 
12, 1968.
the next few days; secondly that, in res­
ponse to the Czechoslovak explanation of 
their refusal, (that more time would be 
needed for preparations for the talks), the 
six-party conference be postponed to a 
date seven or ten days later. In case the 
Czechoslovak leaders refused, they should 
be informed officially that the other five 
members of the Warsaw Pact would hold a 
separate meeting. Kádár was obviously 
trying to buy time for Dubcek and his as­
sociates in the hope that they might go 
back on their earlier refusal.
The top leadership of the CPSU imme­
diately accepted the Hungarian Party's rec­
ommendations, with the additional obser­
vation that the five fraternal parties should 
respond to the Czechoslovak "no" by a 
joint letter, and that the five-party confer­
ence should be held come what may. In 
the meantime Dubcek and his associates 
continued to push for a separate meeting 
between the CSCP and the CPSU, although 
the tone was "softer" now. Since this was
interpreted in Moscow as delaying tactics 
and, in effect, as the rejection of the 
six-party conference, the Politburo of the 
CPSU proposed to hold the five-party 
meeting in Warsaw on July 14. They also 
suggested that the joint letter should be 
handed over as soon as possible. To leave 
the door open for a Czechoslovak retreat, 
Kádár suggested a few amendments to the 
draft of the letter, but these were rejected 
by the Soviets. Then, on July 11, N. V. 
Podgorny, the Chairman of the Supreme 
Council, asked Kádár's assent to the 
proposition that, when handing over the 
letter signed by the five party leaders, 
Chervonenko, the Soviet ambassador, be 
allowed to reveal the date of the meeting 
of the first secretaries in Warsaw, so that 
the Czechoslovak leaders would still have 
time to change their minds by July 14. 
Kádár gave his assent.16
After such preliminaries, the Political 
Committee of the HSWP decided, on July 
12, to send representatives to the Warsaw
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meeting. It was agreed, nevertheless, that 
a political solution must be found to nor­
malize the Czechoslovak situation, and 
that the HSWP should not support the 
planned military intervention.17
On the evening of the vety same day, 
July 12, the Czechoslovak party leadership 
once again approached Budapest with a 
request for Dubcek and Cernik to meet 
Kádár.18 Hoping to be able to prevent a rift 
and a further worsening of relations within 
the Eastern bloc, Kádár would have liked 
to see a Czechoslovak delegation at the 
Warsaw meeting. He therefore agreed to 
the meeting.
This secret meeting between Kádár and 
Dubcek was arranged to take place on the 
afternoon of July 13 in Komarno. At the 
meeting, which was nowhere near as 
friendly as earlier meetings had been, 
Dubcek made it clear that he resented the 
conduct of the fraternal parties, and 
protested at the joint declaration of the 
five parties and the convocation of the 
Warsaw conference. He defended the July 
8 decision of the CSCP's Presidium, main­
taining that any interference in Czecho­
slovak domestic affairs by the CPSU, or by 
any other parties, was unacceptable. He 
reiterated that they did not completely rule 
out the idea of an international confer­
ence, provided that discussion of the 
Czechoslovak situation was not the sole 
item on the agenda. They argued for bilat­
eral talks, on the grounds that they were in 
disagreement not only with the CPSU, but 
also with the Polish, East-German and 
Bulgarian parties. Nor did Dubcek try to 
conceal his resentment over Soviet mili­
tary units' prolonging their stay in Czecho­
slovakia after the military exercise had 
come to an end.
This time Kádár set a much harsher 
tone than he had done on previous occa­
sions. He rebuked Dubcek for his refusal 
to attend the Warsaw meeting, calling that
his worst mistake since January 1968. He 
also pointed out that the Czechoslovak 
leaders' conduct troubled the relationship 
of the six countries within the Warsaw 
Pact, to the detriment of Czechoslovakia, 
and at the same time placing the HSWP, 
and Kádár himself, in a precarious posi­
tion. He also repeated Brezhnev's argu­
ment on limited sovereignty (something 
Kádár had earlier resisted doing under 
similar circumstances), saying that the 
Czechoslovak crisis was the concern of the 
entire international working-class move­
ment, and that the need to find a joint so­
lution for the Czechoslovak problem had 
to take precedence over any feelings of re­
sentment, no matter how justified that 
may have been, as well as over any fear of 
losing sovereignty. Kádár also called 
Dubcek's attention to the fact that both 
Romania and Yugoslavia had their own 
specific interests and that it was far from 
certain that they would be reliable allies. 
Creating closer ties with those two coun­
tries would clearly lead to further deterio­
ration in the already tense relationship be­
tween Moscow and Prague. Kádár urged 
the Presidium of the CSCP to sit down at 
the negotiating table with the Soviet lead­
ers and settle their differences. Kádár, as 
well as Prime Minister Jenő Fock, who also 
attended the meeting, used the opportuni­
ty to mention the HSWP's own resentment, 
most notably over Machatka's article.
This harsh tone took Dubcek and his 
delegation by surprise; they had not ex­
pected such strong criticism from the Hun­
garian leaders, who had up till then sup­
ported them. "Apparently, that was the 
moment that they realized how far they 
had become estranged," the minutes of the 
meeting reveal. "In that phase of the dis­
cussion, both leaders broke down. In their 
confusion, they both acknowledged that 
they had come to a dead end; they kept re­
peating that—in their view—the bilateral
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talks should culminate in a multilateral 
discussion."19 Still, the discussion did have 
some effect: the Presidium of,the CSCP's 
Central Committee sent a letter to Brezh­
nev in Warsaw, telling him that they were 
ready to start talks with the CPSU immedi­
ately, and that they did not rule out the 
possibility of attending a wider conference. 
In comparison to their resolution of June 
8, this letter was a major concession, but it 
had come too late.
The meeting in Warsaw took place on 
June 14 and 15. Because of their prior dis­
cussions with Dubcek, the Hungarian dele­
gation was received with undisguised ani­
mosity. "We sat through the Warsaw meet­
ing, feeling like scabs," Kádár complained 
at the August 7 meeting of the Central 
Committee of the HSWP, "and that was al­
so how the others pictured us.”20 The 
meeting was held in a tense, jittery atmos­
phere. Gomulka spoke first and the heads 
of the other delegations followed suit. 
Kádár addressed the meeting twice. The 
differences of opinion in the evaluation of 
the Czechoslovak situation continued to 
be great; the arguments ran much the 
same as before, although roles had 
changed to some extent. Though not actu­
ally on the agenda, military intervention 
was the main issue, as all participants well 
knew. Gomulka was more restrained this 
time; instead of talking of a counter-revo­
lution, he warned about the danger of the 
CSCP's becoming a social-democratic par­
ty and Czechoslovakia's turning into a 
capitalist country, giving the forthcoming 
16th Conference of the CSCP, brought for­
ward to September 7, as a possible date 
for such radical changes. He stressed firm­
ly that the Czechoslovak crisis could not 
be dealt with by force, and certainly not 
military force. Kádár sided with Gomulka, 
sharing his opinion as far as the social-de­
mocratic tendencies, bourgeois restoration 
and the military intervention were con­
cerned. A new element in Kádár's speech 
was his description of the Czechoslovak 
political system as being "Yugoslav in 
character", capable of increasing the 
threat of a bourgeois counter-revolution. 
But he stressed that the counter-revolu­
tion had not won in Czechoslovakia.
Unlike in Moscow, where Gomulka had 
taken the lead in the attacks against the 
Hungarian position, here it was Ulbricht 
and Zhivkov who joined issue with the 
Hungarian delegates. Ulbricht, who repeat­
ed his phobias about a possible imperialist 
intervention, counter-revolutionary foot­
holds and ideological terror, reacted to 
Kádár's speech by rudely criticizing the 
HSWP's conduct in the entire Czecho­
slovak crisis, going as far as declaring—to 
the surprise of the Hungarian delegates— 
that Hungary could be the next country 
where the socialist system would be shak­
en by the imperialists' intervention. He 
proposed another military demonstration 
in Slovakia. Zhivkov, whose views were 
the most extreme, also denounced the 
Hungarian position, declaring that the 
Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact 
countries had already used up all the polit­
ical options. He openly advocated military 
intervention. Brezhnev spoke in a more re­
strained tone; nevertheless, what he basi­
cally said was that the counter-revolu­
tionary threat had increased in Czecho­
slovakia and if the CSCP was unable to re­
solve the problem on its own, then it was 
"the right and the duty of the socialist 
countries to help." He did not, however, 
openly argue in favour of military interven­
tion; on the contrary, he proposed that the 
five parties should send a warning letter to 
Prague, demanding a firmer line against 
the "counter-revolutionary" forces.
■ Since this was the first occasion since 
1956 that two fraternal parties had openly 
criticized the HSWP at an international 
conference, Kádár decided to speak again.
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Without directly responding to the criti­
cism put forward by Ulbricht and Zhivkov, 
he declared that the Hungarian party line 
on Czechoslovakia was responsible and 
that they stood by it. Eventually the con­
ference decided that—in accordance with 
the views of Kádár and Gomulka—no 
steps should be taken which were likely to 
disturb public opinion in the other social­
ist countries and in Czechoslovakia, and 
which could be interpreted by the West as 
intervention. Consequently, the partici­
pants all voted for the sending of another 
letter. They also decided, however, that, 
unless the Presidium of the CSCP chose to 
cooperate, links should be established 
with the "healthy forces" within the CSCP, 
namely, the pro-Soviet Bilak-Indra group; 
in that case this latter group must be given 
all the necessary support to enable them 
to challenge the legitimate leaders of the 
party. Furthermore, it was also decided 
that, as a last chance, another round of bi­
lateral meetings between the Soviet and 
the Czechoslovak leaders should be 
arranged. (The most ardent support for 
this, eventually approved by Brezhnev and 
Kosygin, came from Kádár.)21
The letter handed over in Prague on 
July 16, reflected the Soviet view and argu­
ments, albeit somewhat toned down, and 
ignored the extreme-left views of the 
East-German and Bulgarian leaders. The 
most that the Hungarian delegation was 
able to achieve, with some support from 
the Poles, was the inclusion of a paragraph 
condemning the entire Novotny era and 
past mistakes. In addition to the already 
voiced demands, the joint letter now con­
tained a new element, the deployment of 
"all available defensive forces", including 
the army, the police, and the workers' 
militia, was openly urged against the "an­
ti-socialist forces", i.e. the non-party op­
position. Ignoring Brezhnev's personal 
plea, the Presidium of the CSCP rejected
the criticism and essentially left the de­
mands of the "five parties" unanswered.
Moscow reacted by initiating serious 
measures. Three crucial motions were 
passed at the meeting held by the 
Presidium of the CPSU on July 19 and 20, 
1968, presumably after serious debate. The 
more moderate members of the top lead­
ership, Brezhnev included, were able to 
persuade the CPSU to make one more at­
tempt to come to an agreement with 
Prague, and the Presidium accepted the 
CSCP's offer of July 14 of another bilateral 
meeting. At the same time, it was decided 
that, in conjunction with the negotiations, 
contingency plans for the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia must be prepared and that 
units of the Warsaw Pact countries to be 
deployed in the invasion must be put on 
alert. It was also decided that, in accor­
dance with the resolution of the Warsaw 
meeting, links should be established with 
Bilak's group, the so-called "left-wing" of 
the CSCP Presidium, in order to present a 
political alternative.22
I n all probability, it was P. J. Shelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central 
Committee, who, on behalf of the CPSU 
Politburo, informed the Hungarian party 
leadership on July 20 or 21 of the decision 
to begin preparations for the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, at the same time convey­
ing a Soviet appeal for the participation of 
the Hungarian army. ’(Naturally, similar re­
quests were made through military chan­
nels.23) After consulting a number of 
high-ranking politicians, including Prime 
Minister Jenő Fock, Kádár assented, on 
behalf of the HSWP, to Hungarian partici­
pation in military action. There has been 
no evidence so far to confirm whether or 
not there was any preliminary discussion 
of the Soviet request in the Political 
Committee of the HSWP. The Hungarian 
assent was highly welcome to the Soviet
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party leadership. Speaking on behalf of the 
Presidium of the CPSU, Brezhnev ex­
pressed his gratitude for the positive re­
sponse, declaring in highly emotional 
tone, that "... this means so much to our 
party and friendship that 1 cannot find 
words to express it. I shall not forget this 
as long as I live.”24
At the August 7 meeting of the Central 
Committee of the HSWP Kádár argued that 
political coercion made it no longer possi­
ble for the party to keep out of the conflict: 
"Theoretically, it would have been a per­
fectly possible option. We could have said 
that we were not going to participate in 
the military preparations. But what would 
have come of it? We saw the anxiety of our 
Soviet comrades, the Poles, the others, 
and, naturally, of our own, too, although 
in our case it was less pronounced. What 
would it have meant if we had said that we 
were not going to participate? In my view, 
it would have only created more anxiety. 
Nothing would have been achieved; on the 
contrary, it would have produced an even 
more complicated situation. Let me tell 
you quite frankly—since we know the situ­
ation, the circumstances—the people [i.e. 
the Soviet leaders] would have decided on 
an even more unpredictable course of ac­
tion."26 Furthermore, Kádár and his associ­
ates were fully aware of the fact that, had 
they decided to stay out of the conflict, 
their chances of exerting influence on 
events in Czechoslovakia and inside the 
Warsaw Pact, would have been small. At 
the same time, they also feared that 
Hungary might become the next target, in 
which case the economic reforms would 
have had to be scrapped.
The Czechoslovak and the Soviet dele­
gations met on July 29 at Cierna na Tisou, 
Slovakia; negotiations lasted for four days 
and the atmosphere was that of an end­
game. Brezhnev and his aides knew that 
military preparations for the invasion of
Czechoslovakia were going ahead full 
steam. Dubcek and his colleagues had no 
idea of what was going on. The Soviets 
deemed the situation as hopeless right 
from the start. In contrast, the Czecho­
slovak leadership were eager to settle the 
dispute, as they wanted, at any cost, to 
avoid a break with the Soviet Union and 
the other socialist countries. The negotia­
tions ended with a surprising result. The 
Soviets consented to the CSCP's continu­
ing the reforms on the basis of their Action 
Programme and to the holding of their 
special party congress. They also promised 
that in the future they would refrain from 
intervening in Czechoslovak domestic af­
fairs. Dubcek and his team promised to do 
everything in order to maintain the party's 
leading role; they also undertook to place 
the media under party control, to put an 
end to open criticism of fraternal countries 
and parties, to ban opposition parties and 
organizations, including the SDP, and to 
dismiss the most criticized officials—in 
other words, the radicals among the re­
form communists, in addition, the Czecho­
slovak delegation agreed to attend another 
six-party conference. The Soviet conces­
sions were anything but honest, as be­
came clear soon enough.26
The six-party meeting was held on August 3 and 4 in Bratislava. On the 
evening of August 2, however, the leaders 
of the "Five" held a separate meeting, in 
which Brezhnev gave an account of the ne­
gotiations at Cierna na Tisou. This report, 
which turned out to be a one-sided ac­
count of events, since it mostly dealt with 
the Czechoslovak promises, although the 
skepticism of the Soviets could also be dis­
cerned, was approved by the participants. 
The sole achievement of the six-party 
meeting was the publication of a joint dec­
laration.27 There was no mention in the 
document of the Czechoslovak situation,
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nor was there any criticism of the CSCP's 
performance. Considerable emphasis was 
put on the cooperation of the socialist 
countries. The document did however, 
contain a remarkable contradiction. On the 
one hand it confirmed the principles laid 
down by the Bandung Conference, and on 
the other hand it approved the Brezhnev 
doctrine, the ideological basis for the so­
cialist countries' limited sovereignty.
After Cierna na Tisou and Bratislava, the 
top leadership of the Soviet Union watched 
Czechoslovak developments on the jump. 
Brezhnev regularly telephoned Prague; he 
also wrote letters and memos, some on be­
half of the Presidium of the CPSU Central 
Committee and some in his own name. In 
addition, the Soviets tried to exert pressure 
on Dubcek's team through János Kádár. 
Even back in Bratislava, Kosygin had invited 
Kádár to take his holidays in the Soviet 
Union; the invitation was repeated by 
Brezhnev on August 7. Kádár spent four 
days at Yalta, where he had informal talks 
with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny on 
the Czechoslovak crisis. Kádár reiterated the 
HSWP’s views, frequently criticizing the con­
duct and tactics of the Soviets. He consis­
tently maintained that political problems re­
quired political solutions, although he now 
added that military intervention was neces­
sary when all other attempts failed. He tried 
to convince the Soviet leaders that the CP­
SU—because of its role played in the inter­
national working-class movement—could 
not appear as the "defender of the past"; it 
should support new approaches and it 
should resist the temptation of interfering in 
other parties' internal affairs. How much of 
Kádár's criticism was actually accepted by 
the Soviets is impossible to tell; what he did 
achieve, however, was a request from 
Brezhnev to talk to Dubcek one more time.
The last round of talks between Dubcek 
and Kádár, this time initiated by the 
Hungarians, was held in Komarno on
August 17. The meeting, which lasted thir­
teen hours and was characterized by ten­
sion and uneasiness, proved to be futile. 
Kádár realized that he and Dubcek were 
not speaking the same language and that 
the Czechoslovaks would not be able to 
keep the promises they had given in Cierna 
na Tisou and in Bratislava; he saw that the 
Czechoslovak leaders were going their 
own way, preparing the party congress. 
Kádár returned to Budapest with the con­
clusion that Dubcek's team was unwilling, 
as well as unable, to cariy out the promis­
es they had given two weeks earlier.28
How much influence Kádár's evaluation 
of the Komarno talks had on the decision 
to launch the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
remains an open question—probably none 
whatsoever. The top-ranking representa­
tives of the Five were summoned to Mos­
cow on August 18, the date set for the inva­
sion was approved, together with the 
Bilak-Indra group's plans for the transfer of 
power. To be able to arrange all this, how­
ever, the Presidium of the CPSU must have 
made their decision on the matter at least 
one or two days earlier. (That was also 
when Kádár learned about the planned date 
of the military action.) On August 20, the 
Political Committee of the HSWP agreed to 
Hungary's participation in the occupation 
of Czechoslovakia.29 One Hungarian divi­
sion, with approximately 12,000 men, was 
to be directly involved in the invasion.30
After August 21, 1968 the Hungarian 
party leadership no longer played the role 
of mediator. Although, according to some 
memoirs, Kádár later claimed that beside 
Svoboda, he, too, had something to do 
with Dubcek's eventual release and invita­
tion to attend the negotiations on August 
23 between the Soviets and the Czecho­
slovaks, the events of the time do not sug­
gest this. Between August 23 and 26 the 
leaders of the Five were also meeting in 
Moscow. However, only the Soviets nego­
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tiated with the Czechoslovaks; the others 
were briefed by them. The representatives 
of the Five could do no more than com­
ment on the outcome of the talks. On 
August 26, the Hungarian party leadership 
approved the agreement signed by the 
Soviets and the Czechoslovaks. In addition 
to carrying out the points of the agreement 
signed at Cierna na Tisou, in this docu­
ment Dubcek also undertook to invalidate 
the decisions of the Congress held on 
August 22, to dismiss large numbers of 
radical reformers, and to agree to a later 
legal arrangement permitting the station­
ing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.31
The Soviet party leadership later con­
tinued with the same methods they had 
employed during the negotiations in 
Moscow: they negotiated with Dubcek and 
his team and only afterwards did they brief 
the leaders of the other four parties. The 
links between Hungarian party and gov­
ernment circles and the Czechoslovak 
leadership (i.e. not only with Dubcek's 
team, but with the "left wing", also) be­
came tenuous. The fact that Kádár severely 
reproached Bilak's group for not having 
the courage to admit publicly that they had 
called in the forces of the Warsaw Pact al­
so contributed to this deterioration.32 The 
Soviets continued to react to every single 
event in Czechoslovak domestic affairs, in­
terfering in everything. Up to the middle of 
October, Brezhnev fairly regularly talked to 
Kádár over the phone, which meant a call 
every two or three days. The last top-level 
conference of the five leaders took place 
on September 17. This time there were no 
arguments; the participants assured the 
Soviets of their support in the handling of 
the Czechoslovak situation. This meant the 
end of the reform movement, "normaliza­
tion"33 in the official terminology. Kádár's 
last attempt to influence events in Czecho­
slovakia was a proposal to withdraw occu­
pation troops at the earliest possible date.
At the time of preparing the military agree­
ment between Czechoslovakia and the 
Soviet Union, Brezhnev still thought it 
important to seek Kádár's opinion. The 
agreement, which was signed on October 
15, was important for Hungary, as it 
permitted the withdrawal of Hungarian 
troops from Czechoslovakia at an early 
date. Beginning with the second half of 
October, Brezhnev's telephone calls be­
came less and less frequent. In late 
January he suggested to Kádár that per­
haps another five or six-party conference 
should be arranged; this, however, never 
came to pass. Gradually, the Czechoslovak 
problem became the concern of Soviet for­
eign policy alone, with less and less im­
portance being placed on the opinion of 
the allies.
I n a famous interview broadcast by Pano­ráma, the current affairs programme of 
Hungarian Television in 1989, Dubcek said 
that if Kádár and Gomulka had given him 
stronger support, they could have averted 
the Czechoslovak tragedy.34 It seems that 
this is not true. Kádár underestimated his 
options, and perhaps gave in too soon; 
nevertheless, once the Soviet party leader­
ship had made their decision, Kádár had 
no way of changing it. Brezhnev and his 
associates were primarily guided by con­
siderations of Soviet security. No Soviet 
troops had previously been stationed in 
Czechoslovakia. The Soviet military com­
mand had always been anxious about easy 
access to Soviet territory through Czecho­
slovakia, making their defence system vul­
nerable at this point. Czechoslovakia's hy­
pothetical withdrawal from the Warsaw 
Pact would have further exacerbated this 
vulnerability. In May 1968, Brezhnev did 
not beat about the bush when he said that 
"we shall never surrender you”. Kádár 
himself had no intention of crossing Soviet 
plans. One of the corner-stones of his pol-
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icy was full cooperation with the Soviet have liked to avoid military intervention,
Union, including Hungary's falling into line but once it had been decided on in
with Soviet foreign policy and coordinating Moscow, the Hungarian leaders accepted
all steps. It clearly follows from the above it. Kádár was not a man likely to change
that Kádár and his administration would his political principles.
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Z s u z s o  U r b a c h
Queen Mary of Hungary and 
the Renaissance in Flanders
Maria van Hongarije, koningin tussen keizers en kunstenaars, 1505-1558 
(Mary, Queen of Hungary, Governor of the Netherlands, Patroness of the Arts 
1505-1558). Museum Het Catharijneconvent, Utrecht and Noordbrabants 
Museum, 's-Hertogenbosch, 1993.
M ary of Hungary, Marie de Hongrie, Maria von Ungarn, that is Mary of 
Habsburg, known in Hungary as "the 
German Mary", married King Louis II of 
Hungary in 1522. As part of the policy at 
the back of the saw, Bella gerant fortes, tu 
felix Austria nube, she had already been 
conditionally bespoken to the future heir 
of the king of Hungary—as yet unborn—at 
the tender age' of one. Mary was born in 
the Coudenberg Palace in Brussels as the 
daughter of Philip the Handsome, Duke of 
Burgundy and Joanna "the Mad" of Castile 
in 1505. Her grandfather, the Holy Roman 
Emperor Maximilian I, baptised her Mary 
in memory of her grandmother, his wife, 
who had died tragically when young. 
Following her father's early death and giv­
en her mother's insanity, she was raised at 
the Malines court of Margaret of Austria, 
her aunt, the Regent of the Netherlands. 
The humanist, music and art-loving court 
provided a stimulating environment for the 
talented girl, who proved to be a skilful 
musician. Maximilian had earlier conclud-
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ed a double marriage agreement with 
Wladislaw II, King of Hungary; under this, 
Mary, from the age of nine, was brought 
up at the courts of Innsbruck and Vienna. 
In 1515, when Mary was ten, and Louis 
nine, the engagement took place in 
Vienna, at the same time as that of 
Ferdinand of Habsburg, the future Holy 
Roman Emperor and King of Hungary, 
Mary's brother (and brother to the 
Emperor Charles V) to Anna of Hungary, 
daughter of Wladislaw and sister to Louis. 
In 1521 Mary travelled to Buda via 
Visegrád. In 1522 she was crowned Queen 
of Hungary in Székesfehérvár, and that 
same year the marriage proper took place 
at the church of Our Lady in Buda. 
According to an old tradition, a green and 
gold dress in the Hungarian National 
Museum was her wedding gown.
Up to 1526, as the Queen of the King 
of Hungary, Mary held court in 
Sigismund's and Matthias' magnificent 
palace in Buda castle. Her favourite diver­
sions were the chase, knightly jousts, mu­
sic and dance, but her court also breathed 
the new spirit of the age and was an in­
strument through which the ideas of 
Martin Luther and Erasmus of Rotterdam 
reached Hungary.
Mary was barely twenty-one when she 
was widowed. Fleeing from the disastrous 
defeat of the Hungarian army by the Turks
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at Mohács on the 29th of August 1526, 
Louis was thrown by his horse and 
drowned in a brook. On the news of the 
lost battle reaching her, Mary had her 
goods and chattels, and the Royal 
Treasury, loaded onto carts and barges, 
and departed upriver for Pozsony 
(Pressburg, now Bratislava) and Vienna. 
The young widow enjoyed the sympathy of 
the whole of Europe. In 1526 Luther dedi­
cated his translation of four Psalms as con­
solation to her and Erasmus wrote his De 
vidua Christiana for her in 1529. In 1531 
Charles V appointed her Governor of the 
Netherlands in succession to her aunt 
Margaret of Austria, an office she occupied 
up to 1555. In that year she followed the 
Emperor Charles V to Spain, after he had 
abdicated and handed over his Spanish do­
mains to his son Philip II. Philip asked her 
to take up her office again but Mary died 
suddenly in Cigales in 1558, following a 
heart attack. She was only fifty-three. She 
kept a lock of her husband's haif in a lock­
et of her necklace, and never took off her 
widow's weeds. Unlike her sister Eleonore 
of Austria, Queen of France, or her aunt 
Margaret of Austria, she never remarried.
In 1531 Mary moved into the huge palace in Brussels of the Dukes of Brabant, 
where she held office as the Regent of the 
Habsburg Netherlands. Her court was a 
centre of humanism and the arts. The pur­
pose of the exhibitions organized in 1993 
was to present not only her political role 
but also her patronage of the arts. As such 
the historical importance of the widowed 
Queen of Hungary is far more than that of 
a great tragic and romantic figure of her 
age. As ruler and patron of the arts she was 
no doubt one of the great women of the 
Renaissance. It is not merely the feminist 
fashion of our time that focuses on her. 
Her life spanned the whole of Renaissance 
Europe from its western marches in Spain
to its eastern marches in Hungary. Indeed, 
she appropriately serves as a symbol for a 
Europe undergoing integration. In 1993 
Antwerp was chosen as the cultural capital 
of Europe and Dutch museums, to add to 
the splendid exhibitions arranged in that 
great 16th and 17th century metropolis, 
deliberately centred on Mary of Hungary. 
This proved a great idea, and the double 
exhibition was a resounding success. True, 
every schoolboy in Belgium and the Ne­
therlands was familiar with Queen Mary's 
name, but that was about all. Thanks to the 
efforts of historians, art historians and lit­
erary historians, an excellent display of 
Renaissance art could be brought together 
involving seventy-seven museums from 
nine countries. Belgium and the Nether­
lands had the lion's share but Hungary, 
Austria, France, Great Britain, and Spain al­
so contributed a great deal. The Hungarian 
material was lent by the Hungarian 
National Museum, the Museum of Fine 
Arts, as well as the Museum of Arts and 
Crafts, the National Széchényi Library, and 
the National Archives. The Hungarian con­
tribution to the catalogue raisonné was al­
so far from insignificant. Two hundred and 
fifty-seven items were discussed in its four 
hundred pages. The editorial board was 
headed by J. Bruyn, Professor Emeritus of 
the University of Amsterdam, with W. P. 
Blockmans, Professor of Medieval Litera­
ture at the University of Leiden, and S. H. 
Levie, Director Emeritus of the Amsterdam 
Rijksmuseum as members. The lion's share 
of the work was done by the historian 
Jacqueline Kerkhoff, who had written her 
1989 Nijmegen doctoral dissertation on 
Maty of Hungary, and Bob van den 
Boogert, who is on the staff of the Art 
History Department at the University of 
Amsterdam.
The Rijksmuseum Het Catharijnecon- 
vent of Utrecht, which in 1991 had shown 
early Netherlandish art from Hungarian
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Berhard Strigel: (c. 1465-1528): Portrait of Louis II as an Infant, 
ca 1515/1516. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.
museums, on this occasion concentrated 
on Mary of Hungary's historical impor­
tance, showing many a masterpiece to this 
purpose. It was the duty of the 's-Herto- 
genbosch Museum—Hieronymus Bosch's 1
home town—to present the Queen as a 
patron of the arts who did much for the re­
ception of Renaissance art. Needless to 
say, it was impossible to even attempt to 
fully cover the latter subject.
1 ■ Kunst um 1492. Hispánia-Austria. Die Katholischen Könige, Maximilian I und die Anfänge der 
Casa de Austria in Spanien. Toledo-Schloss Ambras (Innsbruck), 1992. (Art around 1492. 
Hispania-Austria. The Catholic Kings, Maximilian 1 and the Beginnings of the House of Austria in 
Spain. Toledo-Ambras Palace (Innsbruck), 1992).
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Our times have shown great interest in the 
16th century and its art. Another example 
of a similar display was the 1992 
"Hispania-Austria" exhibition in Toledo 
and Schloss Ambras in Austria.1 Just as in 
the exhibitions in the Netherlands, great 
works of art served as illustrations to his­
tory. The portraits of Queen Maty and of 
her family on their own, extending as they 
do from the Late Gothic to the Late 
Renaissance, were a complete exhibition 
in themselves. A special trouvaille at 
Toledo and Schloss Ambras was the por­
trait of Archduchess Maty at the age of 
fourteen in a huge hat and magnificent 
dress, painted by Hans Maler in Innsbruck 
in 1520. It is now owned by the Society of 
Antiquaries in London.
At Utrecht it was confronted for the first 
time by its companion piece, that of 
Princess Anna, the 16-year-old daughter of 
King Wladislaw II of Hungary, the other 
bride in the arranged double marriage, at 
that time already engaged to the Archduke 
Ferdinand. This is a splendid example of a 
female double portrait, a rare art form.
Flemish or German painter, second quarter of the 16th century: 










Hans Maler (1480/90-1529): Portrait of Queen Anne of Hungary. 
Private collection.
Hans Krell painted Mary (today in 
Bamberg) in 1524, which formed a diptych 
with the picture, a portrait of King Louis II, 
today in the Brussels Royal Art Museum. 
He looks thin, suggesting great spiritual 
refinement, not at all as the pudgy, blue­
eyed boy of Strigel’s portrait from 1515, 
today in Vienna.
One of the finest pieces in the exhibi­
tion, a refined portrait of the young wid­
owed Hungarian Queen by the anonymous 
Brussels court painter called the Master of 
the Magdalen Legend, was lent by the 
Budapest Museum of Fine Arts. As men­
tioned earlier, Mary wore her widow's 
weeds to the end of her life, they became 
an essential element of her iconography. 
Her other portrait, also in Budapest, shows 
the widowed Queen a few years later. A 
coloured woodcut by Cornelis Anthonis
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Hans Maler (1480/90-1529): Portrait of Queen Mary of Hungary, 1520.
London, Society o f Antiquaries.
portrays the ascetically clad but very deter­
mined Regent. The small portrait medallion 
from the Amsterdam Rijskmuseum is a re­
minder of a lost portrait of the elderly 
Queen which Titian painted in 1548. A larg­
er 16th century copy of the lost Titian was 
lent by the Paris Musée des Arts Décoratifs.
The breathtaking highlight at the 
Utrecht exhibition was the full-length and 
life-size bronze statue from Madrid, por­
traying the aged Queen. She commissioned 
the work in 1553, when she was forty- 
eight, from Leone Leoni, an Italian sculptor 
working in the Brussels court, and Leoni's 
son completed it in 1556, when Mary was 
51. The statue survived with its original 
patina, an intact work of rare beauty. This 
was a true imago amongst the painted por­
traits: a broken, aged woman, slightly 
humpbacked, and with tired hands.
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Naturally, there was more to the two exhi­
bitions than splendid portraits and histori­
cal documents. Calligraphy and seals turn 
many 16th century documents into works 
of art. The show of heraldry, the letters 
patent from the Hungarian National 
Archives at an earlier exhibition in 
Schallaburg in Austria2 had already con­
vinced one and all that art historians ne­
glect them at their peril. The most impor­
tant heraldic items on display were two ta­
pestries with the coat of arms of Margaret 
of Austria, the work of Henri van Lack. 
Both are from the Budapest Museum of 
Arts and Crafts, here shown in surround­
ings worthy of them.
The works of art in the two exhibitions 
could also be described as a review of the 
Flemish Renaissance. One of the earliest 
women artists, Catharina van Hemessen, 
was a lady in waiting to Mary of Hungary, 
and her husband was a court musician. 
They both accompanied her to Spain. 
Catharina van Hemessen's painting of a 
Young Girl Playing the Clavichord was 
shown with important documents of 
court music.
Jacques Dubroeucq, the greatest Re­
naissance sculptor in the Netherlands, 
whose 1535 design for the rood screen of 
Saint Waltrudis in Mons is a major work of 
Flemish art, combined the architecture of
rum t t i  f Unknown 
Flemish master: 
The Great Hall 





2 ■ Matthias Corvinus und die Renaissance in Ungarn 1458-1541. (Matthias Corvinus and the 
Renaissance in Hungary 1458-1541).
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Master of the 
Magdalen Legend 
(active at the end 
of the 15th and 
the beginning of 
the 16th century): 
The Widowed 





Roman triumphal arch and the late Fran- 
co-Flemish Gothic in a manner unique in 
his age. No wonder Mary asked him to de­
sign and ornament two of her chateaux, at 
Binche and Mariemont. Binche was once 
the most important Renaissance building 
in the Netherlands. Its fate recalls that of 
King Matthias' Buda residence in that it 
too was totally demolished. In 1554 
Francis I of France's soldiers reduced it to 
rubble, as well as setting fire to Marie­
mont. Some of Binche's treasures have
survived; the Prado treasures, Rogier van 
der Weyden's Deposition from the Cross. 
The frescos of the Great Hall were painted 
by Michiel Coxcie. Binche also had the 
Titians commissioned by the Queen, along 
with Pieter Coecke van Aelst’s tapestry of 
the Seven Deadly Sins, as well as the busts 
of emperors made of Roman alabaster of 
the Great Hall. Dubroeucq's architectural 
design, including the monumental coffered 
vaults of which even the decorations can 










coloured drawing. Beside figures of a 
Renaissance masked ball, the Habsburg 
family, Eleonore, Charles V, Queen Mary, 
and the Young Philip are sitting under a 
canopy. Another drawing has survived, 
showing another hall at Binche, where fig­
ures symbolising the planets were painted 
on the ceiling; a cunning mechanism be­
low it enchanted one and all by taking the 
laid tables up or down. The programme of 
the decorations at Binche was obviously 
the exaltation of Habsburg fame. Ceilings 
decorated with motifs taken from astrono­
my were made all the way from Italy to 
Esztergom, where the palace of Archbishop 
János Vitéz boasted one. Joseph Duverger, 
the art historian drew attention to the fact 
that Mary's patronage of the arts in the 
Netherlands was the very moment of the 
transplanting of the Renaissance style. It is 
very likely that not only her humanist edu­
cation and the years spent at her aunt's 
court in Malines, but also her time in Buda 
helped to shape her taste, prompting her 
to favour the new style. Her time at Buda 
may have been short, but those were the 
happiest and most receptive years of her 
youth. Time was unable to efface the mem­
ory of her husband and the same was 
surely true of the royal residences Buda,
Visegrád, and Esztergom. It is now up to 
Hungarian art historians to trace connec­
tions that may have existed.
Though it may sound paradoxical, the 
Dutch exhibition first articulated the fact 
that it was indeed due to Mary of Hungary 
that the mature Renaissance style was ac­
cepted in Flanders. Tapestries were her 
favourite art, but she also commissioned 
paintings by Titian and the best of the so- 
called Romanist painters like Barend van 
Orley and Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen also 
worked for her. Michiel Coxcie, painctre de 
la Royne, she liked best, and she took his 
Michelangelesque David Defeats Goliath, 
which is now in the Escorial, to Spain with 
her, as she had taken King Matthias's, 
1485 Missal from Buda (today in Brussels). 
Nor did she neglect the great Netherlands 
masters of the previous century. At one 
time she owned Jan van Eyck's double 
portrait of Giovanni Arnolfini and his wife, 
today in the London National Gallery. The 
choice of Mary, the Dowager Queen of 
Hungary, that great patron of Renaissance 
art, as one of the symbols of a Europe in 
the process of unification was justified not 
only by her name but also by her wisdom 
and the steadfastness of her behaviour and 
attitude as a human being, t*-
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J ú l i a  S z a b ó
László Moholy-Nagy's 
Postcards from the Front
I t was in the last cen­tury that the portrayal 
of ordinary life in the 
simple, direct language 
of the drawing or the 
sketch became a prime 
concern of painters. The 
events of the Napoleo­
nic Wars and the suc­
ceeding revolutions were 
recorded in Biedermeier 
drawings and water­
colours. Travel experi­
ences, ordinary days in 
Italy, Greece and the 
Holy Land were cap­
tured in Romantic draw­
ings and then by pho­
tographs. Daily life as 
well as major historical 
events were, of course, 
more frequently depict­
ed by. Realist artists, 
while the favoured top­
ics of the Impressionists 
were the flurry and pul­
sation of busy urban 
life, trees swaying in the 
wind, and the lights of 
the evening, often rep­
resented quite brilliantly 
even without colours, 
and sometimes by theSelf-Portrait (Myself). 1917.
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use of subtle colouring, in watercolours, 
tempera, or pen and wash drawings.
The great leap around the turn of the 
century toward the avant-garde only in­
volved certain smaller groups, and even 
their members had covered the road lead­
ing from Realism to Impressionism before 
turning toward more abstract forms of ex­
pression.
A s a student interested in literature and poetry, László Moholy-Nagy met and 
befriended Iván Hevesy, a critic, who read 
his free-verse poems, and showed little 
surprise when shortly afterwards, around 
1913-1914, his friend began to draw car­
toon-like portrait sketches in coffeehouses 
and in the streets.
Like many of his contemporaries, when 
Moholy-Nagy saw the outbreak of the
Great War, and landed on the front 
himself, he found life, expansive 
and rich up to then, suddenly de­
termined by outside forces and se­
verely limited. It seemed he would 
live a soldiers's life for a long time, 
and the only acceptable way out 
would be some kind of light 
wound. In the eastern and south­
ern theatres of war he saw the 
most different landscapes, strange 
peoples and unfamiliar lifestyles at 
front lines which, by that time, had 
already reached a certain stage of 
technological development: with in 
front of, or behind, scenes of tele­
phone wires and other symbols of 
civilization. The battles, the hope 
of victory, the premonition of de­
feat existed only as vague feelings 
in the minds of the enlisted men, 
and when the grim reality made its 
presence felt, few were able to 
cope with recording it in images. 
Instead, there were theatre and
134
The Hungarian Quarterly
cabaret shows behind the line, 
field hospitals filling the role of so­
cial clubs as well as coffeehouses 
in every godforsaken little place. 
The single form of contact with the 
people at home was a few square 
centimetres of paper on field post­
cards (made from tree barks in 
needier times.) Mail was cen­
sored, which meant that com­
plaints, swear words or anti-war 
phrases rarely made it home at all. 
That may have been one of the 
reasons why so may people made 
drawings, unskilled amateurs, 
highly skilled and aspiring begin­
ners alike, and they often coloured 
their drawn messages. Drawings 
were included in letters, accompa­
nying private or secret messages 
to friends and relatives, or instead 
of them, and were sent to editorial 
offices (those by József Egry, for 
instance). The majority of these 
drawings were mildly impression­
istic—after four decades, Impressionism 
had taken root in Hungary.
The sense of history, the feeling for the 
historical moment was traditionally very 
strong in Hungarian artists. Among 
Moholy-Nagy's contemporaries, this is 
most apparent in the drawings of József 
Ripp-Rónai, János Vaszaiy, József Egiy and 
the young Gyula Derkovits. There are few­
er symbols and more expressiveness (as in 
the wartime postcards of József Nemes 
Lampérth and in György Ruttkay's ink 
drawings sent to fellow-artist and poet 
Lajos Kassák). Realism, tinted with 
Impressionism, can be seen in László 
Mednyánszky's dramatic war images, 
which develop their subject from pencil 
drawing to oil painting.
During the war years László Moholy- 
Nagy probably made hundreds of drawings
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on postcards, which he sent to Iván 
Hevesy and others. His portrayal of the 
episodes and actors of the war is cooler 
and more rational than those of his con­
temporaries mentioned here. He drew ele­
gantly, with a kind of detachment, even 
though he had not then studied in any 
drawing school as yet. He must have seen
Júlia Szabó
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many exhibitions around 1913 in 
Budapest, nevertheless he was 
noone's follower. His drawings are 
characterized not by any search 
for technique but by light, self-as­
sured draughtsmanship. It was 
during these four years that he be­
came a visual artist, one who fills 
the paper in an economical man­
ner, a draughtsman capable of pro­
ducing an image perfectly charac­
terizing its subject with a single 
line. In that manner he recorded 
every major scene of the war in the 




N i c h o l a s  T. P a r s o n s
An Inside Story of Outsiders o n
László Kosa (Ed.): Die Ungarn: ihre Geschichte und Kultur (The Hungarians: 
Their History and Culture. A Handbook of Hungarian Studies). Translated into 
German by Albrecht Friedrich. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994. 500 pp. with 
32 pp. of colour and black and white illustrations.
O n page 430 of this industriously com­piled and in many ways estimable vol­
ume, Mihály Szegedy-Maszák quotes a re­
iterated plea of the writer Mihály Babits, 
namely that Hungarians should be induced 
to "look at themselves simultaneously 
from within and from without". The re­
mark is not a bad starting point, both for 
considering some general aspects of 
Hungarian historiography through the 
eyes of a foreign student, as also for exam­
ining particular aspects of the rather ambi­
tious undertaking under review. Babits's 
remark was made in the context of an as­
sessment of the reformer, Count István 
Széchenyi, dubbed "the greatest 
Hungarian" by Kossuth, his main political 
rival; it touches an ever-exposed nerve and 
is liable (if we are not careful) to pitch us 
prematurely into the maelstrom of 
Hungarian complexities, of kuruc and la­
banc, of the Széchenyi vision versus the 
Kossuth choice, of A kelet népe (The 
People of the East) versus western and/or
Nicholas T. Parsons,
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is the author of Hungary: A Cultural and 
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cosmopolitan culture, of Catholics versus 
Protestants, chauvinists versus patriots, 
the land versus the city, of seductive 
délibáb (fata morgana) versus louring 
nemzethalál (death of the nation), and so 
on and so forth. These are matters that 
supply the oxygen (and some of the nox­
ious gases) at or around a bourne from 
which few travellers return unscathed.
In his introduction the editor describes 
the book's five chronological studies as 
explicating a "linguistic-cultural" unity, 
one, however, that in the nature of things 
is different from that of (for example) the 
linguistic homogeny of a German-speaking 
world encompassing many different states. 
On the other hand, it is conceded that the 
"ethnic-linguistic" principle is infrequently 
applicable ("is not even in every case nec­
essary") for the period up to the 19th cen­
tury, not least because it was an attitude 
largely alien to the official culture of the 
educated classes.
The matter of the book—an historical 
study of the Hungarian language, a con­
densed (largely political) history of 
Hungary, a two-part chronological account 
of literature and the arts, and a section on 
ethnography and folklore—is subsumed 
under the umbrella term "Hungarologie" 
(Magyarságtudomány). You will look in 
vain for this term in the two-volume 
Langenscheidt, but then you would also
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look in vain for "Germanologie", perhaps 
because of the differing roles of Hungarian 
and German linguistic cultures already 
mentioned. The distinction drawn between 
the multi-national state (where the lan­
guage of the state-forming group was of­
ten spoken by a minority of the people) 
and a multiplicity of states sharing a (more 
or less) common language, is no doubt a 
useful one; the term "Hungarologie" draws 
attention to it. Any unease that term pro­
vokes is due less to the incense of special 
pleading it may seem to exude, than to 
scepticism as to whether it is really need­
ed. At any rate it does not yet seem to have 
established itself in English, the Magay 
and Kiss Hungarian-English dictionary 
sensibly rendering Magyarságtudomány as 
"Hungarian Studies".
The editor defines "Hungarologie" as a 
"possible [sfc] interdisciplinary form of the 
branch of knowledge dealing with Hunga­
rian language, culture, history and soci­
ety". He further identifies three versions of 
Hungarologie: as represented in the pre­
sent state of Hungary, as pursued 
amongst the Hungarian minorities in 
neighbouring countries, and as it occurs 
in lands further afield. Indisputably the 
umbilical cord to Hungarian culture 
shared by these three categories of its stu­
dents is the language itself and for this 
reason, as the editor puts it, "the book has 
a linguistic-cultural focus" whose material
is "strongly determined by the past". He 
adds (a shade defensively) that the book is 
not concerned "to lay emphasis on the 
Hungarian national character [and] the 
distinctive ethnic features [of the 
Hungarians]"—functions apparently im­
puted by many to the practice of 
Hungarologie—but rather to present the 
many-sided historical and cultural 
"Eingebettetsein" (embeddedness) of the 
Ungartum (literally: "Hungarianness") ly­
ing in the geographical centre of Europe". 
The locative phrase is something of a 
hostage to fortune in view of the fact that 
nobody can decide exactly where the 
boundaries of Central Europe actually lie, 
although I am told that geographers like 
to tease historians by locating the centre 
of the continent at Minsk. Perhaps it is al­
so noteworthy that the translator (whose 
rendering seems admirably workmanlike 
throughout in respect of the clarity of his 
German) has here had to. resort to a 
coinage in order to suggest that feeling of 
being a distinguishing and distinctive part 
of the Central European furniture that the 
author evidently wishes to stress. At the 
same time, the reference to "Ungartym" 
(Magyarság)—another expression which, 
like Deutschtum, résists adequate transla­
tion into English)*—would seem to thin 
down the distinction insisted upon earlier 
between this work and those that accen­
tuate national characteristics. For this
* ■ "Deutschtum" of course implies a synthesis of race, culture and language in which race tends 
to have the upper hand. Ludwig of Bavaria's Valhalla at Regensburg is a realized example of it, gen­
erously including busts of the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred, Maria Theresia and Mozart (but not Heinrich 
Heine who had allowed himself some satirical remarks about Ludwig and his hall of heroes). All 
those represented are there by virtue of their perceived membership of the Germanic family of na­
tions. The recent erection of a bust to Albert Einstein reverses the Nazis’ attempt to keep their target­
ed categories out of German civilization, the concern now being to keep such categories in. Many of 
the most venerable exhibits in a Magyar Valhalla, were one to be created, would honour persons 
who were not of Magyar origin and in some cases did not speak the Magyar tongue. The list includes 
János Hunyadi (of Romanian origin), Sándor Petőfi (whose parents were Slovak peasants) and a fair 
sprinkling of Poles, Italians, Jews and Germans.
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reader at least, the apparent ambiguity 
lurking behind these remarks has an im­
pact (not necessarily deleterious) on the 
text, of which more later. Meanwhile he is 
left pondering as to whether we are deal­
ing here with the view (espoused by 
Szekfű, Babits and others) that Ungartum 
is an inclusive historical phenomenon, 
arising in the multi-national realm of King 
Stephen and his successors, or with 
something more exclusive, closely tied to 
the Hungarian language per se.
The importance of defining one's terms 
of reference with care when writing about 
matters Hungarian (and Central European) 
is something that students can easily 
learn the hard way, should they not have 
the present book to guide them. Much 
(perhaps too much) has been made of 
multiple and/or marginal identities in the 
countries of the region; moreover inno­
cent inquirers after truth are also faced 
with a process, not exclusive to the area, 
but rather prevalent here, whereby nations 
invent or re-invent themselves at crucial 
junctures of their development, a sort of 
retroactive accumulation of national con­
sciousness. A good deal of the cult of 
Ungartum that a modern tourist may typi­
cally be presented with—conveniently, if 
not entirely fairly, characterized as the 
kitsch of csikós and csárdás—may be 
traced back to the 19th century's discov­
ery of the marketing potential of souvenir 
culture (a potential exploited, for example, 
at the Millennium Celebrations of 1896).
The concentration on linguistic continu­
ity—some 75 per cent of the book is primar­
ily concerned with language and literary ex­
pression—rightly and naturally leads to an 
accumulative portrait of Hungarians both as 
an ethnic group and as a state-forming 
caste; to a portrait also (even if this was not 
the authors' stated intention) of Hungarian 
identity in all its contradictory wayward­
ness, nobility and capacity for self-injury.
A t this point it is worth pausing to con­sider what audience the editors had in 
mind for the type of information on offer, 
and whether the manner in which it is pre­
sented is likely to achieve or defeat the aims 
the individual authors have set themselves.
The Hungarian title (A magyarságtu­
domány kézikönyve) would seem to sug­
gest (with the word kézikönyv, "hand­
book”) that the intention was to produce a 
text for reference or a source-book, and 
this impression is reinforced by the edi­
tor’s expressed hope that the work will be 
of practical assistance to high school and 
university students, including those of 
non-Hungarian origin. On the other hand, 
the material is cast in narrative form, an 
especially graceful narrative in the case of 
the contribution by András Gergely, who 
has achieved the near-impossible task of 
giving a judicious overview of Hungarian 
history from the ethnogenesis of the 
Hungarian people (estimated to be in the 
palaeolithic period) to the first local elec­
tions (1990) after the Antall government 
came to power. The entire sweep of 
Hungarian events is reduced to 114 pages, 
and it is a tribute to its author that the 
reader seldom feels any sense of strain in 
the compression of the material; nor does 
the text degenerate into a list of names 
and dates. The excellence of this part of 
the book rather throws into relief the 
problems faced by some of the other au­
thors. The two sections on "Literature and 
the Arts" by Péter Kó'szeghy (from the be­
ginnings to the end of the 17th century) 
and Mihály Szegedy-Maszák (from the 
18th century to the present) comprise very 
nearly half the text. Nevertheless they con­
centrate (as the editor warned us they 
would) overwhelmingly on the written 
word, with small sections on architecture, 
music and the arts (mostly painting) sand­
wiched at intervals into the chronological 
analysis. Perhaps with the student audi-
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ence in mind, a huge number of authors 
and their works have been conscientiously 
listed. Too conscientiously, in fact, for one 
is bound to ask what instructional purpose 
can usefully be served if the narrative 
landscape is periodically blotted out in a 
blizzard of names and dates. An example 
taken at random from Köszeghy's text (pp. 
264-266) may serve to illustrate the prob­
lem: he has some illuminating remarks 
about the increasing profanity of the liter­
ary texts by the sixteenth century preacher 
Péter Bornemisza and moves on to a thor­
ough, if rather dry, analysis of the achieve­
ment of the great bible translator (1590), 
Gáspár Károli. In between, in five short 
paragraphs, we have to hear about a 
dozen other contemporaries. Obviously 
references of this density are better repre­
sented as entries in a biographical lexicon 
than in the form they appear here.
A related tendency to name-listing on 
this scale is the style-mongering that occa­
sionally disfigures Szegedy-Maszák’s oth­
erwise thought-provoking and stimulating 
contribution. For example, the description 
of Gyula Krúdy as "the most important 
writer of the Hungarian Jugendstil”, (also 
"a developer of the novel form" and "one 
of the most important Hungarian novelists 
of the 20th century") is little more than 
wind, even if you accept (as I do not) that 
the application of the term "art 
nouveau/Jugendstil" to literature is in any 
way helpful. Lóránt Czigány, whose Oxford 
History of Hungarian Literature has set a 
formidable standard by which Hungarian 
literary history may be judged, supplies the 
sort of insight required when he speaks of 
Krúdy anticipating the "stream of con­
sciousness" technique characteristic of the 
work of Joyce and Virginia Woolf.
The style-mongering tendency is even 
more pronounced when the author leaves 
home ground and tackles art and architec­
ture. He gives the painter Csontváry due
recognition, but the nature of the latter’s 
individual genius (surely not to be dissoci­
ated from a quasi-mystical perception of 
Hungarian identity) entirely eludes him. 
Thus we are told that Sunset in the Bay of 
Naples has affinities with Jugendstil, The 
Wailing Wall is linked up with 
Expressionism, and the last works are said 
to be harbingers of Surrealism. Perhaps 
this sort of thing is useful for examination 
answers, but if so, it is the exams that 
need to be questioned.
On the other hand, the balance that 
needs to be struck between the formal re­
quirements of learning and the need to 
supply a readable overview with thought- 
provoking insights is always extremely 
hard to achieve; there certainly are places 
where the authors miraculously do achieve 
it, managing to be both informative and 
stimulating.
For example, Szegedy-Maszák's piece 
(18th century to the present day) will 
doubtless be a rich source for contempo­
rary controversy, principally because the 
author deals fascinatingly with cultural 
politics versus political culture. The 18th 
century is a useful time-hinge, being the 
period (as Kosa points out in The Hunga­
rians in the World) when the Carpathian 
Basin saw the formation of national 
groupings that have not changed greatly 
since (population exchanges and attempt­
ed genocide excepted). The strength of 
Szegedy-Maszák's cultural survey of three 
centuries lies in the author's willingness to 
take time off from gazetting stylistic devel­
opments to sketch in the social, demo­
graphic, religious, and political circum­
stances that gave rise to them. This en­
ables the reader to comprehend the rela­
tive backwardness of 18th century Hunga­
ry in terms of multiple underlying fac­
tors—lingering feudalism, slow population 
growth, the vagaries of religious control in 
education, and so on. Particularly stimu-
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lating is the discussion of the influence of 
the Enlightenment on the cult of national 
character, whether constructive (as with 
Montesqieu's L'esprit des lois, which advo­
cated tailoring the administration of states 
to suit their individual cultures) or ar­
guably disastrous (as in the case of 
Herder's notorious "prophecy" that the 
Hungarians would be absorbed in the pul­
lulating mass of surrounding Slavs, 
Germans, Wallachians—"in centuries to 
come one will perhaps no longer find their 
language"). Hungarian patriotism thus ex­
hibited a contradictory response to the 
Enlightenment as a whole; the seeds of 
contradiction lay in its ultimately doomed 
attempt to exploit ideas (mostly imported 
from France) that seemed to respect the 
integrity of the Hungarian national ideal, 
while simultaneously rejecting many of the 
enlightened ordinances of Habsburg rule 
that seemed to do the opposite.
The history of Hungary is dogged by 
such clashes of irrecóncilables (human and 
abstract), which seem to change their outer 
complexion from age to age, but not their 
essential nature. They crop up frequently in 
Szegedy-Maszák's text, as for example in 
this observation on p. 358: "The Hungarian 
language was simultaneously an advantage 
and a disadvantage for scholarship and sci­
ence. Through it the fruits of learning 
could reach a wider public and this in turn 
obliged the intelligentsia in general to con­
centrate more on the practical, and to 
make their work popularly accessible and 
transmittable; on the other hand the isola­
tion of the Hungarian language increased 
the disadvantages of the exiguous scholar­
ly activity in the country—scholars could 
not count on international recognition of 
their work." Two centuries after the period 
under discussion, Gyula Illyés was to write: 
"the Hungarian's mother-tongue is at the 
same time our softest cradle and our most 
solid coffin"—plus ga change.
In dealing with Count István Széchenyi 
(1791-1860), perhaps the most celebrated 
victim of irreconcilable Hungarian contra­
dictions, Szegedy-Maszák points out how 
the relationship between Liberalism and 
Romanticism is crucial to the culture of 
Hungary in the first half of the 19th centu­
ry. In Széchenyi himself we can perceive 
their dual influence, in that the Benthamite 
utilitarianism, that characterized the active 
man who bullied his fellow-countrymen to 
get things done, is tempered by a "roman­
tic variation of liberalism”, impregnated 
with moral responsibility.
In the national question Széchenyi re­
acted to the pressures of his age and polit­
ical environment, articulating an ambiva­
lence and/or frustration when dealing with 
it that was to recur in different ways up to 
the present. His position veers from the 
non-discriminatory insistence that every 
language created its own world and every 
nation had the potential for a culture 
which only she was called upon to develop 
(Hunnia), to a Cartesian impatience with 
the imperfections of language; in his jour­
nal he pondered whether it might not prof­
itably be replaced by a system of numbers 
covering all concepts, so that the written 
word could be mathematically fixed for 
eternity. (The journal itself was of course 
written in three languages, with cross-ref­
erences to others.)
A fter Szegedy-Maszák's masterly treat­ment of these and other matters that 
characterized Hungarian society and culture 
up to Dualism, it comes as rather a disap­
pointment to read his account of the sec­
ond half of the 19th century, and especially 
of Historicism, with which he seems to be 
notably out of sympathy. An inauspicious 
beginning is made with his treatment of the 
great novelist, Mór Jókai (1825-1904). The 
latter is knocked down with a stale repeti­
tion of charges that are surely due for re­
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assessment, the principal one being that his 
works are mere tableaux welded onto im­
plausible and didactically planned plots. 
Such a dismissal fails to explain what needs 
to be explained, namely why his works have 
endured (Dr. Johnson's acid test of quality) 
and are still quite widely read. Again the 
comparison with Czigány's Oxford History 
of Hungarian Literature is tempting, for 
there we are given a rich analysis of Jókai's 
"national romanticism" and at least some 
clues as to exactly why Jókai's brand of es­
capism was so popular abroad, as well as in 
Hungary. Szegedy-Maszák mentions the 
"simple confrontation between good and 
evil" in the novels and it might have been 
worth noting, in the context of Ungartum, 
that Jókai was the product of a strict Calvi­
nist upbringing. Perhaps that has some­
thing to do not only with the stark dualism 
of his created world but also with his amaz­
ing capacity for work, even if the latter was 
also given artificial stimulus by a fierce wife 
who locked him into his study. (Jókai's col­
lected works make up more than a hundred 
volumes.)
Similarly, the painter Bertalan Székely 
(whose technical excellence is grudgingly 
conceded) is tarred with much the same 
brush as Jókai; together with contempo­
rary painters of Historicism, he is tepidly 
described as "wanting to make national 
history vivid and subordinating picture 
composition to didactic aims". This is vir­
tually to imply that history paintings are 
no more than picturesque trifles or even 
kitsch, yet the genre surely deserves a 
more generous approach. The accusations 
that these painters were indifferent to the 
"artistic tasks" of the age (whatever that 
may mean) and that they did not take as 
their measure the best old masters (nei­
ther did some painters we regard as great) 
may once have been the received wisdom, 
but I suspect the upcoming shows of 
Historicism will prompt a re-think.
Inadequacy seems to turn to prejudice 
when the author turns to architecture and 
Miklós Ybl, who, we are told with Loosian 
asperity, "built Renaissance palaces when 
commissioned to produce bourgeois 
apartment blocks, because he could only 
work to one design [sic]." Readers are ill- 
served by such pseudo-insights, not only 
because of their inaccuracy, but because 
such an account fails to locate a very gift­
ed architect in the context of an age when 
Historicism was the norm throughout 
European architecture. Ybl's best works, 
the fruits of apprenticeship abroad as well 
as in Hungary, may stand comparison with 
those of Theophil Hansen and Charles 
Garnier; here he is made to seem merely 
pretentious, provincial and inept.
In Szegedy-Maszák's final chapters 
(From the Crisis of Dualism to the Revo­
lutions—1890-1919, The Culture of the 
"Three Hungaries"—1919-1944, and A 
Concise Overview of the Recent Past (from 
1945) his strengths as an analyst of culture 
in its relationship to political develop­
ments are again on display. Indeed, these 
chapters ably provide the component of 
social history that András Gergely cannot 
accommodate in his formal political histo­
ry. Vital information is supplied on the 
evolution and gradual (or partial) seculari­
sation of education, the assimilation of 
Jews, and the hesitant advance of female 
emancipation; (incidentally, why should 
Margit Kaffka—1880-1918—the first sig­
nificant Hungarian female writer of fiction, 
be ignored when dozens of near-nonenti­
ties are paraded for inspection?) He shows 
how the 'increasing pressures of national­
ism that led to the collapse of the Dual 
Monarchy, the First World War, the dis­
memberment of ancient Hungary, and fi­
nally, participation in the Second World 
War, are made manifest in the continual 
search by writers and intellectuals for a 
definition (or redefinition) of Ungartum,
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and its role in the world. Here we return to 
an ancient dichotomy, the opposed 
branches of which had simply evolved to 
reflect (or react against) contemporary po­
litical realities. The broad distinction re­
mains, however: that between liberally- 
oriented patriotism inherently respectful of 
the diversity of cultures on the one hand, 
and on the other what has been described 
in a different context as "conservative 
state-sponsored nationalism".
The leading interpreters of this political 
and psychological crisis of identity— 
Endre Ady in poetry, Oszkár Jászi in politi­
cal thought, Mihály Babits in culture—are 
mostly well-known to students of modern 
Hungary. The author deserves our thanks, 
however, for his illuminating treatment of 
the 1920s and 1930s, when numerous de­
fensively written tracts of a "national 
Christian" character appeared. Typically 
these promoted the theme of the 
Hungarian Civilizing mission; but there 
were also thoughtful and ruminative 
works by writers like Gyula Szekfű, Dezső 
Kosztolányi, and László Németh. The lat­
ter two broadly aligned themselves with 
Széchenyi's romantic vision of the unique­
ness of each nation's (potential) cultural 
contribution; Kosztolányi rooted this 
uniqueness for Hungary in the Hungarian 
language, which he treats as indicant of 
national character. Unlike György Lukács, 
Hungary's most spectacular example of 
the trahison des deres, these writers did 
not take refuge in a self-verifying system 
of ideology. Nevertheless, their writings 
tend to betray either the wishful thinking 
of Németh's külön magyar út ("special 
Hungarian way"), which always seemed to 
involve turning the clock back instead of 
facing up to future realities; or, alterna­
tively, they applied themselves to the 
search for an external guarantor of the in­
tegrity of Ungartum, notwithstanding the 
almost universally unhappy experiences
their forefathers had had with such at­
tempts. Particularly interesting in this re­
spect is the analysis of Three Generations 
(1920), a much-discussed work by the his­
torian Gyula Szekfű, a conservative who 
nevertheless challenged the shibboleths of 
narrow nationalistic historiography, to the 
discombobulation of the latter's adher­
ents. In the Széchenyi tradition, Szekfű 
saw Hungary as belonging with the devel­
oped, modern states of Western Europe, 
and was also a paid-up member of what 
George Orwell calls the "change of heart" 
school (as opposed to the proponents of 
violent change, in which category he 
placed Kossuth). Not unrealistically, his 
initial choice of guarantor fell on 
Germany, but his vision of Hungary play­
ing a role in a "Christian-Germanic cultur­
al community" was destroyed by Nazi 
racism; turning away from the Germans, 
he ended up as Hungary's first ambas­
sador to Moscow after 1945. Szekfű was a 
broken man in his last years, his honour 
intact but his vision for Hungary destroyed 
by geo-political realities.
Szegedy-Maszák's fascinating discus­
sion of Szekfű is somewhat lengthy, right­
ly so in my opinion, because so many of 
the enduring questions about the identity 
and historical role of the Hungarians are 
crystallized in Szekfű's work. How relevant 
they remain may be seen from some of the 
remarks made by Gyula Horn in a recent 
interview with Paul Lendvai for Austrian 
television. The Prime Minister designate 
(as he then was) observed that the country 
was now in a situation it had rarely en­
joyed, that of not being under the direct 
political dominance of a neighbouring 
power. Yet hesitancy and economic self- 
interest in the West, coupled with the lour­
ing possibility of a full dress rehearsal for 
Armageddon to the east, are brutal re­




No reviewer feels he has earned his crust 
unless he signs off with a few formal 
quibbles. Most of mine have been aired 
already, but I would add that Antonio 
Bonfini can hardly have entered the ser­
vice of Matthias Corvinus in 1586 if, as 
the author claims, he had already died in 
1503. Secondly, the editors (I presume) 
have chosen to locate a celebrated 
painters' colony in Transylvania at a place 
called "Neustadt"; but it makes no sense 
to mystify readers in this way when a 
town associated with a whole school of 
painting (far too cursorily treated here, by 
the way) is always known by its
Hungarian name of Nagybánya. (On the 
other hand, alert readers will find all 
three names—German, Romanian and 
Hungarian—listed in a different context 
on the previous page). Lastly, and far 
more seriously, the usefulness of the 
book for student and general reader alike 
is drastically diminished by the absence of 
an index. Until Hungarian publishers have 
the grace to supply all translations of 
textbooks and scholarly works with in­
dexes, the contempt in which they obvi­
ously hold the potential readers of their 
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Life's Banalities
Mihály Komis: Napkönyv (Sunbook). Pesti Szalon, 1994, 196 pp. • György Spiró: 
T-boy. Ab Ovo, 1994, 172 pp. • Balázs Győré: Mindenki keresse a saját halálát 
(Let Everyone Look for His Own Death). Cserépfalvi, 1993, 147 pp.
M ihály Komis, the author of several well-received plays and books of fic­
tion and non-fiction, is of the same age as 
the overthrown communist regime in 
Hungary. His new book Napkönyv (Sun- 
book), highly personal in tone, reveals that 
he was never as miserable and desperate 
during the forty years of that communism 
as he was during the four years which fol­
lowed its demise. Sunbook is inspired by a 
need to put into words his state of mind in 
a kind of diary, a reflection on the early 
1990s. Yet it is far from being a normal di­
ary as such: Komis records his days while 
turning his eye on the Sun, both in a literal 
and figurative sense. (Nap means both 
"day" and sun" in Hungarian.) By the Sun, 
he means a kind of constancy, or indeed 
eternity. His personal present and past are 
set in a mythical or spiritual perspective, 
introspection is transformed into a search 
for God and repentance, and the portrayal 
of the present is transformed into an apoc­
alyptic vision. This is an internal mono­
logue of a complex texture, blending a 
great range of themes and tones, feverishly 
and luxuriously, occasionally overflowing 
to profane prayer or litany.
Miklós Györffy
is our regular reviewer of new fiction.
The central motif of the first part, 
"Invocation", is death and the graveyard. 
Komis conjures up his dead at their graves 
in the Budapest Jewish cemetery. A malad­
justed man and writer calls on his ances­
tors, without really knowing why. Though 
the visitor in the book is called Tábor, 
Komis openly speaks of himself and his 
family. Now over forty, he feels his life has 
turned out to be a failure. Nothing has 
come of his youthful dreams; indeed, look­
ing back from maturity, youth seems a 
dream, a paradise lost. Kornis's distracted 
monologue is one of complaint, reckoning 
and self-reproach. A recurring theme is 
sterility, the Great Book that has been 
postponed and is already overdue. Kornis 
obviously intends this Sunbook (which is 
supposed to be continued later) to fulfil a 
promise he once made to himself, to justi­
fy his existence to himself (and perhaps to 
his God). Naturally, he is fully aware of the 
fact that such books are no longer needed 
by anyone.
The subtitle is "The hero of our story". 
The hero of Kornis's stoiy (in this suppos­
edly first volume) is none other than him­
self, placed in that somewhat ironical per­
spective the subtitle suggests. Standing be­
fore the slowly disappearing graves of his 
parents and grandparents, the hero sum­
mons up his memories of them, engages in 
dialogue with them, and ritually identifies
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himself with them by eating the cemetery 
soil. A defiantly blasphemous and narcis­
sistic monologue, verbally glittering, some­
times in the form of vers libre and flowing 
associations, reflections and historical mo­
saics, sets out the basic epic situation of 
the book. On the one hand, there is the 
writer who is chronically blocked yet, as 
the pages show, is finally and triumphantly 
writing, though not liberated from his 
doubts, fears, failures, and agonies; on the 
other, there are his relatives, long gone 
characters from the Jewish petty bour­
geoisie of Budapest, whom memory has 
transfigured into victims, as representa­
tives of the past and the present, our in­
creasingly barbarous nineties.
The second part, "Daytime", concerns 
the writer's present in Budapest, the 
"savour" of his life. It is about the city, the 
streets and houses where he once lived 
and walked, and which now, when he re­
visits them, flood him with childhood 
memories. It is about a "heat wave”, which 
with its scorching, blinding heat and "ca­
daverous colour" conjures up horrid vi­
sions, apocalyptic visions of the godless­
ness of the nineties, of wickedness, cruelty, 
chaotic sell-out, diabolic people, and 
senseless brutality. The desolate Budapest 
of the 1950s and his childhood radiate an 
idyllic and nostalgic mood; all the embit­
tered, spent adult sees are threatening, sin­
ister signs, and this subjective view obsti­
nately ignores some of the historical facts.
"Daytime" centres around the rescue of 
a dog, which develops into a parable and 
the climax of the whole book, presented 
with amazing virtuosity. It is about a 
"Somebody", a ridiculously unimportant 
being, a puppy which has fallen into a 
roadside ditch and has been howling there 
for days, left to itself, a piece of matted 
grime. The writer "treacherously" flees 
from its reproachful, supplicant glance, 
but returns next day, like a criminal to the
scene of his crime. Although he feels an 
urgent need to act, he is unable to do so. 
Almost demented, he rings up and tries to 
get various societies to act; after countless 
failures, he finally happens on a fanatic 
devoted to saving dogs. Both the events 
and their presentation are so intense, have 
so many conceptual and stylistic shades 
added, that the whole part turns into a 
witty, self-ironic, splendidly grotesque and 
hysterically funny story and a cosmic in­
dictment tempting providence.
Sunbook is the book of a quarrel with 
God, now sought for, now disowned, and 
now found again. In his exorbitantly sub­
jective, narcissistic language, Komis seeks 
a place for his individual self, his person as 
a writer, a Jew and a man, his vanity and 
his guilt in the late 20th century. The third 
part, "Night", consists of a single chapter 
subtitled "Submersion", which develops 
precisely this aspect of the book. Here we 
have memories about himself, visions, 
supplications, confessions swirling togeth­
er, in which the precise identity of the nar­
rator becomes blurred: the childhood and 
adult selves of the writer shade into one 
another, and even the ancestors have a 
share. "The hero of our story" is no longer 
simply Mihály Komis, the eminent, some­
what frustrated middle-aged writer, but all 
the experiences, instincts, observations, 
and memories that live within him.
György Spiró, three years Kornis’s se­
nior, also has a devastating opinion of the 
1990s. With a considerable body of work 
to his name (plays, novels and volumes of 
stories and essays), Spiró is now mainly 
active as the artistic director of the reper­
tory theatre company at Szolnok. Almost 
as an exercise in maintaining his literary 
skills, as it were, he has now published 
cursory "horror stories". The title, T-boy, is 
as senseless a pun as some of the stories 
are crazy and absurd. (T-boy" in Hunga­
rian reads as téboly, which means frenzy,
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bedlam.) Most of the stories in the vol­
ume—some of them in the form of scarce­
ly disguised parables—reflect on the latest 
developments in Eastern Europe, or per­
haps in the world. Spiró takes it almost as 
a fact that history is a senseless massacre 
and destruction, in which sooner or later 
everyone has to take their turn. Ruin, fren­
zy, catastrophe and the end lie hidden in 
every corner, however sheltered and se­
cure it may seem, and slowly and methodi­
cally consume everything and everybody.
Most of the horror stories, presented in 
an ostentatiously plain style, seem to be 
events or life stories not worthy of men­
tion; they play down even the dreadful dé- 
nouements as routine turns. The protago­
nist of "Antique" marries and has children 
late, owing to all kinds of familiar vicissi­
tudes; by then he can no longer think of 
anything else but of how to save his family 
and his "happiness" from even greater im­
pending catastrophes. Seemingly nothing 
happens, his wife does not even under­
stand her husband's morbid dread, but fi­
nally fate emerges from within the man 
himself, and he wipes out his whole fami­
ly. "Before he blew out his brains, it oc­
curred to him that he ought perhaps leave 
behind some paper in which he would ex­
plain things, or in which he would call the 
attention of the UN, or some similar pa­
thetic thing, but then he just gestured, 
what does it matter, it is too late, it was 
too late even before he was born." In "The 
Experiment", public servants for some un­
known reason chain a number of captives 
to arcades in the centre of town, and then 
abandon them. The experiment turns out a 
great success, after a few days' time no 
one bothers about the prisoners or thinks 
of releasing them. They have become part 
of the townscape, first in tattered rags and 
later naked, in their own excrement, wait­
ing perhaps to be cleared away. "Synopsis" 
is an ostentatiously transparent caricature
of a parable, which in the frame of a 
prison story provides a synopsis of what, 
according to Spiró, has taken place here in 
Hungary during the first four years of the 
new political system. He passes a summa­
ry judgment: an absurd comedy is going 
on that will not change anything of impor­
tance. Several other stories are similarly 
improvised marginal notes to an imperti­
nent pamphlet on the processes taking 
place in this region.
Some of the horror stories portray 
Spiro's current mood in the form of a 
weird irrationality. In "Rekk" a woman, 
taking her small child, goes abroad to 
meet her lover; the child disturbs their 
téte-á-tétes, so she drowns it. Back at 
home she says she has temporarily left the 
child abroad. Finally it turns out that she 
has done away with it, but since there is 
no corpus delicti, the case becomes more 
and more irksome for the police, until fi­
nally the drowned corpse itself appears at 
the police station. This, however, is so in­
explicable that now it is the police who 
have it conjured away. In another story, a 
man is living a settled family life until sud­
denly he starts growing a second penis, 
causing complications in his marital love- 
making. So they hire a second woman for 
the second organ, which leads to further 
complications. In a refreshing contrast to 
the absurd story, Spiro’s phrasing, all witty 
superiority and off-hand gesture, gives the 
impression that it is of no importance 
whatever to him to tell these trifling sto­
ries. "It would be good," he writes at the 
end of the last mentioned story, "if this 
story had a happy ending, but then life is 
indeed cruel, and far from having a happy 
ending, this story has not even an unhappy 
end. I think the best thing for everybody 
would have been if all the characters had 
retired to a convent."
T-boy also includes stories that are to 
be taken more seriously. These are of a
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more personal inspiration, like "Slave Re­
volt", in which the narrator contemplates 
the razor he has inherited from his father: 
it linked him into a chain, against which 
he can rebel at most as a slave rebels 
against his fate. "Bridge" is inspired by a 
similar thought: his father, his dead first 
wife and the best friend living abroad are 
bridges which have enabled him to be­
come enriched by new heads alongside his 
own head. It is ridiculous to attempt to re­
main his own self throughout, since one 
can only exist as a link in a chain.
The horror stories in T-boy are improvi­
sations dashed off with easy routine. 
Thanks to Spiro's witty, cool and frivolous 
style and black humour, some of them are 
fairly successful. However, some of the 
pieces are strained and concocted. Know­
ing Spiro's basic point of departure, one 
might well ask whether the frightening 
prospects of this fin de siécle look so petty 
and everyday when seen by a superior out­
sider. Is Kornis's profound personal con­
cern not more authentic and fascinating?
Born in 1951, Balázs Győré more or less belongs to Kornis's and Spiro's gener­
ation. So far he has been better known for 
his poetiy, publishing his first book of fic­
tion in 1989. A "journal novel", it is called 
A 91-esen nyugodtan elalhatok (I Can 
Safely Fall Asleep on the 91). This he re­
cently followed up with Mindenki keresse 
a saját halálát (Let Everyone Look for His 
Own Death). The title is a quotation from 
Utas és holdvilág (The Wayfarer and 
Moonlight), a novel by Antal Szerb, the 
essayist and novelist killed in the 
Holocaust. One of the two long stories in 
Györe's new volume takes its subject 
from this novel. Szerb's book is about 
youthful dreams and a yearning for for­
eign parts, about friendships and pas­
sions, the deadly risks of delusions and 
about sobering evanescence. Györe's sto­
ry has similar characters and situations. A 
specific fascination lies in featuring real 
persons under their real names. They are 
former friends of the writer, "who have 
their domicile and personality not only in 
these pages but lived, live and will live 
forever in reality as well." One of them is 
called János Szerb, the son of Antal 
Szerb's widow (though not Antal Szerb's). 
János was a poet and Tibetan scholar, 
who died young, and as presented here, 
his life in many respects resembled that of 
Tamás Ulpius, one of the characters in 
The Wayfarer and Moonlight.
The youthful days conjured up from the 
early 1990s took place in the first half of 
the 1970s. Győré relates the story of János 
Szerb and the circle of friends around him 
tautly and concisely, in the matter-of-fact 
manner of minute-taking, at places almost 
giving the impression of naivety. The story 
itself is made up of short sections, scenes 
and memories. A critic remarked: "Balázs 
Györe's prose expresses the weight of oth­
erwise unnoticed motifs. He carries this 
out at the dictate of an implacable logic by 
which life devours everything—the impor­
tant just as much as the seemingly less im­
portant—and as a consequence everything 
for a moment appears in an equally strong 
light. This logic is rarely evident so openly 
and, despite the profound emotions, so re­
lentlessly in Hungarian fiction. Or is it per­
haps possible that all profound emotions 
are relentless?"
Györe's main topic concerns friendship 
and transience. In his friendship with János 
Szerb and János's first wife, Gyöngyi, he ex­
periences transience. János left the country, 
then committed suicide; Gyöngyi married 
again abroad, and comes to visit Hungary 
only rarely. The other story, "... még mindig 
élünk" (We Are Still Alive) is also about a 
friendship which dates back to university 
years. Here the protagonist is Szczepan, a 
young Pole who, after living and studying in
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Hungary, has to go back to Poland and 
there loses the ground from under his feet. 
In Hungary he is a Pole, in Poland a Hunga­
rian; the duality brings about a grave psy­
chological crisis. Gyore conjures up his 
character in a diary-like description of his 
own stays in Poland. "I considered, and still 
consider friendship a very serious thing," 
he writes in his deliberately naive and banal 
manner. "If I have a friend, I meet him 
every day. I want to see him every day. 
Whether or not we have any business with 
each other. I also meet him if we have al­
ready talked about everything. Even if we 
can only feel bored. We are bored together. 
Friendship is very boring and time-consum­
ing. We are sitting, stay silent and are 
bored. This is friendship." The variation and 
dosage of banal statements balanced on 
apothecary's scales lends a singular melan­
cholic and ironic effect to Györe's text. Let 
Everyone Look for His Own Death is a vol­
ume of fiction whose simplicity, detach­
ment and functionalism have been mea­
sured out by the author with the sensitivity 






G y ö r g y  U h r m a n
In the Place of Hungaroton
By the spring of 1994, the production and release of classical records in Hungary 
had practically ceased. According to a gen­
tleman from the State Property Agency, the 
only solution to the problems afflicting the 
former state-owned Hungaroton record 
company was liquidation, or "final ac­
counts", if this sounds better. This dictum 
was a consequence of the "rapid solution" 
the administration initiated in cultural mat­
ters four years ago. This is all the more 
painful because, by the eighties, it was 
Hungaroton that enjoyed the best image 
and highest prestige in the musical world 
of all the similar firms in the socialist coun­
tries. From the late 1960s onwards, the 
company was on an unbroken rise for 
twenty years, establishing a good name 
and reputation for itself, particularly in 
France, Germany, Britain, and the United 
States. Several of its successful projects, 
most notably the Bartók Edition, were 
awarded the Grand Prix du Disque. Young 
collectors and music lovers now, however, 
know nothing of this, even through
György Uhrman,
for many years on the staff of Hungaroton, 
now reviews records for the daily 
Magyar Hírlap.
hearsay, as hardly any new Hungarian CDs 
are available in shops here or abroad. What 
had once been a workmanlike standard 
was by the eighties raised to the front rank 
by soloists like Zoltán Kocsis, András 
Schiff, or Dezső' Ránki, the cellist Miklós 
Perényi, the clarinettist Béla Kovács, 
singers like Júlia Hamari, Sylvia Sass, Ilona 
Tokody, József Gregor, and later Éva 
Marton et al., with recordings of arias as 
well as complete operas and oratorios. 
Reviewers placed the Liszt Ferenc Chamber 
Orchestra, the Budapest Festival Orchestra, 
the Tátrai and the Takács Quartets among 
the best. The technical quality was usually 
of the highest standard. From the late 70s 
onwards, some of the Hungaroton booklets 
accompanying their records equalled the 
splendour of the old luxurious Decca book­
lets (for instance those for Solti's 
Zauberflöte and Rosenkavalier). The book­
lets that went with the 1981-82 centenary 
Bartók and Kodály recordings presented 
Hungaroton as a scholarly publisher of 
musicological works.
The economic crisis of the late 1980s 
did not spare the firm. Against the back­
drop of a declining economy, a growing 
number of bad decisions were taken by the 
management, and their consequences 
could neither be warded off by the exper­
tise or enthusiasm of most of Hungaro­
tont staff, nor by stretching the scope and
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elbowroom of the firm, despite all the ef­
forts to handle the crisis. The new oppor­
tunities that came with the changes natu­
rally pointed towards independence and 
privatization, but at that point, in the sum­
mer of 1990, the new government chose to 
intervene. The blocking of a planned priva­
tization in collaboration with EMI and the 
events and scandals that followed made 
headlines abroad as well as here. It would 
take many pages to tell the story in detail. 
Suffice it to say that what had up to then 
been a profitable enterprise, with good ex­
port earnings, was destroyed. Nor should 
it go unmentioned that the decision mak­
ers were prompted by a number of per­
formers and composers who thought of 
themselves as inadequately represented on 
recordings. But fate plays funny tricks. 
Hungaroton had in fact issued most of 
their works (including lengthy operas)—as 
it did those of practically all living 
Hungarian composers—even though these 
were non-commercial propositions. 
Between 1990 and 1994, however, virtually 
not a single record appeared by contempo­
rary Hungarian composers, including 
those who had been complaining earlier. 
Although a much broader section of the 
musician confraternity protested against 
the new ministerial and enterprise dicta­
torship, regardless of their political views, 
no notice was taken by the greater and 
lesser powers that be. The disastrous 
Hungaroton management, intriguing 
against each other, ended in unavoidable 
failure. Quite simply, these gentlemen de­
stroyed the efforts of decades. The an­
guished warnings and alarmist prophecies 
of 1990 now look like cheerful optimism 
when compared with the outcome. During 
the 1980s, Hungaroton had issued be­
tween sixty and eighty, exceptionally a 
hundred, classical recordings every year. 
Hungaroton Classic Limited, which has 
undertaken to try to save the label, is plan­
ning to release 15 discs this year; some of 
these are archive recordings and for some 
the expenses are being met by the per­
former and possible sponsors.
W h e r e  h a v e  a l l  t h e  a r t i s t s  g o n e ?
From its old monopoly position, Hunga­roton considered it its duty to satisfy all 
kinds of classical music demands. Under 
the conditions of the hoped for competi­
tive market, however, the mushrooming 
new firms would obviously have to estab­
lish more individual profiles. Quint tried its 
hand, with EMI backing. It soon turned 
out, however, that incompetence and 
chaos reigned in the domestic market and, 
with ill-considered imports, the old and 
new firms eliminated themselves from 
competition and deprived themselves of 
export opportunities.
So the best performers have been forced 
to look to record companies abroad. A 
number, including the Liszt Ferenc 
Chamber-Orchestra, have been successful. 
As in the previous decade, Zoltán Kocsis is 
under contract to Philips; after his earlier 
recordings of Bartók works for piano and 
orchestra, he has scored a great critical 
success with the first volume of pieces for 
solo piano, and the continuation is eagerly 
expected. Kocsis will soon record works by 
Rachmaninov, Debussy and Ravel. The con­
ductor Ádám Fischer, who has been work­
ing abroad, is signed to record for the 
British label, Nimbus. He has performed 
Bartók programmes, and conducted several 
Haydn symphonies in Eisenstadt with the 
Austro-Hungarian Haydn Orchestra, which 
fosters the cultural traditions common to 
the two countries. László Polgár had al­
ready earlier worked with Nikolaus 
Harnoncourt. His Leporello in Don 
Giovanni received the highest praise of all 
the soloists in that recording. Andrea Rost's 
much acclaimed soprano would once have
151
Music
had a recording programme lasting for 
years based on it by Hungaroton, as one of 
the lyrical voices of her generation. She 
now appears in Abbado's productions, will 
next be heard in a Deutsche Grammophone 
recording of Mahler's Eighth.
Naxos, reputed for high standards and 
low prices, has placed more Hungarian 
soloists and ensembles onto the interna­
tional market than all other firms taken to­
gether. They singled out Jenő Jandó as 
their star pianist. Jandó already had a siz­
able Hungaroton repertoire, but Naxos 
commissioned him to do full cycles of the 
Mozart and Beethoven sonatas and con­
certos. He is now continuing with Schu­
bert, Brahms and Schumann. Naxos also 
distributes the recordings of the Éder 
Quartet and the steadily improving Kodály 
Quartet. The latter promises to carry on 
the great Hungarian string quartet tradi­
tion that stretches all the way from the 
Léner and the Waldbauer, through the 
Végh and the Hungarian, to the Tátrai, the 
Bartók, and the Takács quartets.
The list could be continued, still, as a 
consequence of the decline of Hungaroton, 
just as many accomplished musicians 
scarcely have access to a studio. As to the 
leading Hungarian symphony orchestras, 
they feature under their own names or oc­
casionally using fancy names on various 
foreign labels, but some of their record­
ings are pirated, with non-existent names 
then frequently imposed on them.
"When will the darkness fade?" Tamino 
asks in The Magic Flute. Well, a glimmer of 
hope has already appeared with the first, 
heartening, signs of revival.
The Budapest Festival Orchestra broke 
the barriers of late-socialist cultural policy 
through its very formation and existence. 
Most recently they have appeared as the 
publisher of their own performances, un­
der the PONTY label. Their first undertak­
ing, with Iván Fischer conducting, was a
clear critical success. They recorded a var­
ied and enjoyable programme of less wide­
ly known works by the younger Bachs in 
the Athens Megaron. Alongside the pieces 
of chamber music and symphonic charac­
ter, (in which noted soloists appeared like 
Péter Szűts, Miklós Spányi, Erika Sebők, 
et al.), the piece de resistance was the solo 
cantata by Johann Christoph Friedrich 
Bach, Die Amerikanerin, with the American 
Claron McFadden appropriately singing 
the solo part.
The other independent initiative has a 
special story all of its own.
T h e  a u t h e n t i c  v e r s i o n  o f  Bánk t á n
By the summer of 1993, the state record company could not afford to pay proper 
tribute to the memory of Ferenc Erkel, the 
founder of Hungarian national opera. One 
year earlier, Hungaroton did release an LP 
with Erkel's piano works, but this is relat­
ed to Erkel's oeuvre in much the same way 
as if songs were made to stand for Cho­
pin's oeuvre. The Hungarian recording in­
dustry—then in its infancy—made no at­
tempt to record the foremost national 
opera under a nationalist regime between 
the wars; similarly, an administration, 
identifying itself with the national tradi­
tion, did not, in 1993, undertake to sponL 
sor the recording of an authentic version 
of Bánk bán. The piece finally became the 
business of a firm that called itself Alpha 
Line (producer: Tamás Benedek). What is 
special about these three CDs (ALR 005- 
07), released in November 1993, is that no 
living soul today could ever have heard the 
best Hungarian romantic opera in this 
form. The same presumably holds true for 
previous generations as well.
One of the successes in the "authentici­
ty" trend that has irresistibly gained ground 
since the 1960s, was the digital recording 
of an earlier Erkel opera, Hunyadi László
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(1985, Hungaroton HCD 12581-83), in the 
reconstructed version by the Erkel scholar, 
Amadé Németh. Ever since that, the recon­
struction of Bánk bán has been thought of 
as timely. The more than 130 years since 
the premiere in 1861 have seen many modi­
fications, greater or lesser, to the score, in 
keeping with the theatrical and other re­
quirements of the day. Erkel himself made 
many cuts and corrections based on experi­
ence of the performances, and during the 
ensuing years, there were many arbitrary 
alterations, by many hands. It is doubtful 
whether the music has ever been heard as 
the composer originally meant it to sound. 
In 1939, the Budapest Opera wanted to put 
an end to this with a drastic revision. The 
fashionable approach of the time called for 
modernization rather than period authen­
ticity. True, Nándor Rékai hardly added 
anything to the music, but he made a great 
many cuts, inserting them in other scenes 
and had them sung by other characters. By 
so doing he changed, or indeed upset, the 
dramatic and musical balance of scenes 
and put characters in a different light in 
many places. Erkel's librettist, Béni Egressy, 
had a good dramatic sense but a poor flair 
for versification. Almost his entire text was 
abandoned, not only due to the obsolete 
vocabulary that sounded unusual and even 
comical to modern ears, but in particular 
because of bad prosody. Kálmán Nádasdy 
and Gusztáv Oláh, who revised the opera, 
went back to the splendid tragedy of the 
same name by József Katona, on which the 
libretto had been based, and they tried to 
accommodate Katona's expressive lines to 
the music. They made considerable 
changes in the scenes, the order of events 
and the parts. All this magnified the faults 
resulting from the all too many alterations 
ruining a once consistent and balanced 
structure. This was particularly evident in 
Acts One and Two. The condensed work 
undoubtedly had a glib fluency on stage,
but this was achieved at the cost of disturb­
ing the logical order and interpretability of 
the score. Nonetheless, this version was 
considered the right one from 1940 on­
wards. (It served as the basis for all stage 
productions and broadcasts, and for two 
recordings.)
In the 1950s, musicologists studied the original manuscript. Finally, the original 
version, or, more precisely, the recon­
structed score, was completed and pub­
lished in the late 1980s by György Bácskai, 
who was at the time on the staff of 
Hungaroton.
In the first and second acts the sections 
that had fallen victim to the 1939 revision 
have in many places been replaced: at cer­
tain points this amounts to some 60 to 100 
bars. In the second half of Act Two, there 
are three set numbers now heard for the 
first time: an Ensemble, a March and the 
Finale. The original order of scenes, the 
original vocal parts and the mutilated 
episodes have also been restored. Erkel 
made good use of what he had learnt from 
his contemporaries, Donizetti and Verdi, 
but in a manner which considerably differs 
from Verdi's. In any event, the original 
structure based on Scene Grandi certainly 
justifies an attempt at resurrection on a 
new disc. As borne out by the new record­
ing, the authentic version is more colour­
ful, more varied, has more contrasts, and is 
more operatic. While the previous versions 
opted for a verismo-styled treatment, now 
at last one gets the opportunity to judge 
the real merits of the opera, and place 
Erkel more accurately in the history of mu­
sic. This is of great importance, even if one 
comes to acknowledge that in the original 
final scene the musical and dramatic in­
vention lags behind that of the previous 
version: in this form the scene comes over 
ambiguously, as it uses less adequate 
means to convey a moving situation.
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The revision of the libretto gives cause for 
less delight. The lines one hears are un­
doubtedly more singable and of a more 
natural prosody, but they mingle literary 
styles which do not quite harmonize.
This comparison of the authentic ver­
sion with the "traditional" one, itself the 
fruit of a series of revisions, naturally 
prompts a comparison of the performance 
itself with earlier recordings: the 1956 
Hungaroton recording conducted by 
Vilmos Komor (LPX 31054-55) and the 
1969 one, under János Ferencsik (HCD 
11376-77). Both were based on stage pro­
ductions of the period, with casts consid­
ered to be ideal, and both abounded in "ac­
tualized motifs". Over the past century and 
a half, the 13th century story of the murder 
of a hated foreign ruler was often used to 
express hatred of foreign oppression and 
to refer to current social conditions. The 
Alpha Line recording lacked such a firm 
theatrical background. In the spring of 
1993, the Hungarian State Opera commem-. 
orated Erkel once again with a revival of 
the Nádasdy-Oláh version, and its only 
new departure was that the production 
moved the setting to the 19th century.
Heading the Hungarian Festival Chorus 
(an ad hoc ensemble) and the Budapest 
Symphonists, Géza Oberfrank conducts 
Erkel's music with verve and empathy in a 
recording of high technical quality. The 
performance of the ensembles and soloists 
is not really fully mature, but it is effective 
in its informal spontaneity. The chorus, 
though of clear delivery, should have pro­
duced a more poised sound, and the or­
chestra more polished ensemble playing. 
The soloists, apart from the King, meet the 
musical demands on them with precision 
and devotion, but only a few of them—for 
example István Gáti as Tiborc and Éva 
Marton's imposing Queen—come close to 
the convincing, powerful renditions the 
great names of the older recordings provid­
ed their characters with. One probable rea­
son for this is that there was hardly anyone 
who had the opportunity to live with their 
role on the stage for any length of time. 
The reliable Tamás Daróczi (in the part of 
Ottó) and Mihály Kálmándi (as Petur) are 
excellent. Ingrid Kertesi is a gifted, well- 
trained singer, but in the part of Melinda 
she is not really an adequate successor to 
the legendary Júlia Osváth. The character 
calls for a tragical bent and the part un­
doubtedly required a lirico spinto type so­
prano. Kertesi is a lyrical coloratura, and 
her voice is simply not where a consider­
able portion of the part would require it to 
be. The dramatic forcefulness is exhausting 
for her voice, which is perhaps why she 
was miked too closely, and in many places 
this led to edginess and distortion. There is 
good reason why Kertesi's Melinda and the 
listener feel happiest in the lyrical moments 
(Berceuse) or the coloratura runs of the 
first finale and the Mad Scenes. (As with 
many casts, here too, one feels a painfully 
missed opportunity: Ilona Tokody's artistry 
and her truly memorable Melinda have 
long cried out to be recorded.)
Éva Marton promised to be a sensation 
as Queen Gertrudis, the personification of 
foreign oppression. After her splendid 
Judit in Bartók's Bluebeard's Castle, one 
placed great hopes in her ability to do well 
for the other important Hungarian opera. 
She did not let us down as regards dra­
matic force, but the great Wagnerian roles 
she has sung in the last decade have left 
their mark on her voice and breath con­
trol. At the time of the recording she was 
also singing Gertrudis on the Budapest 
stage and her vocal weariness could not 
be disguised. The spreading, edgy and 
wobbling top notes, the coarse middle and 
the colourless lower register made 
Gertrudis sound more vulgar and unre­




The Budapest Opera has employed András 
Molnár in a wide variety of roles over the 
past fifteen years. His respectful and ambi­
tious performance this time, too, is that of 
a kind of generalized "heroic" figure, and 
so the passion and suffering of his Bánk 
cannot really be distinguished in deport­
ment, stance and tone from his Lohengrin, 
Don Jósé or Radames. His voice is more 
robust but less bright at the top than it
was formerly, and after some time it be­
comes tiring to listen to his dull and nasal 
middle register. This is perhaps why one 
gets the feeling that compared to the noble 
pathos of the superb Simándy and Ilos- 
falvy, Molnár is merely pathetic. The au­
thentic Bánk needs real nobility in diction. 
And, of course, performance on stage 






T a m á s  K o l t a i
Oh, Distant Oleannaí
—  Howard Baker: Scenes from a Beheading • Dostoevsky: The Uncle's Dream •
—
H ow can society respond to the chal­lenges of art? Will it tolerate the artist 
who shows a picture that is not what soci­
ety expects him to show? Is he considered 
a member of a minority and treated as an 
enemy, or is he looked upon as a buffoon 
to be held in profound contempt? For that 
matter is there any need today for subtlety 
in thought, for artistic sensibility: would it 
not be better for the artist to surrender au­
tonomy and conform?
Some recent new Hungarian produc­
tions address at least some of these ques­
tions.
In Howard Barker's Scenes from a 
Beheading, the doge of Venice commis­
sions the painter Galactia, to represent the 
Battle of Lepanto, in which the Holy 
League of Venice, Spain, and Pope Pius V 
won a decisive victory over the Turkish 
fleet. As a realistic painter, Galactia paints 
a tableau depicting the horror of the mas­
sacre instead of an allegory of victory. The 
patron furiously rejects an approach that 
is in conflict with official perceptions; he 
has her imprisoned on the charge of be­
traying the republic, and gives the com-
Tamás Koltai,
Editor of Színház, a theatre monthly, is our 
regular theatre reviewer.
mission to a more tractable mediocrity, 
who also happens to be Galactia's lover. A 
lady, a critic close to those in power, ex­
plains to the doge that it is Galactia's bril­
liant painting that will represent Venice to 
history, and even in the present it is not 
dangerous, since those who see it will not 
understand it anyway. The tableau is put 
on show, Galactia is released from prison, 
and she is invited to the highest quarters.
Wrapped in this Renaissance mantle, 
the British playwright has written a con­
temporary English play, and this produc­
tion of the Csiky Gergely Theatre in 
Kaposvár has turned it into a contempo­
rary Hungarian play. In Tamás Ascher's 
production, the doge proclaims sugary af­
fection for his artists, as opposed to the 
cardinal, the true keeper of the state's 
conscience, who hates them ex officio, as 
otherwise he would not be fit for the func­
tion as censor in chief. The question is 
what independent artists (in this case a 
painter) can do if they neither want to 
paint pity for the dead (for the Church) nor 
victory (for the state). The answer is that 
they are either rejected or they accomo­
date themselves to what is needed. Barker 
treats the problem somewhat didactically, 
over-simplifying when he brings the adver­
saries to a rapid understanding that is 
both cynical and bitter in tone. His ap­
proach is the typical illusion of a middle-
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class liberal, namely that the ideologues of 
authority are interested in the aesthetic 
imprint they leave behind, and acknowl­
edge, at least among themselves, what is 
valuable and what is not. Indeed, they are 
able to differentiate between the two. 
Apart from this charming West European 
naivety, Scenes from a Beheading is a good 
and clever play.
The Kaposvár production is truly bril­
liant. Tamás Ascher is unsurpassable in the 
way he can create a perfectly functioning 
production using a bare minimum of theatri­
cal means, while what emerges onstage uti­
lizes a maximum of acting power. Especially 
enthralling is Piroska Molnár as Galactia. 
She is able to put over something that is vir­
tually impossible to express on stage, name­
ly talent. Her Galactia, Rubensian as a figure 
(though not in style), whose work is never 
seen on stage, is the perfection of genius. 
The dreadful hands and distorted faces she 
has painted in her canvas of the Battle of 
Lepanto are reflected in her hungry look of 
longing to master life, in her relentless rea­
soning and sensuality, in the way she sizes 
up the model, and in a voluptuous and crude 
desire for justice. They are reflected in her 
conquering a rat-infested prison with a stat­
ue, that is a work of art, and in her smile as 
she listens to the remarks on her painting 
made by incomprehending viewers. Finally, 
there is her bitter grimace with which she 
tosses off a good many drinks before setting 
off for her own "execution", a reception giv­
en by the highest in the state. "Arriving" 
there would amount to conformity, which 
means death for an artist.
The Dostoevsky production at the 
Művész Színház clearly bears out what 
happens when an artist—in this case the 
famous Russian director Anatoly Vasiliev— 
is not willing to conform. This production 
of The Uncle's Dream inspired a degree of 
indignation both on the part of audiences 
and critics. The reason for their indigna­
tion was that on the first night the produc­
tion, proceeding slowly and breaking all 
the rules of psychological realism and the 
audience's customary expectations, went 
on until midnight. Or was this perhaps not 
the only reason?
Dostoevsky's story, "The Uncle's 
Dream", can be summed up briefly. Maria 
Alexandrovna Moskaliova wants to marry 
off Zina, her beautiful daughter, to the el­
derly prince K, not only said to be half-wit­
ted, but even an imitation of a man, moved 
by springs, with a limp and a glass-eye, 
wearing a wig and corsets, even if he does 
have some of the elegance of a man of the 
world. The wedding plan is on the verge of 
success when Mosgliakov, the prince's 
nephew, whom Zina has repeatedly reject­
ed, makes the uncle believe that he has 
wooed the girl only in his dream, and so it 
all comes to nothing. There is also a poor, 
tubercular teacher, whom Zina loves; 
Maria Alexandrovna claims that he could 
be treated using the prince's money, that 
he could even marry Zina as soon as she is 
widowed, which presumedly will not be a 
long way off. Soon after the prince’s pro­
posal, which fails under scandalous cir­
cumstances, both teacher and prince die. 
In the epilogue to Dostoevsky's story, 
three years later Mosgliakov sees Zina 
again, now the beautiful wife of the gover­
nor, at a ball in the "remotest province". 
He stares at her for several hours, rather in 
the manner of Onegin, in a picturesque 
pose leaning against a column, and "a 
gloomy, abstracted expression, a grim, 
Mephistophelean smile never left his face 
throughout the evening."
The stage version takes in the material 
of the story by "reckoning with a director", 
whose principal aim is to leave much to 
the actor. Dostoevsky's dialogue, already 
long, becomes even longer, absorbing part 
of the narrative; allowing the actor to be 
on stage for an extended time, enabling
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him to gradually build up his character. 
The most important element in the pro­
duction is time—not the performance time 
of three and a half hours, which the first 
night audience, most of them theatre peo­
ple, reacted to with hysterical intolerance, 
but the inner time, intended to allow the 
actor to inhabit the role. This is treated 
much more loosely than is customary, and 
the actor is compelled to fill in the frames 
at his disposal with his full personality.
In Vasiliev's production, psychological 
realism does not function in the traditional 
way, there is no cueing, nor are relations 
resolved in physical action and move­
ment—such assistance is almost totally 
missing. Vasiliev's actors are left to their 
own devices (which does not mean that 
the director expects nothing of them, on 
the contrary, he knows exactly what he 
wants); in exchange they are granted ab­
solute freedom which they are supposed 
to use to step up their intensity and lend 
intimacy to their presence. This can be 
dangerous, and if the actor is "empty”, the 
result can be disastrous. If he is not, how­
ever, the acting presence is incomparably 
richer and more substantial than usual. 
The actor who seems to linger passively in 
his role, generates internal processes, but 
instead of building up a role, he pillories 
his own personality, uniting his intuition 
with the situation at his disposal—captur­
ing his own self in the role as it were.
The fact that the director is still very 
much part of the performance is exempli­
fied by the perfect construct which is the 
uncle. The long, black wig, the small 
pointed beard, the up-turned moustaches, 
the corselet operated by a lever, the thick 
gauntlet and the artificial leg correspond 
not only to Dostoevsky's description, but 
also to the "medieval knight" or "trouba­
dour" at the back of the "idiot". The prince 
is both a "construction" and a person; it is 
bravura acting by Dezső Garas that allows
him to present the two in one. Indeed, he 
manages even more: gallantry in simplici­
ty, and an innocent, sensitive and vulnera­
ble childish spirit, living his life as if in a 
dream, in the lisping parrot of a man, 
speaking in clichés, approvingly repeating 
of what others say. His opportunities for 
acting are greatly restricted: he enters, sits 
down in a chair, puts his left foot on a tiny 
foot-stool, and puts his right hand in his 
lap. From then on he remains almost mo­
tionless, at most giving orders for tea to be 
served with rapid head-shakes and gog­
gling. Among ordinary people, behaving 
like puppets, Zina discovers something hu­
man in need of solace in this sad, ridicu­
lous automaton. This is perhaps why she 
has agreed to the wedding, whose failure 
and the spectacle of the offended prince 
move her to a devastating soliloquy at the 
end of the play. In this last scene each of 
them has a copy of their part in their 
hands, not because they did not receive 
their texts in time for the rehearsals, as 
some naive theatre people thought, but 
because they have formally stepped out of 
their parts. "You are the only person here, 
with a moral sense," the actor in the part 
of the prince tells the actress in the part of 
Zina, almost in his own voice and leaves 
the stage without limping.
People cannot be taken for fools, 
Anatoly Vasiliev tells the public with this 
controversial production. The more torpid 
part of the profession and the audience 
was unable to swallow this unusual bite 
and it stuck in their throats. With the cur­
tain rising on ten thousand occasions dur­
ing a season, they have grown unused to 
the idea that, on some evenings, there is 
something happening as well.
The director Gábor Body, who committed suicide a few years ago, was a conspic­
uous type of the nonconforming artist. His 
films earned international and peer recog-
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nition, but he took an interest in the stage 
only on exceptional occasions. The 
provocative Hamlet he directed was seen 
and has been remembered only by a few. 
Now some friends of his have staged a 
production in the Pécs National in his 
memory. This is based on a novel by 
Bryusov, for which Body once wrote a film 
scenario. The film was never made, and 
this stage adaptation was written by 
Vilmos Csapiár and János Szikora (who 
was co-director of the.Body Hamlet).
Fiery Angel, Bryusov's novel of 1908, is 
a major stylistic accomplishment, with its 
authentic medieval iconography and its 
pastiche of the narrative prose of one or 
two hundred years later. Body, however, 
was not concerned with this, rather with 
the irrational passion of modern man, flit­
ting between heaven and hell; this appears 
in the character of the nun, Renata, the 
novel’s heroine, who, for the sake of her 
love, wanders from Christian submission 
into the sacrileges of alchemy, magic and a 
witches' sabbath. Just as Biyusov wrote his 
own self into a character (or perhaps more) 
of the novel, so too has Csaplár's tran­
scription developed, in way of a homage to 
the film scenario, which shyly preserves 
Body's personality. Embedded into a 
framework story, he redoubles the me­
dieval plot and sublimates it into the imag­
inary story of the "film director”—Body.
The transferences, like some system of 
mirrors or a series of those Russian dolls 
that fit into one another, are too complex 
to lend themselves to easy analysis. 
Although the stage version includes some 
rough-and-ready features—for example, 
the framework story itself—it is well suited 
for a spectacle play. This is an area in 
which the director János Szikora is well 
tested. He has raised the seating at the two 
ends of the chamber theatre in Pécs, and 
has the medieval ritual—both Christian 
and satanic—played in the broad run built
diagonally between them. The events in 
the private sphere take place on two 
stages, complete with sets on either side— 
the basic story from the Middle Ages on 
one, and the contemporary framework 
story on the other. The space in the middle 
presents a series of heightened pictures: a 
clerical procession, a hysterical band of 
nuns, satanic temptation (somewhat remi­
niscent of Kawalerowicz's Mater Johanna 
and Whiting's Devils), torture, penitence, 
crucifixion, witches' Sabbath, black magic. 
Szikora's theatre of spectacle involves fer­
tile imagination and considerable profes­
sional skill. The vision of the performance 
is penetrating. Pure Spielberg, you might 
say, borrowed the closing effect of from 
Tony Kushner's play, Angels in America, 
when in a scintillating conclusion the fiery 
angel of the title comes to take away the 
protagonist. This "Annunciation" is also a 
final farewell to a successful alternative 
season in the chamber theatre of the Pécs 
National, now closed down by the man­
agement. This also allows a conclusion to 
be drawn about the likely fate of "elite" 
artistic attempts at a time when commer­
cialism is gaining ground.
The Budapesti Kamaraszínház, a cham­
ber theatre, staged David Mamet's two- 
handed Oleanna in its recently opened sec­
ond studio. Even if the idea of "political 
correctness" has not yet really filtered 
through, the problem tackled in the play— 
the conflict between John, the university 
lecturer in his forties and Carol, his frus­
trated female student—does exist here, 
too. Here, too, there are many who, like 
Carol, see the "enemy" in the intellectual 
who uses "meaningless" foreign words. 
Despite being successful, with a good job, 
family and a fine home, John still indulges 
in being critical of, indeed "irregular" in the 
world to which he owes everything. We are 
defenceless, Mamet suggests, in face of the 
demagogic, feminist aggression at the back
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of Carol's kind of plebeian generational 
class warfare. This he underlines by writing 
two endings to the play. In one, John 
knocks down and kicks Carol. In the other, 
Carol, after being kicked, puts a statement 
of apology before the professor for him to 
sign, together with a list of books which 
the students have decided to ban.
This Budapest production has a third 
ending in which Carol and John, while mu­
tually exchanging slaps, defy each other 
like two enraged beasts. This version, in­
vented by the director, Krisztina Deák, is— 
believe it or not—gentler than the other 
two, ordering a temporary halt in the du­
el—indicating that the game is not over. 
This is all the more justified since the hid­
den aggression that endangers the values 
of a liberal democratic society—the sub­
ject of the play—is for the time being 
somewhat less topical here, inasmuch we 
are only in the process of trying to build a 
liberal democratic society. This, however, 
does not detract from the merit of the pro­
duction, one of the best in recent months. 
The sweet tune about the distant Oleanna, 
where you could live happily, occasionally 
floats in through the open window as the 
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The Media War helped people realize that in a democracy even 
he who holds the highest post is not an all-powerful monarch: 
he has some rights and does not have other rights.
This must have been a pleasant and liberating surprise.
People were able to witness, with a shiver, the fact that a simple 
citizen can stand up and say in public: "Mr Prime Minister,
I have to tell you, with all due respect, that you are mistaken." 
And nothing happens. No siren-wailing police cars coming, 
no courts martial convening, no jail doors slamming. Nothing.
From: Holding the Past: My Days as a Media Chairman 
by Elemér Hankiss, p. 96.
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